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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis tests the predictions of theoretical models of trade and economic geography 
using micro-data from India. As part of a large, poor and rapidly developing country, 
Indian households receive a disproportionate share of attention from development 
economists. However, there remain large gaps in the understanding of its other micro-
entities – firms.  
 
In Chapter 1, I use detailed panel-level data on 8,253 manufacturing firms from 1990 to 
2008 and demonstrate how firms that export differ from their counterparts who cater to 
the domestic market. After identifying the extent to which the act of exporting drives 
these differences, I provide evidence that Indian exporters performed better than non-
exporters at the outset, and that exporting positively impacts further productivity 
increases.  
 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I focus on how economic activity in India organises itself along 
economic geography factors. Chapter 2 studies firms in the Indian informal sector, who 
have largely escaped close scrutiny before. Using data from national sample surveys on 
over 4 million manufacturing and services enterprises, I find that firms choose to locate 
in particular districts across the country. I show that existing agglomeration within these 
locations, such as that of intermediate buyers and suppliers, is driving the location 
decisions of new firms. In Chapter 3, using previously inaccessible data on inward FDI, 
I find that foreign investors also show evidence of clustering and that existing 
agglomeration and the business environment jointly drive this behaviour. In Chapter 4, I 
collect data from the Indian Patent Office and my analysis concludes that regional 
innovation is largely a function of public research and development and economic 
clustering.  
 
In summary, this thesis uses new data and robust methodological approaches to provide 
important economic insights into the workings of firms in India and the factors affecting 
their productivity and their location decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters focussing on aspects of trade and 
agglomeration across firms and districts in India. Each chapter analyses an empirical 
question using data from India. While the first chapter lies squarely in the field of 
empirical trade economics, the second, third and fourth chapters relate more closely to 
the economic geography literature. In Chapter 1, I address the impact of exporting on 
productivity using firm-level data. In Chapters 2 and 3 I study the factors driving the 
location decisions of informal sector firms and of foreign investors respectively. 
Chapter 4 analyses how patenting activity is related to specific attributes of a given 
location. This introduction will provide a brief summary of each of the chapters in the 
thesis and highlight their key findings and contributions.  
 
In Chapter 1, I examine the link between exporting and productivity for manufacturing 
firms in India. I use data for over 8,000 firms for the period 1990-2008 from Prowess, a 
database that tracks firms over time. The database provides me with information on 
inputs and outputs of firms with which I compute a measure of firm-level productivity. I 
also know whether and to what extent firms in the sample export. With this data, I am 
able to isolate the effect that runs from participation in export markets to productivity. 
This long data panel also allows me to differentiate between the within-industry (or 
cross-sectional) effect and the within-firms (or time-series) effect. I also show that 
controlling for any unobserved characteristics of the firm is important, since these could 
be driving the differences between exporters and non-exporters.  
 
The literature demonstrates that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. 
However, two mechanisms could underlie this difference – exporters could be more 
productive than non-exporters because they export, or because they were more 
productive from the outset. Following other influential papers in the literature, I first 
control for the self-selection effect and then compare exporting firms with non-
exporting firms. I use propensity score matching to identify a control group, i.e. a firm 
that does not export but is similar to a given exporter in every observable respect. I find 
that exporters are indeed more productive than non-exporters. This methodology 
provides me with the within-industry average treatment effect. My estimates suggest 
  6 
that entry into export markets increases the productivity of exporters by 11.03 
percentage points. However, the marginal effect of continuing to export is statistically 
insignificant and after five years of exporting, the treatment group (i.e. exporters) are no 
longer different from the control group (i.e. matched non-exporters).  
 
The paper also estimates the treatment-on-treated effect. I exploit the long panel 
characteristics of the data and include firm fixed-effects, which allow me to control for 
any unobservables at the level of the firm and identify the effect of exporting on a given 
firm’s productivity. To isolate the effect that runs from entry into export markets to 
productivity I use effectively applied tariffs faced by firms. The intuition is that a fall in 
tariffs would encourage firms at the margin to start exporting, which would, in turn, 
affect their productivity. After instrumenting with effectively applied tariffs I find that 
starting to export increases productivity by 24.71 percent. However, the robustness tests 
lead me to conclude that the effect of continuing to export remains marginal.  
 
In Chapter 2, I study the location decisions of firms in the informal sector in India, in 
manufacturing and services industries. The informal or the unorganised sector accounts 
for 43 percent of the country’s non-farm net domestic product and employs over 70 
percent of its workforce. Yet, there is little or no understanding of what factors drive 
these enterprises to locate and cluster in particular parts of the country. I take data for 
services enterprises from the 57th Round (2001-02) and manufacturing enterprises from 
the 62nd Round (2005-06) of the National Sample Survey Organisation. The total 
number of new enterprises in each sector exceeds 2 million, and since I use count 
models, my dependent variable is firm births by 2-digit industry and district. I use data 
from the employment and unemployment surveys for the years 1999-2000 and 2004-
2005 to construct intra-industry and inter-industry (input and output) measures of 
agglomeration that vary by 2-digit industry and district. I also control for other 
geographical factors such as industrial diversity, market access and some attributes of 
infrastructure.  
 
I find that intra-industry clustering is of overwhelming importance to informal firms, 
both manufacturing and services, after controlling for industry characteristics. In 
addition, linkages to buyers and suppliers are also important, while the general business 
environment seem to be largely extraneous to firms’ location decisions. To control for 
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the effect of any unobservable sources of natural advantage that may be driving these 
results, I introduce district fixed-effects in my estimation that successfully control for 
any time-invariant characteristics. I find that although the magnitude of the effect of my 
agglomeration variables is smaller, the direction is unaffected and in most cases, the 
coefficients remain significant. I also investigate if firms in the informal sector appear 
to be guided by different motivations to a location than firms in the formal sector, and I 
further explore co-agglomeration of formal and informal activity, across manufacturing 
and services industries.  
 
These results are very much in line with intuition since informal firms might be 
expected to behave differently from those in the formal sector – they may be less 
encumbered by regulatory structures, they could be less sensitive to wage levels since 
they mostly rely on own or family-labour, and they could me more mobile, across 
locations and industries. Indeed I find that the importance of networks of social 
interaction with intermediate goods’ suppliers or final goods’ buyers within a location 
out weighs the importance of infrastructure or institutional factors. And since the effect 
of public policy on generating such clusters seems unclear, I conclude that government 
might be limited in its ability to encourage relocation of informal firms.  
 
Chapter 3 also explores the attributes of districts in India that drive the location 
decisions of firms – except that it studies the case of foreign investors in India. My co-
author and I collect data on over 19,500 foreign investment projects approved in India 
between 1991-2005. The data on investments gives us information on the value, 
industry and importantly, final location of the investment project. Using count and 
conditional logit models, the paper investigates to what extent factors such as 
agglomeration, local business conditions, institutional conditions and the presence of 
previous foreign investors affect the choice of district. In line with other papers in this 
literature, we find that foreign investors have a strong preference for locations where 
other foreign investors are present. This result remains robust across different years, 
sectors and different types of FDI. Indeed, in a number of cases investors seem to 
follow not only other foreign investors but also those from the same country of origin.  
 
The paper also studies the importance of different types of infrastructure - educational, 
financial, transport and power, and of institutions such as labour regulations and social 
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unrest. The impact of access to banks and that of the ease with which states can hire and 
fire workers seems to matter. There is also evidence to indicate that districts in the 
neighbourhood of large metro areas do not benefit, in terms of attracting more FDI, 
from having easier access to larger markets than more remote districts. The paper is 
unable to deal with omitted variables bias since the model does not reach concordance 
with the introduction of location fixed-effects. We conclude that path dependence might 
constrain the influence of regional policymakers.  
 
And lastly, in Chapter 4 I analyse patent applications from firms, individuals and 
research institutions to determine the extent to which research and development 
expenditures and clustering of economic activity within a location affect innovative 
activity. Patent data for India is available from the US, EU and Indian Patent Offices at 
the level of states in the country. Since states in India are often the size of small 
countries and can be many times as populous, this paper attempts to carry out the 
exercise at the level of districts. Data is collected from the weekly journals published by 
the Indian Patent Office, which contain information on the date of the application, name 
and address of the investor and the international patent classification code. Owing to 
limited data on explanatory variables taken from the NSSO, the analysis is restricted to 
pooled cross-sections. The main variables of interest are private R&D expenditures 
within and in neighbouring locations, intra-industry clustering and human capital, 
measured by the proportion of the population with a high-school degree, or with a 
scientific degree.  
 
I find that private R&D expenditures, education and intra-industry, all have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the rate of patenting activity within a district. 
Although the regressors are lagged, I include year, industry and district fixed effects to 
deal with any omitted variables bias. I find that the effect of R&D remains broadly 
stable, that the effect of intra-industry clustering also remains significant and that 
industrial diversity continues to matter. The effect of education also remains broadly 
stable across these specifications. I conclude that public policy might be hard pressed to 
influence private R&D expenditures but that it could play an important role in investing 
in education to raise the level of human capital. 
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These papers contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. India is a large, 
rapidly developing country and whilst it has been of much interest to development 
economists, the lack of sound data has hampered research in other fields. For instance, 
the question of whether or not exporting affects productivity has been around for a 
number of years, and this is a first paper that offers robust empirical findings using data 
from firms in India. Chapter II studies the case of informal firms in India and the factors 
that affect their location decisions. These are firms that account for an overwhelming 
proportion of GDP and employment in the country, and yet that have been ignored in 
previous firm location studies. Chapter III uses a new dataset on the activities of foreign 
investors in India to determine their location choices – lack of data has hindered others 
from tackling the same question. And Chapter IV uses data collected from the Indian 
Patent Office to determine what aspects of a location might encourage patenting 
activity.  
 
This dissertation makes valuable contributions in aspects other than providing a better 
understanding of firm behaviour in India. Chapter 1 is one of the few attempts in the 
empirical trade literature that separates the within-industry effect from the within-firms 
effects. While economists care about the effects of exporting on average industrial 
productivity and to what extent this is driven by the reallocation of productivity across 
firms, they also care about what happens to average firm-level productivity over time. 
The analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is also carried out at the level of the district – a 
spatial unit that corresponds well to American counties or to the EU NUTS 3 
classification, and importantly to Marshall’s notion of agglomeration. I use household 
and enterprise data from the National Sample Survey Organisation, which allows me to 
construct measures of agglomeration across the 604 districts in the country. Studies that 
have analysed FDI stocks and flows or patenting activity in India have done so 
primarily at the level of states. 
 
I also use different techniques to address possible endogeneity bias in these chapters. In 
Chapter 1, I use propensity score matching and instrumental variables techniques to 
control for the self-selection of more productive firms into the export market. Indeed, 
the use of effectively applied tariffs as an instrument to control for self-selection could 
easily be replicated in other studies. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I use industry and location 
fixed effects to control for omitted variables bias.   
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In summary, this dissertation makes some key contributions to the existing empirical 
literature. It does this by using existing data innovatively and by collecting, extracting 
and assembling new data to address important questions in the field of trade and of 
economic geography. Not only does the dissertation apply cutting-edge techniques to 
deal with troubling questions of endogeneity, it also illustrates the shortcomings and the 
applicability of these methods in different settings.  And lastly, it provides important 
economic insights into the workings of firms in India and the factors affecting their 
productivity and their location decisions.  
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Abstract 
 
 
This paper identifies two separate effects – that of exporting on 
productivity across firms, and that of starting to export on productivity 
within firms. It uses detailed panel data from 1990 to 2008 for over 8,000 
manufacturing firms in India across 4-digit product categories. The 
findings show that exporting is associated with a jump in productivity, 
both within industries and within firms, but that this effect tapers over 
time. Entry into export markets has a positive effect on firm performance 
in the very beginning, but there is no evidence of sustained learning-by-
exporting. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F14, D24 
Keywords: Exporting, Productivity, Within Firms versus Across Firms, India 
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1.1  Introduction 
 
In this paper, I examine the link between exporting and productivity for manufacturing 
firms in India. I study firm-level data in India at the National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) level for the period 1990-2008. With the exception of the last few years, this 
period saw significant entry into exports markets – see Figure 1.A.1. I find three main 
results. First, I demonstrate that firms’ productivity is positively related to their 
participation in export markets, across firms and within firms. Second, I show that part 
of the increase in productivity is accounted for by learning-by-exporting, after having 
controlled for any self-selection into exporting. And third, I find that the learning-by-
exporting effect is the highest immediately subsequent to entry into exporting and then 
begins to level off.  
 
An important empirical finding of the literature (Roberts and Tybout 1997, Clerides et 
al 1998, Bernard and Jensen 1999, Van Biesebroeck 2006, Alvarez and Lopez 2005) is 
that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. There are two mechanisms that 
can explain this difference - the first is related to self-selection and the second to 
learning-by-exporting. Exporters may be more productive than their counterparts, who 
only supply the domestic market, simply because more productive firms are able to 
engage in export activity and compete in international markets. The second, more 
important mechanism, and one which this paper will focus on, is learning-by-exporting 
by firms, in other words, post-entry productivity benefits. The idea being that when 
firms enter export markets they gain new knowledge and expertise, which allows them 
to improve their level of efficiency. However, the two effects are not mutually exclusive 
– it is possible that high productivity firms that enter the export market continue to 
improve their productivity because of their exposure to exporting.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The next section provides a 
descriptive overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on exporting and firm 
productivity. Section 1.3 describes the data and shows that exporters are in fact different 
from non-exporters in a number of ways. Section 1.4 outlines the empirical 
specification for unbiased production function estimates, and the identification of gains 
from exporting. Section 1.5 carries out robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.  
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1.2  Theory and Evidence 
 
The potential link between trade and economic growth has been fundamental to 
international and to development economics. This paper concerns itself with the 
question of whether firms achieve higher productivity by becoming exporters.  
 
The empirical and theoretical literatures have moved forward in fits and starts. Earlier 
endogenous growth models (Grossman and Helpman 1991, Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
1991) predicted that international technology diffusion through exposure to export 
markets could boost within-plant productivity1. The traditional export-led growth 
hypothesis (Kaldor 1970, Dixon and Thirlwall 1975) posited that external demand 
would enable firms to exploit economies of scale2 leading to productivity growth. Firms 
could also invest in productivity-enhancing technology in anticipation of larger export 
markets (Yeaple 2005).  
 
Another microeconomic channel is the reallocation of economic activity across firms 
within industries. Models by Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Krugman (1994) 
predicted that average productivity could rise if resources were shifted to industries with 
lower average costs. Heterogeneous firm models (Melitz 2003 and Bernard et al 2003) 
also argue that the existence of trade costs allows only the most productive firms to 
enter export markets. As low productivity firms exit, output and employment are 
reallocated towards higher productivity firms and average industry productivity 
increases. In other words, it is the reallocation of activity across firms, and not within-
firm productivity growth, that drives industry-level productivity.  
 
A slew of papers test the predictions of these theoretical models, and their empirical 
findings demonstrate that differences between exporters and non-exporters could arise 
whether or not exporting enhanced productivity.  
 
                                                
1 Industrial-level productivity could also rise if individual firms’ new technological learning 
spilled-over and positively affected the total stock of knowledge for all firms, thus raising 
aggregate productivity. 
2 Firms move to a lower point on the average cost curve since a rise in output is accompanied by 
a less than proportionate rise in average costs.  
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There are some studies that find little of no evidence of learning-by-exporting. See 
Table 1.A.1 for a summary of some key studies. For instance Bernard and Jensen (1999) 
find that the benefits from exporting for American firms are unclear. Although 
employment, growth and profitability are higher for exporters, productivity and wage 
growth is not superior. Kim (2000) finds only marginal increases in productivity 
following trade liberalisation in Korea. Delgado et al (2002) find evidence of higher 
productivity for exporters versus non-exporters and attribute this to the self-selection of 
more productive firms into the export market. They do not find much evidence to 
support the learning-by-doing hypothesis, and if so, only for younger exporters. 
Castellani (2002) finds evidence of productivity gains associated with increases in 
export intensity. Other studies, such as Isgut (2001) and Clerides et al (1998), the latter 
using data from several countries, also conclude in favour of the self-selection and 
against the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Only the most productive firms have a 
sufficient cost advantage to overcome transportation costs and compete internationally. 
Exporters are more productive than non-exporters, not because there are any benefits 
associated with export activities, but they are simply more productive at the outset. 
Some studies look at trade liberalisation in general and not just exporting. Hung et al 
(2004) find that exporting activity itself does not seem to promote productivity in the 
US, and that it is import competition that attributed for the largest part of labour 
productivity growth in manufacturing during 1996-2001. Pavcnik (2002) and Fernandes 
(2007) find that it is trade liberalisation more generally that has a strong positive impact 
on firm-level productivity, in Chile and Columbia, respectively. Indeed the former is 
one of the few papers in the literature that is able to identify both, the within-industry 
and the within-plant effects. 
 
However, some studies do find empirical support for post-entry productivity gains. For 
instance, Kraay (1999) for China, Bigsten et al (2004) for sub-Saharan Africa, and Aw 
et al (2000) for Taiwan, find evidence of learning-by-exporting. Loecker (2007) finds 
that Slovenian export entrants become more productive once they start exporting, and 
that the productivity gap between exporters and their domestic counterparts widens over 
time. He also finds that productivity gains are higher for firms exporting to higher-
income regions. Biesebroek (2005) finds evidence that sub-Saharan exporters are more 
productive than their counterparts who only serve the domestic market, and that the 
former enjoy increasing rates of productivity growth. Other examples of some studies 
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are Castellani (2002), Baldwin and Gu (2003, 2004), Blalock and Gertler (2004), Girma 
et al. (2004) and Greenaway and Kneller (2008). Park et al (2010) study firms in China 
and find that the productivity gains are greater for firms that export to more developed 
markets. However, not all studies are able to describe the source of these learning 
effects. A notable exception is Baldwin and Gu (2004). From their analysis of Canadian 
plants they conclude that exporters learn from participation in export markets through 
channels that include new innovations, as well as technology transfer from abroad and 
investments in absorptive capacity such as human capital. 
 
A recent working paper by Tabrizy and Trofimenko (2010) studies the effect of 
exporting on productivity for firms in India. They find no evidence of post-entry 
productivity gains and conclude that productivity differences between exporters and 
non-exporters are explained only by self-selection. There are some crucial differences 
between this paper and their study. Although the sample of firms comes from the same 
data source, their period of study covers only a ten-year period (1998-2008) whilst this 
paper studies firms over a twenty-year period (1989-2008). Additionally their measure 
of productivity, which has been calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin techniques, controls 
for simultaneity bias but does not control for endogenous exit. As capital-intensive 
firms are better able to weather a negative productivity shock and thus more likely to 
survive in the market, and since exporters also tend to be more capital-intensive than 
non-exporters, this suggests that their productivity estimate does not account for the 
large downward bias on the capital coefficient. They also deflate firm-level data using a 
national wholesale price index and not industry-specific input and output deflators. 
Most importantly, their paper describes pre- and post-entry productivity differentials 
between exporters and non-exporters mainly by using dummy variables for different 
types of exporting behaviour.  
 
It is interesting that for the same countries different studies find confirming or 
conflicting evidence of learning-by-exporting effects, albeit, not always for overlapping 
periods in time. For instance, both papers that study the United States (Bernard and 
Jensen 1999, and Hung et al 2004) find no evidence of learning-by-exporting. There are 
three studies for Germany, of which the first finds a positive result (Bernard and 
Wagner 1997), while the later two (Wagner 2002, and Arnold and Hussinger 2004) find 
no effect. Both studies for the United Kingdom (Girma et al 1004 and Greenaway and 
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Kneller 2008) find positive effects. For Columbia, the first two studies (Clerides et al 
1998 and Isgut 2001) find no evidence, while a later study (Fernandes 2007) finds some 
evidence. It seems that if a study focuses on a developed country or if it uses cross 
sectional analysis, it is less likely to find learning-by-exporting effects. 
 
It is also possible that firms in developing countries that are further away from the 
technological frontier and that export to other, perhaps more developed markets, also 
make larger strides in productivity increases. According to the Global Economic 
Prospects report (World Bank 2008), progress in developing countries reflects the 
absorption of pre-existing technologies and not at-the-frontier inventions. The 
technology achievement index3 for developing countries clearly shows that India is a 
laggard with a score of 0.04 – the highest value is 0.25 for the United States. Thus, one 
might expect Indian exporters to enjoy large productivity increases as compared their 
other domestic counterparts, whilst US exporters may not be much more productive 
than non-exporters. 
 
 
1.3  Data and preliminary analysis 
 
1.3.1. Data description 
Firm-level data on output and inputs is drawn from the Prowess database. Prowess is a 
corporate database that contains normalised data built on a sound understanding of 
disclosures of over 20,000 companies in India. The database provides financial 
statements, ratio analysis, fund flows, product profiles, returns and risks on the stock 
market etc. The Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE), which collects 
data from 1989 onwards, assembles the Prowess database. The database contains 
information on 23,168 firms in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services for the 
years 1989 – 2008, yielding a total of 437,283 observations. On average there are 8 
                                                
3 The technology achievement index is published by the United Nations Development 
Programme and combines (a) the indicators of human skills (mean years of schooling in the 
population age 15 and older and enrollment ratio for tertiary-level science programs); (b) the 
diffusion of old innovations (electricity consumption per capita and telephones per capita) and 
of recent innovations (Internet hosts per capita and high- and medium-tech exports as a share of 
all exports); and (c) the creation of technology (patents granted to residents per capita and 
receipts of royalties and license fees from abroad). The index is constructed as simple averages 
of these indicators within subgroups and then across groups. 
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years of data on each firm. However, data are either not available or are reported as 
missing values for a number of observations for different variables such as sales, capital 
stock and wages. This paper focuses mainly on firms in the manufacturing sector, since 
their exporting behaviour is more easily observable. After cleaning the data4, the final 
dataset contains 8,253 firms for the years 1989-2008, yielding a total of 69,286 
observations.  
 
Table 1.1: Data Summary 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Firms (#) 8,253    
Observations (#) 69,286      
Sales 1,103 10,556 0 842,770 
Gross Assets 1,881 19,614 0 1,352,683 
Investment 24 250 0 14,239 
Wage Bill 92 901 0 56,568 
Raw Materials Bill 523 4,591 0.03 269,567 
Electricity Bills 50 345 0 14,989 
Age 19 18 0.25 173 
Note: Sales, assets, wages, raw materials and electricity are reported in INR ’000s. 
 
There is a large degree of firm heterogeneity in terms of size and age – see Table 1.1. 
Firms in the sample also include both exporters and non-exporters – a total of 5,191 
firms enter the export market at least once over the period of study. Some caveats 
should be mentioned here. It is not mandatory for firms to supply data to the CMIE, and 
one cannot tell exactly how representative of the industry is the membership of the 
firms in the organisation. Prowess covers 60-70 percent of the organised sector in India, 
75 percent of corporate taxes and 95 percent of excise duties collected by the 
Government of India (Goldberg et al 20105). Large firms, which account for a large 
percentage of industrial production and foreign trade, are usually members of the CMIE 
and are more likely to be included in the database. This also explains why more than 
60% of the firms in the sample enter the export market at some point over their lifetime. 
And so, the analysis is based on a sample of firms that is, in all probability, taken 
disproportionately from the higher end of the size distribution. As Tybout and 
                                                
4 I exclude observations for which data on sales, gross assets and wages are missing. I check 
whether these values are systematically missing for particular industries, years or types of firm 
(by age, and by type of ownership), and find that this is not the case.  
5 Quoted in earlier version of NBER working paper. 
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Westbrook (1994) point out, a lot of productivity growth comes from larger plants, and 
so a more comprehensive study might have found smaller average residual effects.  
 
1.3.2 Preliminary Analysis: Are exporters different? 
At the outset I am interested in knowing whether the facts found in the literature – that 
exporters differ from non-exporters – also hold for firms in India. By regressing firm 
characteristics on a dummy for whether the firm exports, a number of studies have 
documented that exporters differ from non-exporters in important ways. Following 
Bernard and Jensen (1999) and others, I run the following OLS regression that tells me 
whether firms that export are different from those that don’t: 
 
€ 
ln xit = α + βEXPit + γControlsit + δ tTimet + λkIndk
k
∑ + ξ jDistrict j
j
∑ +ε ikt
t
∑  (1) 
where 
€ 
x  refers to the characteristics of firm 
€ 
i  at year 
€ 
t  active in industry 
€ 
k  in district 
€ 
j , 
€ 
EXP  is an export dummy equal to one when the firm is an exporter and zero 
otherwise. Firm-specific controls include the size (number of employees), the age and 
the type of firm (private domestic, private foreign, public or mixed). I also control for 
industry, year and location effects, where subscripts 
€ 
k , 
€ 
t  and 
€ 
j  run through the number 
of industries 
€ 
(Ind), years 
€ 
(Time), and districts (
€ 
District ) respectively. In total, there are 
22 2-digit NIC industries, 20 years (1989-2008) and 265 districts. The coefficient 
€ 
β 
reveals to what extent exporters differ from non-exporters, within the same year, 
industry and district. The results are presented in column (1) of Table 1.2.  
 
However, this regression doesn’t say anything about whether there is something about 
the act of exporting that makes exporters different from non-exporters. Indeed, if I re-
run regression (1), comparing exporters with non-exporters before the former started to 
export, I find that exporters were different from the outset – see column (2) of Table 
1.2. 
 
Thus, to know if exporting is truly associated with any changes in firm characteristics, I 
run the following OLS regression that tells me whether participation in export markets 
is associated with differential characteristics for a given firm: 
 
€ 
ln xit = α + βEXPit + γControlsit + δ iFirmi + δ tTimet
t
∑ +ε it
i
∑    (2) 
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where 
€ 
x  refers to the characteristics of firm 
€ 
i  at time 
€ 
t  active in any particular industry 
and location. 
€ 
EXP  is an export dummy equal to one when the firm exports and zero 
otherwise. Firm-specific controls include the size and the age of the firm. The difference 
is that since I am now mainly interested in within-firm variation with regards to 
exporting over time, I include firm and year fixed effects. The coefficient 
€ 
β reveals 
whether a given firm is different with regard to exporting. The results are reported in 
column (3) of Table1.2. 
 
The results show that exporters are indeed different from non-exporters: they have a 
higher wage bill (128 per cent higher), operate on a larger scale, add higher value, sell 
more and invest more than non-exporters. However, this is not very informative in itself 
because exporters were different from the outset. Thus, what is pertinent is that, for a 
given firm, participation in export markets is associated with a higher wage bill (57 per 
cent higher), more assets, more value added, higher sales and more investment.  
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Table 1.2: Firm characteristics and exporting 
Firm Characteristic  
€ 
β 
€ 
R2  
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Average wage bill 1.28*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.73 0.77 0.90 
Gross Assets 1.12*** 0.55*** 0.41*** 0.68 0.75 0.92 
Gross value added 1.33*** 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.68 0.75 0.86 
Sales 1.53*** 0.59*** 0.81*** 0.65 0.70 0.84 
Investment 1.02*** 0.41*** 0.27*** 0.60 0.72 0.65 
Productivity 0.11***    0.08** 0.26*** 0.76 0.75 0.83 
Observations 
(min/max) 34,429/41,118 12,743/16,407 38,759/41,920 
  
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Specification (1) refers to Equation (1), wherein industry, district and year fixed-effects are 
included; Specification (2) is similar, except that exporters are compared with non-exporters before they started to export; Specification (3) 
refers to Equation (2) wherein firm and year fixed effects are included.   
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While others in this field have compared exporters to non-exporters within a given 
industry, location and/or year and found differences (see Table 1.A.1), the data for firms 
in India clearly shows that these differences could easily be driven by intrinsic pre-
exporting differences. And that only by studying firm characteristics for a given firm 
can one truly identify the association, if any, between the act of exporting and 
productivity.  
 
It should be kept in mind that nominal values are deflated using NIC 2-digit level output 
and input specific price indices. Since more productive firms are likely to have a lower-
than-average firm specific price, the use of industry price indices might systematically 
underestimate the output of more productive firms and therefore underestimate their 
productivity. On the other hand, if exporters were more likely to use better quality 
inputs and materials, then using industry-specific deflators would overestimate 
productivity. The converse would be true for less productive firms. In the absence of 
firm-specific prices I am unable to overcome this bias. 
 
The strong positive association between a given firm’s characteristics and its 
participation in export markets could reflect the decision of better firms to self select 
into the export market and/or it could reflect the effect of exporting on the firm. 
Ultimately I am interested in the effect of exporting on productivity - as Paul Krugman 
said ‘Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything’6. The 
next chapter will deal with the computation of productivity and will then go on to 
disentangling the effect of exporting on productivity by controlling for the self-selection 
effect, across firms and within firms.  
 
1.4  Empirical Specification 
 
Following the influential papers of Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Clerides et al (1998), 
the literature has used mainly two methods to measure learning-by-exporting effects. 
The first method consists of separating the sample into mutually exclusive groups, such 
as exporters and non-exporters, to assess differences in plant performance between 
these groups (see Loecker 2007, Greenaway and Kneller 2008, Girma el al 2004). The 
                                                
6 Paul Krugman (1994) The Age of Diminished Expectations, MIT Press. 
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second method of measurement of learning-by-exporting effects consists of one or more 
dummies for lagged export participation in a regression explaining some measure of 
firm performance. For example, Clerides et al (1998) regress average variable costs on 
lagged export participation controlling for real exchange rate, lagged capital stock and 
lagged average variable costs. Kraay (1999) regresses three alternative measures of 
performance (labour productivity, TFP, and unit costs) on lagged export participation, 
lagged performance and firm fixed effects. Bigsten et al (2004) and Van Biesebroeck 
(2004) estimate production functions with a lagged export participation dummy added 
as a shifter of total factor productivity. 
 
The measure of plant performance used in this paper to assess the presence of learning-
by-exporting effects is total factor productivity (TFP)7. I will use both methods, 
propensity score matching to separate the sample into two mutually exclusive groups 
and instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect of exporting on firm-level 
productivity. 
 
1.4.1 Estimating Productivity 
The estimation of production functions can be affected by two different sources of bias. 
Since firms’ inputs and outputs are simultaneously chosen, inputs will be correlated 
with any shocks, say demand or productivity shocks, that would be captured in the error 
term and coefficient estimates will be biased. Under fairly general assumptions8, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show that under simple OLS estimations the labour co-
efficient will be upward biased and the capital co-efficient will be downward biased, 
implying that productivity estimates will be upward biased for more capital-intensive 
firms (such as exporters).  On the other hand, the selection problem is generated by the 
relationship between the unobserved productivity variable and the shutdown decision. 
In this case, firms’ choices on whether to exit the export market depend on their 
productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) obtain consistent production function estimates 
                                                
7 TFP measures the economic and technical efficiency with which resources are converted into 
products.  
8 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) consider the bias in three different cases: when only labour 
responds to the shock and capital is not correlated with labour (the labour co-efficient will be 
biased upwards, and the capital co-efficient will be unbiased); when only labour responds to the 
shock and capital and labour are positively correlated (the labour co-efficient will be biased 
upwards, and the capital co-efficient will be biased downwards); when labour and capital 
respond to the shock, the two are positively correlated and labour responds more strongly to the 
shock (the labour co-efficient will be biased upwards and the capital co-efficient will be biased 
downwards).  
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controlling for the fact that firms’ choices on whether to exit the market depends on 
their productivity9.  
 
This paper follows Olley and Pakes (1996) – henceforth referred to as OP – to obtain 
consistent production function estimates. The OP approach uses investment to control 
for the simultaneity between inputs and outputs. Consider the following production 
function: 
 
€ 
Yit = AitLitβ l Iitβ i Kitβ k  
 
where 
€ 
Yit  is output, 
€ 
Ait  is total factor productivity, and 
€ 
Lit ,Kit ,Iit  represent labour, 
capital and investment, respectively. TFP is modelled as: 
 
€ 
Ait = exp(ω it +ε it )  
 
where 
€ 
ω it  is a firm-specific productivity shock known to the firm manager, but 
unknown to the econometrician, and 
€ 
ε it  is a zero-mean productivity shock realised after 
variable inputs have been chosen. 
 
The production function of a given firm is described as follows, where output is 
expressed as a function of the log of inputs and shocks: 
 
€ 
yit = β0 + βl lit + βkkit + βiiit +ω it +ε it        (3) 
 
As mentioned above, there is a possibility that the coefficients on the variable input, i.e. 
labour, are upwardly biased and that there is a corresponding downward bias in the 
coefficient on the quasi-fixed input, i.e. capital. To obtain consistent production 
function estimates, I use the OP procedure. Estimation proceeds in two stages. In the 
first stage, the coefficients on labour are obtained by semi-parametric techniques. It is 
assumed that a firm’s demand for investment increases monotonically with productivity, 
conditional on capital. Then the inverse of the investment demand function depends 
only on observable inputs and capital, and its non-parametric estimate can be used to 
                                                
9 Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment as a proxy to control for the simultaneity problem, i.e. 
when inputs are endogenous to productivity.  
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control for unobservable productivity, removing the simultaneity bias. Since 
productivity is assumed to affect capital with a lag10, there is no simultaneity problem in 
estimating the coefficient on capital. Loecker (2010) argues that if firms that export are 
also firms that invest more, then using the OP procedure would overestimate the capital 
coefficient and underestimate the returns from exporting. I do not include past exporting 
experience when estimating productivity. 
 
The OP procedure also controls for the endogeneity of firm exit by computing survival 
probabilities for the firm. The probability that the firm survives in the market depends 
on lagged values of capital and the proxy for productivity. These probabilities control 
for the selection bias and are based on some threshold of productivity below which a 
firm exits the market. The survival probabilities are then introduced into the production 
function to generate the coefficient on capital. In Appendix A, I discuss the estimation 
algorithm for getting reliable estimates of the production function in more detail. 
Nominal values have been deflated using output (sales) and input (labour, capital, 
investment) deflators11.  
 
I re-run Equations (1) and (2) with the computed measure of unbiased productivity as 
the dependent variable. Recall that the first regression controls for district, industry, 
year and group fixed effects and that the second controls for year and firm fixed effects. 
I find that exporters are 11 per cent more productive than non-exporters. More 
importantly, I find that for a given firm, exporting is associated with a 26 per cent 
increase in productivity. I also run Equation (2) disaggregated by 2-digit NIC industry 
and find that the positive association between exporting and productivity is broadly 
positive across firms in all manufacturing industries, with the exception of tobacco 
products – see Table 1.A.3. 
 
Another way to see this relationship is graphically. I rescale time in such a way so that 
€ 
t = 0  refers to the year when the firm begins to export, 
€ 
t =1 is when the firm has 
exported for a year and so on and so forth. The sample consists of only those firms that 
                                                
10 More specifically, it is assumed that productivity follows a Markov process: 
€ 
ω it = E[ω it |ω it−1]+ ξit  where 
€ 
ξit  represents the unexpected part of current productivity to 
which capital does not adjust.  
11 Where the input deflators are constructed by their weight in the Consumer Price Index basket, 
and the data is taken from the Central Statistical Organisation.  
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export at least once, i.e. 5,191 firms. In the graph the productivity of these firms is 
averaged for the 5 years before entry into export markets, for the year of entry and then 
for the subsequent 5 years of exporting. I re-run Equation (2), i.e. with year and firm 
fixed effects, since I am mainly interested in how productivity for a given firm changes 
after its entry into export markets and how it changes with continued participation in 
export markets. The number of firms over which the TFP estimate is averaged falls for 
every additional year of participation since fewer and fewer firms export continually 
over the 5 year period. Most firms export for 1-2 years only, after which they either exit 
the sample altogether or they re-enter export markets – in either case, once they stop 
exporting, they are no longer included in the sample.  
 
The fitted values that describe the relationship between exporting and productivity are 
depicted graphically in Figure 1.1. The bold lines refer to the estimated coefficient 
€ 
β, 
which equals 1 when the firm exports, i.e. at the point of entry and for the 5 subsequent 
years that the firm continues to export, and which equals 0 for the 5 years before entry. 
This is after controlling for firm characteristics (size and age) and including firm and 
year fixed-effects. The dashed lines show the 99% upper and lower bound confidence 
intervals around the parameter estimates. The levels of TFP jump at the time of entry 
into export markets and then taper off and do not grow over time. In other words, for 
firms in the sample that export, average TFP is associated with an increase when the 
firm first enters the export market and subsequent years of exporting do not seem to be 
associated with any further increases.  
 
I emphasise here that the regressions carried out in Equations (1) and (2) earlier do not 
control for endogenous self-selection of more productive firms into exports, but they do 
find that (1) exporters are different from non-exporters within the same industry, 
location and year, and that (2) for a given firm, exporting is associated with a jump in 
productivity.  
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Figure 1.1: TFP and entry into export markets 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Identification of productivity gains from exporting 
In the following sub-sections I will identify two separate estimates of exporting on 
productivity, using propensity score matching and instrumental variables techniques. 
The first estimate is a within-industry estimate that provides me with the effect of 
exporting on aggregate industrial productivity after controlling for the self-selection of 
more productive firms into the export market. This estimate of productivity is directly 
comparable with other empirical papers in the literature that also compare productivity 
differentials between exporters and non-exporters within a given industry (and often 
within a given location and year). The second estimate is a within-firm estimate that 
provides me with the effect of entry into export markets on aggregate firm productivity 
after controlling for the self-selection problem. In other words, I will identify the effect 
of exporting on a given firm over time and the coefficient would no longer be 
constrained to be the same across all firms. In summary, this section will separate the 
cross-section variation across firms using Propensity Score Matching (PSM), and the 
time-series variation within firms using Instrumental Variables (IV).  
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Across-Firm Estimate (Propensity Score Matching) 
 
Following Girma et al (2004) and Loecker (2007), I control for the self-selection of 
more productive firms in a given industry into export markets (i.e. the Melitz effect) by 
creating control groups using matching techniques based on average treatment models 
as suggested by Heckman et al (1997). The aim of this methodology is to evaluate the 
causal effect of exporting on productivity by matching export starters with non-
exporters. The identifying assumption in estimating the treatment effect (i.e. exporting) 
comes from the introduction of the state variable – lagged productivity – in the 
matching procedure. The method constructs a counterfactual that allows me to analyse 
how productivity of a firm would have evolved if it had not started exporting. The main 
problem in this type of analysis is that one does not observe the counterfactual and 
therefore it is necessary to match the exporting firm with a control group of similar 
firms that do not export.  
 
A straightforward method to assess the impact of exporting would be to compare 
average outcomes of productivity between firms that exported and those that did not. 
However, this methodology fails to control for any differences in pre-export 
characteristics across firms, which could severely bias the estimates if, for instance, 
more productive or larger firms were more likely to export. Another option might be to 
run a regression of productivity, the outcome variable, on a dummy variable for whether 
the firm was active in export markets, conditional on time-lagged observables at the 
level of the firm, such as age, size and past productivity. This method imposes arbitrary 
functional form (mostly linear) assumptions concerning the treatment effects and the 
control variables, that may or may not be accurate and which matching avoids. This is 
valuable since these functional form restrictions are usually justified neither by theory 
nor by data (Angrist and Pischke 2008). In addition, the predictor variables in an 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression are included with regards to their exogeneity 
and suitability to predict the outcome variable, i.e. productivity. In the propensity score 
matching (PSM) method, the matching covariates or the exogenous variables are chosen 
with regards to their ability to predict participation, and not their suitability to predict 
the final outcome. In other words, the PSM technique creates treatment and control 
groups based on the propensity of firms to export conditional on pre-export 
characteristics, while the OLS technique would predict the productivity of firms, 
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conditional on pre-export characteristics. The parameters in an OLS regression will be 
biased even in large samples unless the right-hand side variables are exogenous.  
 
The main problem with the PSM technique is that the matching procedure is based on 
observables only, and any bias owing to unobservables cannot be ruled out.  Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003) illustrate how qualitative fieldwork can help validate the choice of 
covariates, which in turn could help minimise the selection bias. Balancing tests could 
help to test for systematic differences in the covariates between the treatment and 
comparison groups. Additionally, owing to the need to assure comparability in terms of 
initial characteristics, some firms have to be dropped owing to lack of sufficiently 
similar matches. This could create a possible sampling bias in the inferences about the 
impact to the extent that firms that export (i.e. that receive the treatment) are dropped to 
achieve common support12.  
 
However, PSM remains a popular tool for carrying out evaluations more generally, and 
it is particularly useful for this analysis for a number of reasons. A practical advantage 
is that it does not require randomisation data and is less costly and time-consuming to 
implement. The propensity score tries to create the observational analogue of an 
experiment in which every participant (here, firm) has the same probability of 
participation (here, in export markets). Unlike regressions, matching does not presume 
linearity and also helps identify problems with the support of the covariates. This is 
because, compared to OLS regressions that are run on the entire sample, PSM 
techniques help to reduce bias in the computation of the impact estimates by restricting 
the sample to where the conditional probability of participation is the same between 
participant and comparison groups. Ravallion (2008) provides some examples of studies 
where PSM techniques compare both, favourably and unfavourably, with OLS and 
randomisation methods.  
 
The main aim in the following exercise is to evaluate the causal effect of exporting on 
the performance indicator – here, TFP. Following Loecker (2007) I rescale the time 
periods in such a way that a firm starts exporting at 
€ 
s = 0. Let 
€ 
ω is be the outcome at 
time 
€ 
s - the productivity of firm 
€ 
i  at period 
€ 
s - following entry in export markets at 
€ 
s = 0 and the variable 
€ 
STARTi  takes on the value one if the firm 
€ 
i  starts to export. The 
                                                
12 See the discussion of the problem of non-overlapping support bias in Heckman et al (1997).  
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causal effect can be verified by looking at the difference: (
€ 
ω is
1 −ω is
0), where the 
superscript denotes the export behaviour. The crucial problem is that 
€ 
ω is
0  is not 
observable. I follow the micro-econometric evaluation literature (Heckman et al 1997) 
and I defined the average effect of export entry on productivity as: 
 
€ 
E[ω is1 −ω is0 | STARTi =1] = E[ω is1 | STARTi =1] − E[ω is0 | STARTi =1]   (4) 
 
The key difficulty is to identify a counterfactual for the last term in Equation (4). This is 
the productivity effect that entrants in export markets would have experienced, on 
average, had they not exported. What is mainly of interest is the magnitude of the 
‘impact’, labelled in red in Figure 1.A.3 and the main problem is the calculation of the 
counterfactual that is to be deducted from the total change.  
 
This counterfactual is estimated by the corresponding average value of firms that 
remain non-exporters: 
€ 
E[ω iso | STARTi = 0]. An important feature of the construction of 
the counterfactual is the selection of a valid control group. In order to identify this 
group it is assumed that all the differences in productivity (except that caused by 
exporting) between exporters and the appropriately selected control group is captured 
by a vector of observables, including the pre-export productivity of a firm. The intuition 
behind selecting the appropriate control group is to find a group that is as close as 
possible to the exporting firm in terms of its predicted probability to start exporting. 
More formally, I apply the propensity score matching method as proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This boils down to estimating a probit model with a 
dependent variable equal to one if a firm starts exporting and zero elsewhere on lagged 
observables including productivity.  
 
The probability of starting to export is modelled as follows. 
€ 
START  is a dummy 
variable that equals one at the time a firm starts exporting. The probability of starting to 
export, i.e. the propensity score, can be represented as follows: 
 
€ 
Pr(STARTi,0 =1) = F(ω i,−1,CONTROLSi,−1)      (5) 
 
where 
€ 
F(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The re-scaling of the time 
periods implies that the probability of starting to export is regressed on variables prior 
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to this period 
€ 
s = 0 and I use the subscript ‘
€ 
−1’ to denote this. The most important 
variable in estimating the propensity score estimation clearly is the lagged productivity 
variable. Differences in productivity will be conditioned on pre-export levels of 
productivity and the size and age of the firm. I also include a full set of industry and 
year dummies to control for common aggregated demand and supply shocks. I use 
nearest-neighbour one-to-one matching, with replacement13.  
 
Let the predicted export probability for firm 
€ 
i  (which is an eventual exporter) be 
denoted by 
€ 
pi . The matching is based on the method of the nearest neighbour, which 
selects a non-exporting firm 
€ 
j  that has a propensity score 
€ 
p j  closest to that of the 
export entrant. This results in a group of matched exporting and non-exporting firms 
needed in order to evaluate the causal impact of exporting on productivity. Following 
both Girma et al (2004) and Loecker (2007) I match within each 2-digit NIC sector and 
therefore create control groups within narrowly defined sectors as opposed to matching 
across the entire set of firms. This is likely to be important as the marginal effect of 
various variables on the probability of starting to export may differ substantially 
between different sectors due to different technological and market conditions that firms 
face in different industries. This implies that I estimate the probability to start exporting 
for each industry separately, allowing the coefficients to vary within the various 
industries. However, I am unable to control for other differences between firms that 
produce the same product, for instance, quality, mark-ups, employee skill sets etc.  
 
Once I have this counterfactual in hand I use a difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology14 to assess the impact of exporting on productivity. Following Loecker 
(2007) the estimator of the learning-by-exporting effect (
€ 
βLBE ) is calculated in the 
following way. Assume 
€ 
N  firms that started exporting and a set 
€ 
C  of control firms, 
with 
€ 
ω1 and 
€ 
ω c being the estimated productivity of the treated and the controls 
respectively. Denote 
€ 
C(i) as the set of control units matched to a firm 
€ 
i  with a 
propensity score of 
€ 
pi . The number of control firms that are matched with an 
                                                
13 Matching with replacement tends to reduce bias, and can be performed in cases where the 
control group is smaller than the treatment group.  
14 Another option would be to use a double DID wherein the changes over time across the 
treatment and counterfactual groups would be compared. This method would help to contain the 
bias owing to unobservables in the data. However, owing to selective retrenchment of firms 
from export markets over time, I would be faced with a potentially larger bias, since I am unable 
to follow-up with firms that drop out of the sample over time.  
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observation 
€ 
i  (starter) is denoted as 
€ 
Nic  and the weight 
€ 
wij =
1
Nic
 if 
€ 
j ∈C(i) and zero 
otherwise. In this way every firm 
€ 
i  that started exporting is matched with 
€ 
Nic  control 
firms. I stress that the matching is always performed at the time a firm starts exporting 
and 
€ 
s = {1,2,.....,S}  denotes the time periods after the decision to start exporting, i.e. at 
€ 
s = 0. I introduce two estimators getting at the productivity effect at every time 
€ 
s 
(Equation 6) and a cumulative productivity effect (Equation 7). The first estimator, 
€ 
βLBE
s  
at every period 
€ 
s after the decision to start exporting, is given by: 
 
€ 
βLBE
s =
1
Ns i
∑ ω is1 − wijω jsc
j∈C (i)
∑ )
' 
( 
) ) 
* 
+ 
, ,        (6) 
 
In words, I estimate the productivity premium of firms that started exporting at each 
period 
€ 
s compared with (a weighted average of) productivity of a control group based 
on nearest neighbour matching at every period 
€ 
s. However, since I am also interested in 
how starting to export impacts the productivity trajectory of a firm, I estimate the 
average cumulative treatment effect. This is the productivity gain gathered over a period 
€ 
S after the decision to start exporting. The second estimator, 
€ 
βLBE
S , is given by: 
 
€ 
βLBE
S =
1
NS
ω is
1 − wijω jsc
j∈C ( i)
∑
s=0
S
∑
s=0
S
∑
' 
( 
) ) 
* 
+ 
, , 
i
∑        (7) 
 
This provides me with an average cumulative productivity gain at every time period and 
plotting these estimated coefficients over time gives me a relation between time (
€ 
s) and 
the productivity gain. The estimate in Equation (7) gives us the productivity premium 
new exporters have gathered over time. This implies that the entire productivity path of 
export entrants is compared to that of the control group, whereas the estimate in 
Equation (6) estimates the productivity premium at the each time period 
€ 
s.  
 
The firms in the treatment group in the analysis have been matched at the point of entry 
into export markets with firms in the control group. The control group consists of firms 
that never export over the period of comparison, i.e. 6 years – the year of entry into 
export markets and the 5 years thereafter. It is possible, however, that the counterfactual 
group contains firms that don’t export for the duration of the comparison, but which 
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might enter the export market in the future, and which might have exported in the past. 
Thus, exporters are matched with non-exporters at the point of the formers’ entry into 
export markets; after which, the two sets of firms are followed over time and the 
average difference in productivity is reported – for each year of exporting, and for each 
cumulative period of exporting. In other words, if an exporter 
€ 
Ae  is matched with a 
non-exporter 
€ 
Ane at time 
€ 
s = 0, the PSM procedure will compare the productivity 
differential between the two firms at each additional year of exporting (i.e. 
€ 
s =1,2...5). 
Firms that export are only matched once over the period of analysis, i.e. at the point of 
entry in export markets. If firms drop out of export markets (i.e. they stop exporting), 
they are no longer included in the analysis and do not enter the control group of non-
exporters.  
 
I find that the first year of exporting is associated with a large increase in productivity 
(11.03 per cent), but that each subsequent year of exporting is no longer associated with 
a rise in productivity – see Table 1.3. However, the cumulative effect of exporting on 
productivity continues to remain positive and significant up until the fourth year of 
exporting, at which point the productivity increase associated with exporting is 
approximately 4.46 per cent. By the fifth year of exporting, the cumulative productivity 
differential is no longer significant. Thus, entry into export markets is associated with a 
rise in productivity, but the marginal effect of continuing to export seems to be 
insignificant. 
 
Table 1.3: Estimated learning by exporting effects 
s 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Outcome: productivity     
€ 
βLBE
s  0.1103*** -0.0420 -0.0302 -0.0329 0.0277 
 [0.038] [0.034] [0.040] [0.039] [0.052] 
# treated 4324 3538 3204 2786 2445 
# controls 3394 2971 2690 2344 2073 
    
Outcome: cumulative productivity   
€ 
βLBE
S  0.1103*** 0.0814*** 0.1007*** 0.0446* 0.0072 
 [0.038] [0.029] [0.029] [0.024] [0.025] 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in square brackets 
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Also, the cumulative estimator 
€ 
βLBE
S  is not equal to the sum of the pure time estimator 
€ 
βLBE
s  due to the unbalanced data. Formally, 
€ 
βLBE
s
s∑ ≠ βLBE
S  since 
€ 
N  varies with 
€ 
s. Firms 
also start to drop out of the sample as the total number of years of exporting (i.e. the 
value of s) increases. This could be because less productive firms that are unable to 
survive exit the export market, and/or firms that began to export in recent years drop out 
because the sample period comes to an end. If the former is true, the average treatment 
effect will be upwardly biased. However, if the latter is true then we should not expect 
to see any bias. In the first five years of exporting, I lose between 40 percent of firms 
because the sample period comes to an end. The remainder of the firms exit the export 
market, with the largest number of firms exiting the market in the first two years of 
exporting. And so, the coefficients could be biased upwards since I am unable to control 
for endogenous exit.  
 
The propensity score matching method also assumes that there exists a region of 
‘common support’, where the treated and control propensity scores overlap, and over 
which a robust comparison can be made. A straightforward way to check the overlap is 
a visual analysis of the density distribution of the propensity scores across the treated 
and control groups before and after matching (see Figure 1.A.4). Firms that fall outside 
of the region of common support are disregarded and for these firms the treatment effect 
cannot be estimated. With matching the proportion of such firms is small, and since the 
region of common support is vastly improved the estimated effect on the remaining 
firms can be viewed as representative. In Table 1.A.4 I provide the t-test of the equality 
of means between the treated and the matched control group. I find that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the means of the conditioning variables between the 
treated and the control group, and that matching reduces the bias by 19 percent for 
productivity to 95 percent for sales.  
 
Within-Firm Estimate (Instrumental Variables) 
 
The problem with propensity score matching techniques is that it eliminates the 
selection problem based only on observables, and that it assumes away every possible 
problem with the error terms – this could include endogeneity and/or measurement 
error. Additionally, this estimate only provides me with the productivity differential 
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between exporters and non-exporters within a given industry, and says nothing about 
the within-firm effect of exporting on productivity. In this section, I will use an 
instrument to deal with the methodological shortcomings of the matching procedure, 
and to identify that part of the effect of exporting on productivity that is owing to time-
series variation15. 
 
A good instrument would be a variable that affects the productivity of the firm only 
through its effect on the firm’s decision to export, and which would be exogenous to 
changes in firm-level productivity. I use effectively applied tariffs faced by exporting 
firms. These tariffs are defined by destination country for each industrial sector at the 
NIC 4-digit level from 1990 to 2008. Since these are tariffs imposed by destination 
countries, individual firms in India should not be able to affect the level of tariffs. And 
in theory, a fall in tariffs should positively affect a firm’s decision to enter the export 
market and thus affect firm-level productivity.  
 
One might argue that increases in firm-level productivity in India could have a direct 
impact on tariffs faced by exporting firms if destination markets raised their tariffs to 
protect their domestic markets. If this were the case, one would expect to see a positive 
relationship between exporting and tariffs. But in fact tariffs and exports are negatively 
related (see Figure 1.A.5), and so it would seem more likely that lower tariffs drive 
higher export volumes. Alternatively one may argue that an increase in firm-level 
productivity leads to an increase in exports, which in turn creates pressure from 
exporting firms from the originating country, i.e. India, on destination markets to lower 
their tariffs. In other words, that exports are driving tariffs. However, India’s share of 
the global export market is small, and since independence has varied between 0.5 and 
2.5 percent, and between 0.5 and just over 1 percent over the period of study. When 
disaggregated by sector the range varies between 0.32 and 0.55 percent. When further 
disaggregated by the top 20 country destinations (that make up almost 75 percent of the 
total market share of Indian exports), the range varies between 5.72 and 0.09 percent 
(see Figures 1.A.7 and 1.A.8). So, a more likely story would be that Indian exporters are 
in fact price takers in global markets16. It has been argued that India is able to punch 
                                                
15 DiPrete and Gangl (2004) provide a valuable comparison between PSM and IV techniques 
and illustrate how these can be seen as complementary analyses, and not necessarily substitutes.  
16 It could be argued that Indian exporters may be able to influence tariffs in products where 
they have a small share of the destination market precisely because the latter might not care 
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above its weight at the WTO, for instance through anti-dumping investigations. In fact 
in 2002, India overtook the US to become the highest initiator of anti-dumping cases at 
the WTO. However, the point of anti-dumping cases is mainly to try and protect 
domestic markets from cheap imports. For instance, most anti-dumping cases were 
brought out against China, Brazil, and Taiwan etc. It could, however, be the case that 
countries may still use anti-dumping as a clever negotiating tool to increase market 
access.  
 
I use effectively applied tariff rates, in levels and changes, taken from the Trade 
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS)17. The classification system used is 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Revision 3), at the 4-digit level, as 
this corresponds on a one-to-one basis to the Indian National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) system at the 4-digit level. I re-run Equation (1) with productivity as the 
dependent variable and I instrument the dummy variable for starting to export with 
export-weighted tariffs. My instrument, i.e. tariffs, varies by industry and year, whilst 
my instrumented variable, i.e. the dummy variable for when the firm starts exporting, 
varies by firms over time. I am unable to find an instrument that is specific to firms, but 
I use tariffs at the 4-digit industry level to narrow the effect as best I can. As in my 
earlier OLS specifications, I include firm fixed-effects, which also controls for the 
differential effects that changes in industry-level tariffs would have on firms depending 
on their individual characteristics. I also include year fixed-effects. Thus, the instrument 
is time varying and applies within firms.  
 
It could be argued that a change in tariffs at the 4-digit industry level has little to do 
with individual firms’ decisions to export, and simply affects the industry-level 
propensity to export. Indeed, if I were interested in the average effect of exporting on 
industry-level productivity, the instrument, i.e. effectively applied tariffs would apply at 
the level of the industry. However, it could also be the case that a change in industry-
level tariffs affects firms in that industry differently, depending on the individual 
characteristics of the firm. It’s possible that not all firms would respond to an industry-
level change in tariffs in the same way – some firms might be more inclined than others 
                                                                                                                                          
about providing better access, especially if in return it were able to gain concessions in other 
sectors.  
17 TRAINS data is made available through the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
database.  
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to adjust export behaviour. For instance, Bown and Porto (2010) study the effect of an 
increase in preferential market access for the Indian steel industry and find that some 
firms within the industry, such as those which historically had export ties to developed 
markets, responded more quickly than others in order to increase their exports. Indeed, 
as their analysis shows, aggregating variables at the industry-level fails to capture the 
differences across firms, some of which are large producers who were active for a 
number of years prior to the shock and others that were relatively new entrants to the 
market18.   
 
The decisions to export are endogenous choices of the firm and it is easy to imagine 
ways in which the export status could be correlated with unobserved firm characteristics 
that directly affect both the level and the growth rate of firm productivity. For example, 
dynamic firm managers may be more aggressive in entering export markets and also 
more aggressive in making productivity-enhancing investments. An industry-level drop 
in tariffs would improve access for all firms within an industry; however, it is likely that 
some firms might be better poised to exploit the change than others. Regressing 
industry-level productivity on an aggregate firm-level decisions to enter export markets 
would mask such individual differences across firms. For instance, we could take the 
example of the textile industry, at the level of the 4-digit National Industrial 
Classification 1730, i.e. Manufactures of Knitted and Crocheted Apparel. TFP, defined 
for a firm for a given year, could be regressed on a dummy variable for whether this 
was the first year of exporting for that textile firm, with or without firm fixed-effects. In 
the former case, the average effect of starting to export on productivity is 10.53 percent, 
while in the latter it is a mere 1.62 percent (the respective 
€ 
R2 are 0.707 and 0.064). 
When aggregated across all textile firms within the 4-digit NIC industry, it seems that 
the effect of entry on productivity is much smaller than if firm-specific unobservables 
are taken into account. Since both regressions, i.e. with and without firm fixed-effects, 
control for the age and size of the firms, this could be an indication that other factors, 
say managerial capacity or supplier relationships, might be important when computing 
the average effect of entry into export markets on the productivity of textile firms. If 
some textile firms were better prepared to exploit a change in market access than others, 
                                                
18 For instance, when aggregated across all firms, it seems that the share of sales associated with 
the preferential products seems to fall in response to the increase in market access. This could 
be because new entrants in the market sell only a small share of preferential products, compared 
to more established firms, which brings down the aggregate average for all firms.  
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which in turn would predict the propensity of the firm to start exporting, these 
differences should be controlled for to arrive at the true effect of export entry on 
productivity.  
 
Recall, that productivity here has been calculated after having controlled for the 
potential simultaneity of input choices and unobserved exit, and so I am mainly trying 
to control for any reverse causality between productivity and the decision of the firm to 
start exporting. I run the regression using changes and levels of weighted tariffs, using 
two-stage least squares techniques. I check the exogeneity of the export status using the 
Durbin-Wu Hausman specification test, and find that the results of the IV estimates are 
preferable. The instrumented coefficient remains positive and significant. The F-statistic 
is above the rule-of-thumb value of 10 in the case of changes in tariffs, but this is not 
the case for tariff levels.  
 
Table 1.4: IV Estimation 
Predictors OLS IV (Tariffs) 
  Tariffs (Δ) Tariffs (level) 
Start 0.1588*** 0.2471* 0.8417 
 [0.030] [1.036] [2.344] 
Age -0.0236*** -0.0202 -0.0223*** 
 [0.005] [0.013] [0.008] 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
    
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
# 16,444 16,442 15,899 
€ 
R2 0.814 0.814 0.815 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in square brackets (clustered at the firm level19). The dependent 
variable is firm-level productivity.  
 
I also find that instrumenting for starting to export raises the coefficient dramatically. 
With OLS techniques starting to export is associated with a 15.88 percent increase in 
productivity. However, instrumenting with changes in tariffs raises this effect to 24.71 
                                                
19 The residuals could be correlated across firms or time. For instance, economy-level shocks 
would cause correlation between firms at a moment in time, and persistent firm-specific shocks 
could cause correlation across time. Thus, I also cluster standard errors by year, but this does 
not affect the results. 
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percent. Similarly, when instrumenting with tariff levels the co-efficient rises to 84.17 
percent, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. My endogenous variable, 
exports, is weakly correlated with my instruments, whether changes or levels of tariffs 
(see Table 1.A.5 for first-stage results). In general, the weaker the correlation between 
the instrument and the variable being instrumented, the greater is the population 
variance of the coefficient. The increase in the instrumented coefficient could also be 
owing to heterogeneity in export effects, implying that the marginal return to exporting 
is higher for lower productivity firms, who are also more affected by changes in 
effectively applied tariffs. Van Biesebroeck (2005) finds a similar result using ethnicity 
of the owner as an instrument, and Card (2001) elaborates on such econometric results 
when using instrumental variables.  
 
 
1.5  Robustness and Other Exercises 
 
1.5.1 Intensive Margin 
Another interesting sub-question is whether productivity is determined not just by 
participation in export markets, but also by the intensity of that participation. In other 
words, firm productivity could be affected by the extensive margin of exporting (i.e. 
participation), but additionally it could be affected by the intensive margin of exporting 
wherein firms increase their years and/or intensity of exports. As pointed out by Park et 
al (2010) one might expect to see continued improvements in productivity with more 
years of exporting if, for instance, productivity-enhancing investments are lumpy and 
firms make additional investments following a few years of exporting. Research by 
Blalock and Gertler (2004) and Kraay (1999) finds that firms grow more productive 
with continued participation in export markets. Others, such as Castellani (2002) and 
Girma et al (2004) find that export intensity is also related to larger increases in firm-
level productivity. In this section, I examine how productivity changes are related to 
continued participation (and discontinuation of that participation) and the intensity of 
that participation in export markets.  
 
First, I examine within the same regression, how entry into, continued stay in and exit 
from export markets impacts firm-level productivity. I modify Equation (2) as follows: 
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€ 
lnTFPit = α + β1startit + β2stopit + β3continueit + γControlsit + δ iFirmi + δ tTimet +
t
∑ ε it
i
∑          
           (8) 
 
In the original Equation (2), log TFP of the firm was regressed on a dummy variable 
that equalled 1 if the firm engaged in exports for that given year and 0 otherwise. In the 
modified version in Equation (8), log TFP of the firm is regressed on 3 different 
variants of the export participation of a firm - a firm could be present in export markets 
in a given year because it began to export in that year, or because it continues to export 
in that given year, or it could have exported in the previous year but discontinued 
participation in the given year. Thus, in Equation (8), 
€ 
startit  is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when the firm first enters the export market and zero otherwise, 
€ 
stopit  is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exits the export market and zero otherwise, 
€ 
continueit  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is already present within the 
export market and continues to export and zero otherwise (i.e. it equals zero if the firm 
enters the market or exists the market). Since a firm could ‘continue’ to export for more 
than one year, this variable is interacted with the number of years of exporting, for 5 
years and 10 years respectively. Firm-specific controls include the size (number of 
employees) and the age of the firm. In contrast to other papers that study between-firm 
effects, since I am mainly interested in within-firm changes, I include firm fixed-effects.  
 
Table 1.5: Exporting and the Intensive Margin 
Variables  Productivity Productivity 
 (1) (2) 
Start 0.0967***  
 [0.007]  
Continue1 0.0151***  
              (5 years) [0.002]  
Continue2 0.0098***  
             (10 years) [0.001]  
Stop  -0.1093***  
  [0.001]  
Log (Exports)  0.0472*** 
   [0.006] 
Age -0.0195*** -0.0242*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 
  42 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
     
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
# 35,379 25,378 
 
€ 
R2 0.836 0.922 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust standard errors in square brackets (clustered at the firm level) 
 
 
According to the results (see Table 1.5), the year of entry into the export market is 
associated with an increase in productivity for the firm. In other words, starting to 
export is associated with a 9.67 per cent increase in productivity. However, the positive 
effect of continuing to export grows smaller over time, although it remains statistically 
significant. The variable ‘continue’ is interacted with the number of years of exporting 
in the short (5 years) and in the medium term (10 years)20. Continuing to export for 5 
years is associated with an average increase in productivity of 1.51 per cent, and 0.98 
per cent for 10 years of continued participation. In other words, on average, a firm that 
exports continuously for 10 years is 0.98 per cent more productive than when it first 
started to export.  
 
What is interesting is that exiting the export market has a negative effect on firm 
productivity. Exiting the market is associated with a 10.93 per cent fall in productivity 
compared to the previous year. It should be kept in mind that although the OP method 
controls for endogenous exit from the sample, it does not control for endogenous exit 
from export markets. And so the negative coefficient on ‘stop’ could be an overestimate 
since I am unable to observe firms that exit both, the export market and the sample, at 
the same instant.  
 
In the second exercise, following Castellani (2002) and Girma et al (2004) I regress 
firms’ TFP on exports as a proportion of sales, controlling for the age and size of the 
firm and with the inclusion of firm fixed-effects (see Column 2 of Table 1.5). I find that 
the value of total exports has a positive and significant effect on firms’ productivity – 
implying that the more that a firm exports, the higher the productivity of the firm. In 
this case, a percentage point increase in export volume leads to a 4.72 percent in 
productivity for my sample of firms.  
                                                
20 The possible range is (1,20), with firms exporting for an average of 4-5 years. 
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1.5.2 Spillovers 
The sample also provides me with information on whether firms belong to particular 
ownership groups. These are large business groups that own a number of firms, usually 
operating in similar industries, along the vertical or horizontal scale of production. 
There are a total of 583 business groups where the mean number of firms within each 
group is 6.5, the minimum 2 and the maximum 12721. As an example, take the ‘Rane 
Group’, which has 12 firms that produce steering systems, engine valves, brake linings 
etc. In any given year, anywhere between 1 to 5 firms within the Rane Group export.  
 
One might expect knowledge spillovers to be high for firms within the same business 
group since there would be few or no restrictions on technology sharing. Technological 
spillovers are one of the channels through which firms with access to foreign markets 
became more productive. It could be theorised that non-exporting firms might be able to 
access better technologies or production processes or designs if other firms within the 
same business group had access to foreign markets through exporting.  
 
I regress productivity of non-exporters in a given business group on the total number of 
exporting firms within the same business group in that year, controlling for the location, 
age and size (number of employees) of firms and again I include firm and year fixed-
effects since I mainly interested in the effect for a given firm. I also carry out this 
exercise at the 2-digit NIC level to study how spillovers might matter between firms in 
industries with higher technological relatedness.  
 
 
 
                                                
21 The business group with the most firms is the Tata Group. 
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Table 1.6: Business Groups 
NIC NIC Sector Name Exporters (sum) L.Exporters (sum) Observations  
15-36 0.0055  2,103 0.770 
 
All 
 0.0081 1,879 0.792 
15 -0.0036  492 0.658 
 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 
 -0.0147 448 0.715 
17 -0.0567  146 0.728 
 
Manufacture of textiles 
 -0.0341 124 0.730 
21 -0.0278  81 0.746 
 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
 -0.0104 73 0.742 
22 -0.0475  26 0.977 
 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
 -0.0069 22 0.952 
23 0.0755  30 0.786 
 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
 0.0627 28 0.906 
24 0.0271  348 0.688 
 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
 0.0190 304 0.653 
25 -0.0592***  93 0.847 
 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
 -0.0778*** 86 0.855 
26 -0.0095  188 0.533 
 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
 -0.0104 175 0.559 
27 0.0053  144 0.643 
 
Manufacture of basic metals 
 0.0085 128 0.664 
28 0.1984***  29 0.995 
 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipments 
 0.1680*** 25 0.998 
29 -0.0235  84 0.852 
 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 
 -0.0007 74 0.862 
30 0.0854  23 0.872 
 
Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 
 0.0109 18 0.975 
31 0.0083  108 0.732 
 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C. 
 0.0217* 96 0.867 
32 -0.0053  52 0.843 
 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
 0.0337 48 0.904 
34 0.0669***  116 0.862 
 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 0.0504*** 102 0.860 
35 -0.0482  52 0.619 
  
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
   0.0326 46 0.543 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust standard errors clustered at firm level (not shown) 
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I find that on average (see Table 1.6), the number of exporters within a business group 
seems to have no statistically significant effect on the productivity of non-exporters 
within the same business group. I find similar results if I use lagged values. However, 
when I drill down to particular industry groups I find more interesting results. For 
manufacturers of rubber and plastic products (NIC 25), the productivity of a given non-
exporter falls by 5.92 percentage points if an additional firm within the same business 
group exports, suggesting that firms within the same business group grow at the 
expense of others. On the other hand, the effect of additional exporters on the 
productivity of non-exporters in a given business group is positive for motor 
manufacturers and for fabricated metal producers – the productivity of a given non-
exporter increases by a whopping 6.69 and 19.84 percent respectively if an additional 
firm within the same business group exports.  
 
 
1.6  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper analyses the effect of exporting on firm-level productivity over a period that 
saw a large increase in the number of exporting firms. Descriptive statistics find that 
exporting is positively associated with size, capital intensity and value addition, within 
and across firms. Ultimately, however, it is the causal effect of exporting on a given 
firm’s performance that is of interest. In the paper I identify the effect of entering export 
markets after controlling for the self-selection of more productive firms into such 
markets. Since I care mostly about the within-firm effect of exporting, wherever 
possible, I use firm-fixed effects. This is in stark contrast to the earlier literature that 
studies across-firm effects.  
 
To identify the within-industry effect of exporting on productivity, I use propensity-
matching techniques. I construct a set of ‘control firms’ and then evaluate the effect of 
the ‘treatment’, i.e. exporting. I find that exporting does indeed lead to a positive and 
significant effect on the productivity of firms that begin to export. I also find that the 
marginal effect of continuing to export is insignificant, although the cumulative effect 
of exporting after a few years of exporting is still positive. Since I match firms within a 
given industry, this methodology allows me to identify the within-industry effect of 
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exporting. Using matching, I control for a Melitz-type effect wherein more productive 
firms are also more likely to become exporters.  
 
I then move on to identifying the effect of exporting on a given firm, i.e. the within-firm 
productivity premium. I use effectively applied tariffs faced by a given firm in world 
markets to control for reverse causality. The decision of the firm to enter the export 
market is instrumented with export-weighted tariffs – the intuition being that a fall in 
tariffs would reduce the fixed cost of entry for firms at the margin. Again, I find that 
entry is associated with a large increase in productivity. The large jumps in productivity 
immediately subsequent to entry leads me to suspect that firms in my sample might 
anticipate entry into export markets, making productivity-enhancing investments which 
then allow them to recoup large productivity premiums in the first few years of 
exporting. There is no evidence of continued learning-by-exporting effects, whether 
within-industry or within-firms.  
 
I also study the effect of the intensive margin of exporting for firms, for continued 
participation and for higher intensity of participation. I find that the gains from 
exporting are the highest in the first few years of entry and then begin to taper off. In 
other words, after tracking firm performance for up to 5 years, I find that there is no 
evidence of further productivity benefits, except in those firms that are most exposed to 
export markets. I also find evidence that productivity gains are reversed when the firm 
decides to exit the export market. I check for any evidence of spillovers from exporting 
to non-exporting firms within the same business group, and find that there may be 
positive externalities for some industries, but that on average there are little or no 
spillovers. 
 
My results for the within-industry effects are in line with previous findings in the 
literature. Loecker (2007) uses propensity-score matching techniques to identify the 
effect of exporting on firms in Slovenia and finds that the annual productivity premium 
from exporting varies between 8 to 13 per cent. Using similar techniques, this paper 
finds that average productivity premium for firms that start to export are 11 per cent, but 
that these premiums are no longer significant over time. Biesenbroeck (2005) 
incorporates lagged exports within the production function and finds robust evidence for 
a positive effect of exporting on productivity. He also uses the ethnicity of the firm 
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owner as an instrument for the decision of firms to export, and again finds evidence for 
a causal and positive impact. Using different techniques, his estimate of the effect of 
exporting on productivity varies between 25 to 28 per cent for firms in Africa. I use 
effectively applied tariffs as instruments, but the instrument is applied within-firms and 
not across-firms, and my estimate of the effect of starting to export is around 24 percent. 
In other words, I find that the effect of exporting on within-firm productivity is much 
higher than that for within-industries.  
 
The paper uses different ways to get at the effect of exporting on productivity. It starts 
with a set of simple descriptive statistics, wherein the productivity of a given firm for a 
given year is regressed on a dummy variable for whether that firm exports in that year, 
controlling for the size, age and time-invariant unobservables at the level of the firm. 
This regression illustrates that exporting is associated with a 26 percent increase in 
average firm-level productivity. However, this regression does not control for the self-
selection of more productive firms into exporting. The paper then uses two different 
methodologies to control for the endogeneity of firm entry – it matches exporters with 
like firms and calculates the productivity differential over time, and it uses effectively 
applied tariffs as an instrument to predict entry into export markets. Using propensity 
score matching techniques, I find that exporters become 11 percent more productive 
than similar non-exporters after entry into export markets. Using instrumental variables 
techniques, I find that entry into export markets is associated with a 24 percent increase 
in average firm-level productivity.  
 
In the paper, I also try and assess the impact of continuing to export, i.e. the 
productivity differential beyond the first year of entry into export markets. I do this in 
two ways at different stages in the paper. First, the propensity score matching exercise 
allows me to follow exporters over time and compare their performance to the matched 
non-exporters. And second, in the robustness exercises, productivity of a given firm is 
regressed on dummy variables for whether that firm is a new entrant, is continuing to 
export, or has exited the market, controlling for firm characteristics and 
unobservables22. In the first case, I find that that exporters remain 4.46 percent more 
                                                
22 It should be kept in mind that the robustness exercises do not control for endogeneity of entry 
into (or exit from) export markets, and only provide an indication of the association between 
continuing to export and firm-level productivity.  
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productive than their matched non-exporter counterparts after the fourth year of 
exporting. However, since exporters were 11 percent more productive in the year of 
entry, this would indicate that the productivity differential between exporters and their 
domestic counterparts seems to be falling over time. In the second exercise, the results 
reveal that continuing to export for 5 years is associated with a 1.51 percent increase, 
and for 10 years is associated with a 0.98 percent increase in productivity. However, the 
year of entry is associated with a much larger, 9.67 percent, increase in productivity. 
Both these exercises indicate that new entrants into export markets see a marked 
increase in productivity, but that these increases do not seem to be sustained over time. 
 
A few other papers (Damijan and Kostevc 2006, Damijan et al 2004) also find a similar 
result – productivity improvements, although present, are far from permanent and tend 
to dissipate shortly after initial entry. One of the explanations for this occurrence may 
be a simple utilization of excess capacity caused by the sudden availability of a larger 
product market. In other words, there is little evidence for any sustained learning-by-
exporting and it may be that the initial productivity hike is solely a consequence of a 
scale effect whereby the firm takes advantage of a larger market to place its additional 
output. In essence, the hike in productivity only reflects the fact that firms can take 
advantage of their spare capacity in new markets. One way to check if this might be the 
case would be if sales and/or capital show a substantial change in the year of entry. To 
explore this possibility further, I plot the average sales and capital (gross assets) in the 
years before and after entering export markets (see Figure 1.A.9). I find that the year of 
entry is associated with a marked increase in sales and capital. Thus, there is some 
indication that the increase in productivity growth could be attributed to the initial 
utilisation of excess capacity, although conclusive evidence for this would rely on the 
availability of capacity utilisation data. As firms proceed to increase their size in order 
to accommodate the increased sales the productivity hike diminishes quickly in the data. 
Thus, this would suggest that the observed improvements in productivity in the year of 
entry into export markets might primarily be a reflection of a growth in inputs.  
 
This study makes a few contributions to an already crowded literature. It is an attempt 
to understand the productivity premium from exporting for a poor, rapidly developing 
country. There has been no previous robust methodological work on answering the age-
old, yet classic, question of the effect of exporting on firm-level productivity for a large 
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and increasingly important country like India. Developing countries that are growing 
briskly are also where one would expect the gains to be the highest. Evidence on the 
determinants and computation of firm-level productivity in low-income countries is also 
rare. In addition, I use an instrument, i.e. effectively applied tariffs that has previously 
not been used in the literature to control for the self-selection effect within firms. The 
use of tariffs nicely isolates the effect of entry into export markets on productivity, and 
since these tariffs are hardly unique to the case of India, they could easily be applied in 
other settings.  
 
And lastly and most importantly, to my knowledge, this is a first attempt to identify the 
effect of participation in export markets that separates the across-firm effect from the 
within-firm effect. The existing empirical literature focuses almost primarily on 
controlling for the self-selection of more productive firms within a given industry. In 
contrast, in this paper I identify the effect of starting to export within firms. Although 
the question of whether exporting raises aggregate industrial productivity is a 
tremendously interesting one, it seems perilous to ignore the effects on aggregate firm 
productivity.  
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Appendix 1.A 
1.A.1  Estimating Productivity 
Following Olley and Pakes (1996) it is assumed that in year 
€ 
t  the manager observes the 
firm’s current productivity 
€ 
ω it  before choosing labour 
€ 
lt  and investment 
€ 
it  to combine 
with the quasi-fixed input, capital 
€ 
kt  for the production of output 
€ 
yt . Output is 
expressed as follows: 
 
€ 
yt = β0 + βl lt + βiit + βkkt +ω t +ε t        (A1) 
 
Inputs are divided into a freely variable ones (
€ 
lt ,it) and the state variable capital 
(
€ 
kt ). The error term is assumed to be additively separable in a transmitted component 
(
€ 
ω t ) and an i.i.d. component (
€ 
ε t). The key difference between the former and the latter 
is that the former is a state variable and hence impacts the firm’s decision rules, while 
the latter has no impact on the firm’s decisions.  
Since 
€ 
ω t  is known to the manager but unknown to the econometrician and may be 
positively correlated with 
€ 
lt  and 
€ 
it , it generates a potential simultaneity bias that is 
addressed by the following estimation procedure. The firm’s variable input demands, 
derived from profit maximisation, depend on privately known productivity and capital. 
Investment’s demand function is given by: 
 
€ 
it = i(ω t ,kt )   
 
and it must be monotonic in all 
€ 
ω t  for all relevant 
€ 
kt  to qualify as a valid proxy – 
implying that conditional on capital the demand for investment increases with 
productivity. Assuming that monotonicity holds, the input demand function can be 
inverted to obtain 
€ 
ω t  as a function of investment and capital, as below. Note that this 
function depends on observables only.  
 
€ 
ω t =ω(it ,kt ) 
 
Consider the problem of self-selection. Firms with larger capital stocks can expect 
higher returns on capital even in the face of lower levels of productivity, and will 
choose to stay longer in the market. Thus the self-selection generated by the exit 
behaviour implies that the expectation of productivity will be decreasing in capital, 
leading to a negative bias in the capital coefficient.  
The first stage of the estimation proceeds by rewriting Equation (A1) in a partially 
linear form: 
 
€ 
yt = βl lt + φ(it ,kt ) +ε t        (A2) 
 
where, 
 
€ 
φ(it ,kt ) = β0 + βiit + βkkt +ω(it ,kt )       (A3) 
 
Since 
€ 
E[ε t | it ,kt ] = 0 , taking the difference between Equation (A2) and its 
expectation conditional on investment and capital generates the following expression: 
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€ 
yt − E[yt | it ,kt ] = βl (lt − E[lt | it ,kt ]+ε t      (A4) 
 
Equation (A4) is estimated by OLS (no constant) to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates for labour. The conditional expectations in Equation (A4) are the intercepts of 
locally weighted least squares (LWLS) regressions of output and labour on (
€ 
it ,kt ). After 
obtaining estimates for 
€ 
βl , we estimate the function 
€ 
φ(.) as a LWLS regression of 
€ 
yt − ˆ β l lt  on  (
€ 
it ,kt ). If one were only concerned with the marginal productivities of the 
variable inputs (but not the co-efficient on the proxy variable) one could stop here. To 
obtain a capital co-efficient, a plant-level measure of productivity a more complete 
model for 
€ 
φt (.)  will be required since capital enters it twice. To estimate 
€ 
βk , in addition 
to the estimates of 
€ 
βl  obtained from the partially linear model, estimates of the survival 
probabilities are also used. These probabilities are given by: 
 
€ 
Pr{χt+1 =1 |ω t+1(kt+1)Jt} ≡ Pt        (A5) 
 
where 
€ 
χt  is defined as the indicator function and is equal to zero if the firm exits the 
market, and 
€ 
Jt  refers to the information available at time 
€ 
t . In the implementation the 
probability of survival is estimated by fitting a probit model of 
€ 
χt+1 on the state and 
proxy variables, as well as their squares and cross products.  
In the next stage the expectation of 
€ 
yt+1 − βl lt+1 conditional on information at time 
€ 
t  and survival is given as: 
 
€ 
yt+1 − βl lt+1 = βkkt+1 + g(Pt ,φt − βkkk ) + ξt+1 +ε t+1    (A6) 
 
where, 
€ 
ξt+1 =ω t+1 − E[ω t+1 |ω t ,χt+1 =1], and is the unexpected productivity shock and is 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The unknown function 
€ 
g(.)  is 
approximated by a second-order polynomial in 
€ 
φt − βkkk  and 
€ 
Pt 23. The estimates of 
€ 
βl , 
€ 
φt  and 
€ 
Pt  are substituted in (A6) for the true values of 
€ 
βl ,
€ 
φt  and 
€ 
Pt , to then obtain 
estimates of 
€ 
βk  by minimising the sum of squared residuals in equation (A6). Since the 
estimation routine involves three steps, the stat command implemented uses the 
clustered bootstrap errors, treating all observations for a single firm as one cluster.  
Following Loecker (2007) with the coefficients of the production function in 
hand, I then recover a productivity measure for the firm 
€ 
i  in industry 
€ 
j  at time 
€ 
t 24: 
 
€ 
ω ijt = yijt −βlj lijt −βkjkijt  
                                                
23 Readers interested in the details of the estimation system can refer to Yasar et al (2008).  
24 It should be noted here that this measure of productivity if not the true unobserved 
productivity shock. It also includes the i.i.d. component which is assumed to be zero on average.  
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Tables 
Table 1.A.1: Summary of empirical findings on exports and productivity 
Study Country Sample Methodology Evidence* 
    
€ 
ω e >ω ne
 
LBE 
effects 
Aw and Hwang (1995) Taiwan 2,832 firms; 1986 Translog production function, cross-section √ x 
Bernard and Wagner 
(1997) 
Germany 7,624 firms; 1978-92 Panel Data √ √ 
Clerides et al (1998) Colombia, 
Mexico, 
Morocco 
All firms; 1981-91, 1986-
90, 1984-91 
FIML of cost functions; Panel data 
√ √1 
Kraay (1999) China 2,105 firms; 1988-92 Dynamic panel √ √ 
Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) 
US 60,000 plants; 1984-92 Linear probability with fixed effects 
√ x 
Kim (2000) Korea 36 sectors; 1966-1988 Translog production function; cross-sections √ x 
Isgut (2001) Colombia 6453 plants; 1981-1991 Difference-in-Differences methodology (with 
dummies) 
√ x 
Delgado et al (2002) Spain 1,766 firms; 1991-96 Nonparametric analysis of productivity 
distributions 
√ x 
Castellni (2002) Italy 2,898 firms; 1989-94 Cross-section √ √2 
Wagner (2002) Germany 353 firms; 1978-89 Panel data; Matching √ x 
Alvarez and Lopez 
(2005) 
Chile 5,000 plants; 1990-96 Ordered probit; pooled data √ √ 
Baldwin and Gu (2003) Canada 8215 firms; 1974-1996;  System GMM; Cross-sections √ √ 
Arnold and Hussinger 
(2004) 
Germany 389 firms; 1992-2000 Olley and Pakes production function; Matching 
techniques 
√ x 
Bigsten et al (2004) Cameroon, 
Ghana, 
Zimbabwe 
289 firms; 1992-1995 Maximum likelihood, System GMM methods; 
Panel data √ √ 
Girma et al (2004) UK 8,992 firms; 1988-1999 Matched samples √ √ 
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Hung et al (2004) US 40 industries; 1996-2001 Difference-in-Differences Methodology; Panel 
data 
√ x 
Blalock and Gertler 
(2004) 
Indonesia 20,000 firms; 1990-1996 Translog, Olley and Pakes, Levinsohn and 
Petrin production function;  
√ √ 
Van Bisebroeck (2005) Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
1916 firms (9 countries); 
1992-1996 
GMM, Maximum likelihood, Olley and Pakes 
production function; Cross-section √ √ 
Loecker (2007) Slovenia 7915 firms; 1994-2000 Olley and Pakes production function; Matched 
samples 
√ √ 
Fernandes (2007) Colombia 6474 plants; 1977-1991 Levinsohn and Petrin for production function; 
Panel data 
√ √ 
Greenaway and Kneller 
(2008) 
UK 11,225 firms; 1988-2002 Matched samples 
√ √ 
Park et al (2010) China 3,339 firms; 1995, 1998, 
2000 
Instrumental Variables Technique 
√ √ 
*
€ 
ω e >ω ne : Exporters more productive than non-exporters; LBE: Learning-by-exporting effects. 1: Some learning from exporting in the case of Morocco. 2: Learning 
associated with export intensity. Source: Girma et al (2004), modified and updated.  
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Table 1.A.2: Capital and Labour Coefficients (by Industry) 
NIC NIC Sector Name Olley-Pakes OLS 
    Capital  Labour # Capital  Labour # 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 1.0256*** 0.2055*** 7,564 0.7470*** 0.3182*** 8,831 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.7768** 0.2802*** 154 0.7828*** 0.3638*** 195 
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.7123*** 0.3469*** 6,398 0.6441*** 0.3858*** 7,883 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.7421*** 0.3848*** 851 0.6738*** 0.4743*** 1,027 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags and 
footwear 0.1178 0.4476*** 550 0.4740*** 0.5791*** 687 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 0.5592*** 0.4966*** 293 0.4338*** 0.7010*** 360 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.3629** 0.4996*** 1,716 0.3609*** 0.5891*** 1,968 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.6958*** 0.3982*** 548 0.5495*** 0.4679*** 692 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.6992*** 0.4302*** 619 0.5686*** 0.5638*** 735 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.7428*** 0.4490*** 12,143 0.5286*** 0.5308*** 14,326 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.8023*** 0.4534*** 3,619 0.5484*** 0.5463*** 4,384 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.5144*** 0.4920*** 2,499 0.5274*** 0.5773*** 2,983 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.8639*** 0.2580*** 5,738 0.5827*** 0.3569*** 6,773 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipments 1.0148*** 0.2689*** 1,644 0.6635*** 0.3629*** 1,968 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 1.0025*** 0.3401*** 4,072 0.6799*** 0.3958*** 5,013 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 0.9153*** 0.6034*** 477 0.3873*** 0.6965*** 591 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C. 1.1370*** 0.3449*** 2,238 0.6669*** 0.4295*** 2,694 
32 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus 0.9436*** 0.6574*** 1,489 0.4887*** 0.6974*** 1,863 
33 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 1.0387*** 0.4980*** 708 0.5121*** 0.6117*** 856 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.7570*** 0.5300*** 3,262 0.4936*** 0.5983*** 3,655 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1.0306*** 0.4041*** 557 0.5877*** 0.4551*** 660 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing N.E.C. 1.2380*** 0.1309*** 888 1.0892*** 0.1825*** 1,142 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: The Table reports production function estimates using Olley-Pakes and simple OLS methodologies, by each 2-digit NIC industry. With 
constant returns to scale the sum of the coefficients should equal 1, and if higher, this implies increasing returns to scale for the given industry. 
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Table 1.A.3: Exporting and TFP (by Industry) 
NIC NIC Sector Name 
€ 
β Errors #  
€ 
R2 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.2686*** [0.036] 4,955 0.708 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -1.1438*** [0.248] 126 0.789 
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.2609*** [0.030] 4,757 0.618 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.6911*** [0.128] 483 0.564 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags and footwear 1.0234*** [0.167] 347 0.701 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 0.2577*** [0.093] 228 0.749 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.3966*** [0.058] 1,181 0.560 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.1837** [0.072] 373 0.766 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0.0323 [0.092] 479 0.619 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.3354*** [0.022] 8,945 0.618 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.3084*** [0.040] 2,681 0.635 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.1969*** [0.043] 2,016 0.557 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.3733*** [0.040] 3,918 0.628 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipments 0.4486*** [0.062] 1,060 0.705 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 0.0813*** [0.028] 3,293 0.716 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery -0.1037 [0.152] 320 0.670 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C. -0.0480 [0.045] 1,713 0.731 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.1458** [0.068] 1,165 0.716 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.1107 [0.094] 469 0.800 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.0775*** [0.029] 2,326 0.707 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.1869 [0.116] 475 0.812 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing N.E.C. 0.1914 [0.121] 610 0.568 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: The Table reports estimates of Equation (2) with the sample restricted to a given 2-digit NIC industry. Each row reports the co-
efficient, standard errors clustered at the firm level and the 
€ 
R2 from one regression as well as the number of observations.  
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Table 1.A.4: Balancing Tests 
  Mean   t-test 
Variable Sample Treated  Control % bias % bias ↓ t p>|t| 
Lag (Sales) Unmatched 5.2063 5.6853 -26.6  -10.86 0.000 
 Matched 5.2063 5.2287 -1.2 95.3 -0.46 0.687 
        
Lag 
(Productivity) Unmatched -0.1919 -0.3138 9.0  3.88 0.000 
 Matched -0.1919 -0.0937 -7.2 19.3 -2.27 0.023 
 
 
 
Table 1.A.5: First-Stage Results 
Predictors Start 
Δ Weighted tariffs -0.0009**  
 [0.000]  
Weighted tariffs (levels)  -0.0007* 
  [0.000] 
Age -0.0052*** -0.0056*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes 
# 16,442 15,899 
€ 
R2 0.496 0.499 
Partial 
€ 
R2 0.001 0.001 
F-Statistic 10.17 5.61 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Robust standard errors in square brackets (clustered at the firm level) 
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Figures 
Figure 1.A.1: Number of exporters 
 
 Source: Based on Prowess, CMIE (Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.A.2: Technology Achievement Index 
 
Source: Based on data from Global Economic Prospects (World Bank 2008) 
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Figure 1.A.3: Identification of the true impact 
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Figure 1.A.4: Region of Common Support (Unmatched and Matched samples) 
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Figure 1.A.5: Tariffs and Exports   
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and Trains 
 
 
Figure 1.A.6: Indian Export share 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and Comtrade 
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Figure 1.A.7: Range of export shares by industries 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and Comtrade 
 
 
 
Figure 1.A.8: Range of export shares by top 20 export markets and industries 
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) and Comtrade 
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Figure 1.A.9: Sales, Capital and Entry into Export Markets 
 
Notes: S = Sales, GA=Gross Assets (Capital) 
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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the determinants of firm location choice at the district-
level in India to gauge the relative importance of agglomeration economies 
vis-à-vis good business environment. A peculiar characteristic of the 
Indian economy is that within the non-farm sector, unorganised enterprises 
account for 43.2% of NDP and employ 71.6% of the workforce. I analyse 
National Sample Survey data that covers over 4.4 million enterprises in the 
unorganised sector, in both manufacturing and services industries. The 
empirical analysis is carried out using count models. Since the unorganised 
sector has little access to formal credit facilities and remains untouched by 
changes in regulations, in line with intuition I find that intra-industry 
clustering and linkages to buyers and suppliers are of paramount 
importance. In short, the general business environment seems to be largely 
irrelevant for the location decisions of unorganised sector establishments, 
whilst agglomeration economies seem to matter more. I conclude that 
public policy may be limited in its ability to encourage relocation of 
informal firms. 
 
 
Keywords: Agglomeration, Informal Sector, Location Choice, India 
JEL Classification: R1, R3, O1 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The unorganised, or informal sector25 is an important means of livelihood to millions of 
people in developing countries. Because of its very nature – it is unregulated by 
government – data collection and subsequent analysis lags far behind that for the formal 
sector. In India, the informal sector often falls outside the scope for planned 
development efforts, and thus remains in the shadows with regard to productivity, social 
security and statistics.  
 
This paper is a first attempt to understand the forces that drive the clustering of informal 
sector activities in India. I study how new firms within the Indian unorganised sector 
choose to locate themselves across districts26 in the country. Using count models I carry 
out an empirical test of the decisions of individual firms. In the model, firms compare 
potential profitability as a function of observable location specific advantages, market 
access, agglomeration economies and a set of unobserved local attributes of the district. 
And so, to unpack the location decisions of unorganised sector firms, an econometric 
analysis of location patterns is carried out to identify the ‘revealed preferences’ of firms. 
Firm-level data for the unorganised sector is taken from surveys conducted by the 
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), which includes information on the 
number and type of new firms within each district.  
 
It is important to test whether individual firm’s decisions are based on agglomeration 
economies, or on other factors, such as good business environment – the latter being 
more amenable to change by policy than the former. In theory, if government is 
interested in encouraging industrial growth in particular regions, it should have a clear 
understanding of what factors drive firm location decisions. Since earlier papers have 
analysed the case of location decisions made by the Indian formal sector (albeit only for 
manufacturing firms - see Lall et al 2004, Lall and Chakravorty 2005), this paper does 
not reinvent the wheel and concentrates mainly on an analysis of the informal sector. It 
does provide an overview of how the results differ between the formal and the informal 
sector as a sub-section in the robustness analysis, but the point of the paper is not to 
                                                
25 A number of countries, including India, often use the terms ‘unorganised sector’ and 
‘informal sector’ interchangeably. 
26 India is a federal union of 28 states and 7 union territories, which are further sub-divided into 
604 districts.  
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make a comparative study. Since there is little or no research that sheds light on what 
factors attract smaller, unorganised sector firms to a location, this paper is, first and 
foremost, an attempt to fill in this gap in the knowledge. In particular, one might expect 
informal firms to behave differently from those in the formal sector – they may be less 
encumbered by regulatory structures, they could be less sensitive to wage levels since 
they mostly rely on own or family-labour, and they could me more mobile, across 
locations and industries. The importance of networks of social interaction with their 
intermediate goods’ suppliers or their final goods’ buyers within a location might 
outweigh the importance of infrastructure or institutional factors. These links might be 
with other establishments in the informal sector, or with those in the formal sector, and 
the paper will make an attempt to disentangle the relationship between the two sectors, 
formal and informal, and across industries both manufacturing and services. Since the 
informal sector in India is a significant source of employment (32%) and economic 
growth (22.6%) (National Account Statistics 2005), there remains a yawning gap in the 
empirical understanding of how a large proportion of the country’s economic sector 
makes location decisions. 
 
While the results of the analysis provide an understanding of what drives clustering in 
informal industries in India, they also add to a rapidly growing body of empirical 
evidence that tests the theoretical implications of Krugman’s economic geography. This 
paper finds that agglomeration economies have a significant effect on firms’ location 
decisions, and that the ability of incremental policy reforms to counter the effects of 
geography may be limited. Indeed, clustering of firms within the same industry, and 
clustering close to buyers or suppliers has very different implications for the formal 
versus the informal sector. At the same time, informal firms seem unaffected by labour 
costs, while the same may not be true of formal firms. A similar result is obtained for 
different types of infrastructure. If public policy finds itself limited in its ability to affect 
industrial diversity or the clustering of buyers and suppliers, then in the case of the 
unorganised sector, geography could indeed be destiny. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a descriptive overview of 
the clustering of informal sector activity, in both the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Section 2.3 starts with a theoretical explanation of the factors influencing the location of 
economic activity, and presents evidence of how these theories have been tested 
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empirically in the literature. This section also provides an overview of how 
agglomeration economies may be different for sectors, formal compared to informal, 
and services compared to manufacturing. Section 2.4 lays out the estimation framework 
and discusses the main sources of data. Section 2.5 presents the results of the model. 
Section 2.6 describes the identification strategy employed, disaggregates the results by 
size and industry-type and studies co-agglomeration and input-output linkages between 
the organised and the unorganised sectors. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses the 
implications of the findings.  
 
 
2.2 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The unorganised sector in India refers to those enterprises whose activities or collection 
of data is not regulated under legal provision and/or which do not maintain regular 
accounts. These enterprises are not registered under the Factories Act of 1948. The Act 
requires all firms engaged in manufacturing to register if they employ 10 workers or 
more and use power, or if they employ 20 workers or more. Thus, it can be reasonably 
assumed that all privately-owned manufacturing enterprises meeting these two criteria 
are said to be in the organised sector. All public sector enterprises are also automatically 
assumed to be in the organised sector. Services enterprises are not required to register 
under the Factories Act (unless they happen to also be engaged in manufacturing 
activities), and thus, most privately owned services firms are officially classified as 
being in the unorganised sector. This also applies to large banks, insurance and real-
estate firms that maintain proper accounts but which are not registered under the 
Factories Act. Although the data on unorganised firms excludes firms in the finance and 
trade sectors, later in the paper, I analyse enterprises by size to try and control for this 
problem of definition of what constitutes as unorganised for services firms.  
 
The terms ‘unorganised’ and ‘informal’ sector enterprises are used interchangeably in 
this paper; technically, however, the latter are a subset of the former. The informal 
sector comprises mainly of unincorporated proprietary or partnership enterprises, while 
the unorganised sector includes the same along with cooperative societies, trusts and 
private limited companies. The data used in the paper refers primarily to firms in the 
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unorganised sector. The unorganised sector in India cuts across various well-defined 
industries and crafts, conglomerates like cottage and household industries, khadi and 
village industries, handlooms, handicrafts, coir, sericulture etc, set up all over the 
country in rural, semi-urban and urban environments. 
 
The difference between what constitutes as organised and unorganised extends far 
beyond adherence to a bureaucratic procedure of registration. The unorganised sector 
consists predominantly of very small-scale enterprises – between 90 to 93 per cent of 
the establishments in the sample employ less than 5 workers, and between 68 and 70 per 
cent employ no hired labour at all. Thus, these enterprises are tiny with regard to 
economic characteristics, and there is very little understanding of the sort of incentives 
that may drive their location behaviour in India owing to lack of good data.    
 
The unorganised sector in India continues to occupy a substantial place in the country’s 
economy. Its share in the country’s Net Domestic Product (NDP) was 56.7% in 2002-
03. The importance of the unorganised sector differs substantially across farm and non-
farm activities. For instance, in the same year, its share of agricultural NDP was a 
whopping 96%, and its share of manufacturing and services NDP was 39.5% and 46.9% 
respectively. The unorganised sector’s total NDP contribution can be broken down into 
its services (43.2%) and manufacturing (16.8%) components. Manufacturing enterprises 
are often registered because they require more licenses and need access to more 
infrastructure and capital. On the other hand, service activities can be undertaken 
without many of these pre-requisites. 
 
The importance of the unorganised sector is even starker with regards to employment. 
In 2004-05, the unorganised sector was a source of livelihood to approximately 86.3% 
of the country’s workforce. Although a large section of the unorganised sector works 
within agricultural activities, it is pertinent to note that 71.6% of the total employment 
in the non-farm sector was also unorganised. In other words, although the unorganised 
sector contributes just over half of the country’s NDP, it employs almost 90% of its 
workforce.  
 
The contribution of the unorganised sector to employment has also remained broadly 
stable over the last few decades, with that of the formal sector rising very slowly over 
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time. Informal agricultural employment has barely budged around the 99.4 per cent 
mark. In fact the proportion of unorganised sector employment has risen for all these 
sectors, especially for services and manufacturing by a few percentage points over the 
period of study (1983-94 to 1999-2000). Sectors like electricity, gas and water supply, 
and transport and communication have also experienced rapid informalisation of their 
workforce. In other words, the dominance of unorganised employment in the country 
shows no signs of abating (see Table 2.A.3). 
 
Having established that the unorganised sector is much too important too be ignored, 
and before studying the impact of various factors affecting the location of unorganised 
firms, I will now establish that both types of industry within the unorganised sector, 
manufacturing and services, show evidence of spatial clustering27 across different 
districts in India. A study of what drives spatial concentration of economic activity can 
only be interesting if such patterns exist in the first place.  
 
Over the last decade, there has been much interest in studying the location and the 
geographic concentration of economic activity. The clustering of economic activity has 
important implications for development, through its effect on employment and growth. 
The location of clusters of economic activity drive growth by increasing the 
productivity of firms and industries, by increasing the pace of innovation through the 
exchange of ideas and by stimulating the formation of new businesses. This creates 
jobs, which in turn attracts more people and activity, leading to a virtuous cycle of 
growth and employment.  
 
The Government of India has focussed much attention on trying to encourage industrial 
activity in secondary cities or to areas where such activity has not previously clustered 
or even favoured. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has used a 
number of tools targeting those within the informal sector. For instance, special health 
insurance schemes have been set up, social security measures were put into place and 
funds have been made available for technical, marketing and credit facilities to 
households, workers and firms in the informal sector. In addition, a number of states in 
India, for instance, Maharashtra, have provided a slew of incentive schemes focussing 
                                                
27 Clustering is a phenomenon in which events or artefacts are not randomly distributed over 
space, but tend to be organised into proximate groups.  
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primarily on small-scale enterprises. Such incentives include exemptions from central 
excise duties, sales tax reductions, product and power subsidies etc. Since enterprises 
can enjoy these incentives provided their production is below a certain threshold, this 
has to some extent helped flourish smaller enterprises.  
 
However, even though the unorganised sector is of critical importance to the economy, 
there is little understanding of what attracts these activities to locations. As pointed out 
before, unorganised sector establishments look very different from those in the 
organised sector – they are smaller, have less capital, avoid taxes and regulatory 
burdens and probably rely more on informal networks and less on public goods such as 
power, water and transportation. It could be theorised that the economic incentives that 
drive their location decisions may also be equally different. Note here that I do not 
make any normative assessments of whether informality should be encouraged or not. 
There is evidence in other countries (see La porta and Shleifer 2011) to show that 
informal firms provide inexpensive goods and services of substantially lower quality, 
however this is also exactly what their customers are able to buy28.  
 
There are many methods to ascertain whether firms are uniformly distributed across 
various locations or if they show patterns of spatial concentration. Clustering in its 
simplest forms can be shown graphically, or through a bird’s eye view of where 
industry is located by means of maps.  
 
Figure 2.A.2 provides maps representing an actual representation of firm density for the 
country – the size of the circle is proportional to the number of new informal firm births 
within the district. If we were to assume, as I do later in the paper, that a given firm 
chooses a location based on the current characteristics of that location, we need to look 
at the location decisions made by new firms to study if these show any signs of 
geographical clustering. Studying the past location decisions of existing firms would be 
difficult in the face of inadequate data with regard to two aspects: data on when these 
firms made their decisions and data corresponding to the characteristics of the location 
when these decisions were taken.  
 
                                                
28 Indeed, La Porta and Shleifer (2011) conclude that since informal firms are so inefficient, 
bringing them into the formal sector by taxing them or requiring them to comply with 
government regulations would probably drive most of them out of business.  
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The total number of new informal manufacturing and services units exceeded 2 million 
respectively. It is clear that whilst some districts in the country host a lot of new 
unorganised economic activity, others are virtually empty. Also firm births tend to 
cluster in the same geographical districts, albeit with some differences depending on the 
type of sub-sector. There are 604 districts in the country, of which informal 
manufacturing firms are present in 578 districts, and of these around 39 districts account 
for 50% of all economic activity. On the other hand, informal services firms are present 
in 556 districts. Of these, around 60 districts account for 50% of all economic activity. 
In other words, new informal activity is highly concentrated within a few districts in the 
country.  
 
Of course one could argue that clustering in these districts is simply a factor of the size 
of the district. And so, the next set of maps carries out the same exercise, but after 
controlling for the area of the district (in 
€ 
km2), district population and coastal dummies 
(i.e. whether the district borders a coast) – and there remains evidence of concentration 
of economic activity in the country. After adding controls, clustering moves from 
particular districts to clusters of districts. In other words, the per capita rate remains 
high for the densely populated districts and for their neighbouring districts (see Figure 
A.2.3).  
 
Although maps provide a convenient visual representation of the location of new 
economic activity, more detailed statistics are required to ascertain if there is any 
evidence of clustering. If economic activity of a particular industry is biased towards a 
subset of regions, then the industry is said to be ‘concentrated’; and if economic activity 
of a particular region is biased towards a subset of industries, the region is said to be 
‘specialised’. I use the Theil index to study what regions are specialised, and the 
Ellison-Glaeser (EG) Index29 to study concentration across industries (see Appendix A 
for construction of these indices).  
 
The Theil Index here provides an indication of the over or under-representation of 
district across a set of given industries, i.e. the distribution of new firms by NIC sector 
across districts. The index belongs to the family of generalised entropy inequality 
                                                
29 Duranton and Overman (2005) use a more distance-sensitive measure of concentration. I am 
unable to estimate their index owing to lack of micro-data on firm location.  
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measures wherein the values vary between 0 and ∞, with zero representing an equal 
distribution and higher values representing higher values of inequality30. I calculate the 
Theil Index for unorganised manufacturing and services, and for organised 
manufacturing and services31. I present the results in the form of maps for visual 
comparisons and also list the top ten districts by contribution to the Theil Index. The 
value of the index for unorganised manufacturing and services equals approximately 
3009 and 9503 respectively. The corresponding values for organised manufacturing and 
services are 4827 and 417. It should be noted that whilst I have comparable data for 
unorganised manufacturing and services industries (578 and 556 districts respectively), 
the same is far from true for organised manufacturing and services (495 and 127 
districts respectively). It is interesting to note that the maps depicting the contribution of 
the Theil Index for the unorganised sector correspond to some extent to the visual 
clustering presented in earlier maps. In other words, districts such as Mumbai, Delhi, 
Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmadabad, Thane, Pune etc show evidence of 
agglomeration even after using different descriptive techniques to control for district-
specific characteristics and for the size and the distribution of firms across districts.  
 
There is also limited concordance between the top ten most clustered districts (arranged 
by count of new firms, count of new firms controlling for size, and contributions to the 
Theil Index) across unorganised and organised sectors for both industries, 
manufacturing and services. In other words, not only does the unorganised sector, for 
both manufacturing and services industries, shows more evidence of clustering, but it 
also seems to be clustered in different districts. The differences in the patterns of 
clustering is interesting, since we may also be interested in exploring the linkages 
between organised and unorganised activity later in the paper to see if they are 
substitutes or complements.  
 
The EG Index provides an indication of the district within which new unorganised 
sector activity is concentrated. 2.A.6 and Table 2.A.7 provide the EG Indices for the 
                                                
30 The value of the index increases in the inequality of the distribution of firm births by district 
with respect to total firm births: 
€ 
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31 As explained later in the text, I use the Annual Survey of Industries for data on organised 
manufacturing, and the Prowess database for organised services.  
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unorganised sector, for manufacturing and services industries, across districts. The 
Index has the property of controlling simultaneously for the employment distribution 
among firms and regions. In their paper, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) demonstrate that 
the index takes the value of zero under the null hypothesis of random location 
conditional on aggregate employment in that region. In other words, the no-
agglomeration benchmark is when the value of the index is zero (i.e. 
€ 
E(γ) = 0). In 
general, if the EG index is greater than 0.05, the industry is considered to be highly 
concentrated. I find that manufactures of office, accounting and computing equipment, 
transport and communications equipment, and that of leather products, among others is 
highly concentrated in a few districts. Services related to research and development, 
computers and supporting transport and other activities also shows evidence of much 
concentration.  
 
Having established that there is overwhelming evidence of clustering in unorganised 
industry across different districts in India, this paper will examine the factors that drive 
such clustering. In particular it will focus on identifying the role of agglomeration 
economies in influencing the decision of firms to cluster, i.e. to locate close to one 
another. It will examine the nature and scale of agglomeration economies using district 
and NIC 2-digit-level data for unorganised firms in India.  
 
 
2.3 Theoretical background and Literature 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of the theoretical understanding of 
agglomeration economies and outline a few empirical studies of relevance.  
 
For an excellent overview of the location theory, see Brulhart (1998) (Table 1, Page 
778) that describes the different theoretical schools and lists their principal 
distinguishing features. Marshall (1919) was the first to identify the benefits from 
industrial clustering. Clusters of firms, predominantly in the same sector, could take 
advantage of localisation economies, such as the sharing of sector-specific inputs, 
skilled labour and knowledge. Thus, cost-saving externalities are maximised when a 
local industry is specialised. The Marshall-Arrow-Romer (Marshall 1890, Arrow, 1962, 
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Romer 1986) models predict that such externalities predominantly occur within the 
same industry. Therefore, if an industry is subject to localisation externalities, firms are 
likely to locate in a few regions where other firms in that industry are already clustered. 
 
The next level is that of inter-industry clustering32, i.e. when firms in a given industry 
and those in related industries agglomerate in a particular location. The benefits of 
clustering would include inter-industry linkages, buyer-supplier networks, and 
opportunities for efficient sub-contracting. Venables (1996) demonstrates that 
agglomeration could occur through the combination of firm location decisions and 
buyer-supplier linkages, since the presence of local suppliers could reduce transaction 
costs and increase profitability. Inter-industry linkages can also serve as a channel for 
vital information transfers.  
 
An overall large size of the urban agglomeration and its more diverse industry mix is 
also thought to provide external benefits beyond those realised within a single sector or 
due to a tight buyer-supplier network (Henderson 2003). Chinitiz (1961) and Jacobs 
(1969) proposed that important knowledge transfers primarily occur across industries 
and the diversity of local industry mix is important for these externality benefits. These 
benefits are typically called urbanisation economies and include access to specialised 
financial and professional services, availability of a large labour pool with multiple 
specialisations, inter-industry information transfers and the availability of less costly 
general infrastructure. Larger cities also provide a larger home market for end products, 
and make it easier to attract skilled employees. Other factors that make big cities more 
attractive are urban amenities not available in smaller towns and a large number of 
complementary service providers such as financial and legal advisers, advertising and 
real estate services etc. 
 
Thus, industrial clustering could take place at different levels, which would have 
different implications for the associated agglomeration economies. A firm could gain 
from economies of agglomeration that arise from localisation economies, that occur as a 
result of concentration of firms within the same industry; inter-industry economies, that 
occur as a result of concentration of firms in related industries in a particular area; and 
                                                
32 As Deichmann et al (2005) points out, empirically the distinction between own-industry 
versus cross-industry is dependent on the level of sectoral aggregation.  
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urbanisation economies, that occur across all industries as a result of the scale of a city 
or region by means of its large markets and urban diversity. It is also pertinent to note 
that localisation, inter-industry and urbanisation economies are not mutually exclusive – 
they may occur individually or in combination.  
 
 In the empirical literature, there are two broad approaches to identify the determinants 
of firms’ location decisions. One is survey-based or the ‘stated preference’ approach’, 
for instance to ask firms directly, through an investment climate survey, for instance, 
about what location factors are important to them. The second approach is a modelling 
approach or an econometric analysis of empirical patterns used to identify ‘revealed 
preferences’ based on the characteristics of the region.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no empirical tests in the literature on factors that 
could drive the location decisions of informal activity33. The existing research looks 
mainly at the formal sector – whether for manufacturing, or services or both. For 
instance, with regards to formal manufacturing in India, Lall and Meningstae (2005) 
analyse the productivity of plants sampled from 40 of the country’s largest industrial 
cities and found that differences in clustering across locations were explained by market 
access, labour regulation and the quality of power supply. With regards to foreign 
entrants into domestic manufacturing sectors, Head and Reis (1996) show that foreign 
firms in China preferred to locate in cities where other foreign firms are located. In their 
paper Head and Mayer (2004) show that downstream linkages made regions in Europe 
more attractive to Japanese investors, but the paper does not account for access to 
suppliers. Cheng and Kwan (2000), and Amiti and Javorcki (2005) also confirm that 
regional markets and buyer-supplier linkages were important factors affecting the 
location decisions of foreign firms.  
 
Services firms are theorised to be different from manufacturing. For instance, in some 
services, product specialisation, rather than standardisation, may be more important in 
capturing markets (Enderwick 1989), and proximity to competitors, suppliers and 
                                                
33 There is however, a large and developed literature on workers’ occupational choices, with 
their intellectual roots in the Harris-Todaro (1970) model in which workers compare expected 
incomes in a dual-sector setting.  Within this setting, Tiglao and Tsutsumi (2005) model 
location choices of informal households in Manila, in conjunction with occupational sector 
choices.  
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markets may be significant determinants of location decisions (Bagchi-Sen 1995).  With 
the introduction of new communication technologies and the ability to slice the service 
production chain more thinly, it could be argued that proximity would cease to be an 
important factor in explaining agglomeration economies. Earlier research conducted in 
North America (Kirn 1987 for the US, and Coffey and McRae 1989 for Canada) found 
that producer services did not necessarily follow population and manufacturing location 
patterns – they could locate in peripheral regions and develop an export base. However, 
more recent research (Dekle and Eaton 1999, Coffey and Shearmur 2002) found 
evidence that the agglomeration economies exerted a stronger influence in services than 
in manufacturing, in spite of advances in information and communications technology.  
 
There are a number of reasons why informal activities are different from the formal 
economy. For instance, they are usually an extension of the household economy and 
start-ups that require little or no capital investment. Informal sector enterprises in India 
comprise of unregulated micro-enterprises, the bulk of which employ less than five 
workers, and all of which employ less than 50 workers. Examples of such enterprises 
are those that produce bidis (Indian cigarettes), small piece-rate suppliers to the textile, 
weaving or footwear sectors, small shopkeepers etc. The informal sector is also the 
largest employer of rural migrants in big cities like Mumbai, Kolkata and Delhi, and 
like in other countries, the sector serves as the only source of employment to those who 
are unable to find work in the formal economy. Thus, small enterprises have been 
viewed as an important means of promoting industrialisation and employment in poor 
countries.  
 
McGee (1977) noted that the informal sector in South-East Asian cities tended to 
concentrate in areas of dense population such as nodes of transportation, or where there 
are adjacent activities such as entertainment complexes, public markets and also in 
those localities where they could benefit from product complementarities and mutual 
customer attraction. A priori, there is no reason to assume that informal sector activity 
remains unaffected by agglomeration economies. Indeed, it could be hypothesised that 
in the absence of access to formal credit facilities, or alternatively since they are 
untouched by changes in regulations, the importance of buyer-supplier linkages and 
informal networks of social interaction could be more important to them than to firms 
operating in the organised sector. The informal sector in India largely ignores labour 
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regulations, officially recognised collective bargaining processes, taxes or institutional 
obligations. There is some research (Marjit and Kar 2009) to show that informal 
manufacturing and self-employed units accumulate fixed assets and invest and that 
often they are able to do so in times when their formal counterparts are mired in 
complex regulations. 
 
Production in the formal sector is also dependent on subcontracting among informal 
firms specialised in some aspect of the vertical production chain. Although parts of the 
unorganised sector pertain mostly to the production of non-tradables in the economy 
(think of street vendors and domestic help) they are also an important input to the 
production of intermediate goods, processed exports and import substitutes, supported 
by supply side contracts with the formal sector. For instance, informal carpet weavers in 
Agra operate alongside larger, more formal carpet designers and exporting firms in the 
city. And to the extent that the informal sector is linked to its formal counterpart, wages 
in the sector could be affected by structural changes in the formal industrial sector.  
 
With the theoretical and empirical literatures in mind, this paper will concentrate on the 
extent to which agglomeration economies matter to informal firms’ location decisions, 
and compare them to those in the formal sector. The next section will describe the 
estimation framework employed and them move on to discussing the results and 
possible endogeneity bias.  
 
 
2.4 Estimation Framework 
 
2.4.1 Econometric model 
A popular model of location choice are conditional logits which assume that a firm 
evaluates alternative locations at each time period, and would consider relocation if its 
profitability in another place exceeded that at its current location34. The use of a discrete 
choice framework to model location behaviour goes back to the 1970s, when Carlton 
                                                
34 In reality, relocation can be costly and firms need to take account of sunk investments in 
production capacity, and other costs of moving. However, these relocation costs are not 
considered in the model.  
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(1979) adapted and applied McFadden’s (1974) Random Utility Maximisation (RUM) 
Framework to firm location decisions.  
 
Within such a discrete choice framework, a general profit function is used to explain 
how new firms choose a location. Following McFadden the model assumes a set 
€ 
J = (1,2,.....j,.....n)  of possible locations (districts) assuming that location 
€ 
j  offers 
profitability level 
€ 
π ijk  to a firm 
€ 
i  in industry 
€ 
k . The resulting profitability equation 
yielded by location 
€ 
j  to a firm 
€ 
i  in industry 
€ 
k  is: 
 
€ 
π ijk = βZijk +ε ijk          (1) 
 
where 
€ 
β is the vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated and 
€ 
ε ijk  is a random term. 
Thus, the profit equation is composed of a deterministic and a stochastic component. 
Under the assumption of independent and identically distributed error terms 
€ 
ε ijk , with 
type I extreme-value distribution, then it can be assumed that the ith firm will choose 
district j if 
€ 
π j
i ≥π l
i  for all l, where l indexes all the possible location choices to the ith 
firm. Thus, the probability that any firm will choose to locate in a district j is given by: 
 
 
€ 
pijk (π ij ≥π il∀l ≠ j) =
eβZ ijk
eβZ ijk
m=1
J
∑
       (2) 
 
where 
€ 
pijk  is the probability that firm 
€ 
i  in industry 
€ 
k  locates in district 
€ 
j . If we let 
€ 
dijk =1 if firm 
€ 
i  of industry 
€ 
k  picks location 
€ 
j , and 
€ 
dijk = 0  otherwise, then we can 
write the log likelihood of the conditional logit model as follows: 
 
€ 
logLcl = dijk log pijk
j=1
J
∑
k=1
K
∑
i=1
N
∑         (3) 
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In practice, however, the implementation of the conditional logit model in the face of a 
large set of spatial alternatives is very cumbersome35. The conditional logit model is 
also characterised by the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
Consequently, the ratio of the logit probabilities for any two alternatives does not 
depend on any alternatives other than the two considered. More formally, this implies 
that the 
€ 
ε ijks are independent across individual firms and choices; all locations would be 
symmetric substitutes after controlling for observables. This assumption would be 
violated if districts within particular states were closer substitutes than others outside of 
the state boundary. The addition of dummy variables for each individual choice would 
effectively control for choice specific unobservables, amounting to the following 
specification:  
 
€ 
π ijk = δ j + βZijk +ε ijk          (4) 
 
where s are the alternative specific constants introduced to absorb factors that are 
specific to each particular choice. In this case all explanatory variables (observable or 
unobservable) that only change across choices are absorbed by the alternative specific 
constants. In the presence of large datasets, such as the one I plan on using, this 
implementation would be impractical because of the large number of parameters to be 
estimated. And this would still leave the problem of the IIA unsolved.  
 
To overcome the potential IIA problem and to remain computationally tractable in the 
face of numerous location alternatives caused by the use of disaggregate or micro level 
of geography, a number of studies investigated the applicability of count models such as 
Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB), to predict the number of firms located on each of 
a large number of alternative locations (Papke 1991, Becker and Henderson 2000, 
Coughlin and Segev 2000, Holl 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, Carod and Antolin 2004).  Papke 
(1991) models the number of firm formation with a Poisson distribution and also 
controls for unobserved location heterogeneity using a fixed-effects framework. Wu 
(1999) compares the applicability of Poisson and NB in intra-metropolitan location 
behaviour of foreign direct investment in Guangzhou, China. Becker and Henderson 
(2000) investigate the impacts of environmental regulation on the formation of polluting 
                                                
35 Guimaraes et al. (2003) provide an overview of the problems and how different researchers 
have attempted to deal with them in the past.  
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plants, where they indirectly compare empirical results between fixed-effects Poisson 
and conditional logit. Coughlin and Segev (2000) apply NB to examine the location 
determinants of foreign-owned manufacturing plants at US county level. Using 
Portuguese municipality data, Holl (2004a) estimates a fixed-effects Poisson model, 
Holl (2004b) estimates a fixed-effects NB model, and Holl (2004c) estimates both a 
fixed-effects Poisson and NB when studying location behaviour of new or relocating 
firms. Carod and Antolin (2004) focus on the level of geographic aggregation and 
present three econometric results based on a multinomial logit, conditional logit and the 
Poisson model, but they do not directly address the comparability between the 
multinomial logit and Poisson.  
 
In this way, count models gained popularity as the number of alternative locations 
increased, since what these lead to computational burdens in conditional logit models 
but in count models these are an advantage owing to the availability of more numerous 
observations. In addition, one might also think of the problem as that of explaining the 
firm births within a location as a function of the characteristics of that location – see 
Ghani et al (2011). If this were the case, then the functional form of a count model, 
wherein the dependent variable is the count of the new firms within a given industry 
within a given district, would also perform well. Unlike an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification, a count specification would have the added benefit of allowing for the 
possibility of zero counts. However, count models were at the time not understood to be 
as theoretically well founded as the conditional logit model, which is based on the RUM 
framework. This was until Guimaraes et al (2003, 2004) showed that count models can 
be specified in a way that is theoretically and empirically consistent with conditional 
logit models and thereby the RUM framework.  
 
Guimaraes et al 2003 show that the implementation of conditional logit models yields 
identical log-likelihood functions to Poisson regression models when the regressors are 
not individual specific. They demonstrate how to control for the potential IIA violation 
by making use of an equivalence relation between the conditional logit and Poisson 
regression likelihood functions. In a separate paper, Guimaraes et al (2004) provide an 
empirical demonstration. In this model the alternative constant is a fixed-effect in a 
Poisson regression model, and coefficients of the model can be given an economic 
interpretation compatible with the Random Utility Maximisation framework.  
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Guimaraes et al (2003) demonstrate that Equation (3) is equivalent to that of a Poisson 
model that takes the number of new firms in a district, 
€ 
n jk, as the dependent variable 
and includes a set of location-specific explanatory variables. The same results will be 
obtained if we assume that 
€ 
n jk follows a Poisson distribution with expected value equal 
to 
€ 
E(n jk ) = λ jk = exp(αh jk + βZ jk ) , where 
€ 
[α,β] is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated and 
€ 
h jk  is a vector of 
€ 
K  dummy variables, each one assuming the value 1 if 
the observation belongs to industry 
€ 
k . Thus, the above problem can be modelled as a 
Poisson regression where the 
€ 
[α,β] vector can be estimated regardless of the number of 
 parameters. Information on actual individual firm choices is grouped into vectors of 
counts without any loss of information. This occurs since there are groups of firms 
faced with the same choice set and the same choice characteristics. For instance, 
consider the problem of identification of the relevant regional factors that affect firm 
location. Typically, researchers view these individual location decisions as profit 
(utility) maximising actions. Firms from diverse sectors evaluate the regional 
characteristics of different regions (i.e. districts) and choose to locate in the region that 
maximises potential profits. In this case, it is common to assume that all firms face the 
same choice set, and the relevant characteristics of the regional choices are identical for 
firms belonging to the same industry. The available information consists of regional 
counts of firm births by industry and variables that reflect the characteristics of the 
regions. Despite the fact that the data consist of individual level choices, the true 
variation of the data is at the group level. Thus, data for the dependent variable may be 
summarised by vectors of counts. 
 
I am interested in modelling the data using McFadden’s discrete choice Random Utility 
Maximisation (RUM) framework. This means that inference is based on the 
multinomial distribution because my interest lies in studying the impact that covariates 
have on choice probabilities, treating the number of firms in each industry group as 
given, wherein all firms share some common industry-level characteristics. This 
introduces the possibility that there exist some unobservable industry-specific effects 
that are likely to equally influence all firms belong to the same industry. If this happens, 
then the individual choices will be correlated and the vectors of counts will exhibit extra 
multinomial variation (i.e. overdispersion). Much like what happens with count models, 
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in this circumstance the conditional logit model will remain consistent but will tend to 
underestimate the variance-covariance matrix.  
 
Guimaraes and Lindrooth (2007) illustrate how the problem can be tackled by using 
Negative-Binomial count models, based on the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution. The 
Dirichlet-Multinomial regression is a natural extension of McFadden’s conditional logit 
model, and their paper shows that this relationship is the same as that of the negative 
binomial regression to the Poisson regression. In other words, the NB model provides a 
parametric alternative to deal with the problem of overdispersed data, and the 
parameters of the model would be equivalent to the Dirichlet-multinomial regression, 
which is an extension of the conditional logit regression. In the same way that the 
likelihood for the conditional logit model is obtained by letting the 
€ 
n jk  (i.e. the number 
of new firms in a given industry and district) following a Poisson law and conditioning 
on the total sum for each group, a similar relationship can be derived for the Dirichet-
multinomial model. In this case, 
€ 
n jk is modelled directly as an overdispersed count 
variable, wherein the number of new firms is distributed according to the negative 
binomial law implying that the total sum of counts for each group also follows a 
negative binomial distribution. Thus, the approach by Guimarares et al (2003, 2004) and 
Guimaraes and Lindroth (2007) effectively controls for the IIA assumption, for 
conditional logit and for Dirichlet-logit models. Accordingly, in this I will use the 
equivalent Poisson and negative binomial regressions to generate coefficients. See 
Mukim and Nunnenkamp (2012) for a comprehensive list of empirical papers that use 
count models and those that use conditional logits.  
 
To sum up, I test the importance of economic geography and locational factors by 
implementing a count model, wherein the count of new firms within a location is 
modelled as a function of factors common to the location and those common to 
particular sectors within a location. The original estimation framework is based on a 
location decision model in which individual firms compare profitability across different 
locations. Since a firm would choose a location depending on the characteristics of the 
location at that given point in time, the model studies the decisions made by new firms. 
In other words, the location decisions of firms are modelled at the point of time at 
which they begin operations at a particular location as a function of the characteristics 
of the chosen location at the time of the decision to locate. As explained later, I use the 
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count of new firms for the years for which I have adequate data for the explanatory 
variables. 
 
2.4.2 Specification of variables 
The deterministic component of the function consists of the various attributes of the 
location that can influence the profitability of a firm in that particular location, the 
random component consists of the unobserved characteristics of the location, and 
measurement errors. The dependent variable in the model is the count of new informal 
firms at time 
€ 
t , whilst all the explanatory variables in the model are defined at time 
€ 
t −1. Section 4.3 below describes the sources of data and the cross-sectional time period 
for manufacturing and services firms in detail. To reduce clutter, I don’t show the time 
subscript below.   
 
The observables in this model are given by: 
€ 
Zijk :σ jk,Λ jk,U j ,MAj ,Ed j ,X j ,W j ,WE j  
 
Where: 
  represents localisation economies, represented by the share of employment in 
industry k  found in district j 
 
€ 
Λ jk  represents inter-industry trading relations measured by the strength of buyer-
supplier linkages 
 represents urbanisation economies in district j (measured by the Herfindahl Index to 
reflect industrial diversity) 
 summarises access to markets in neighbouring districts 
  measures the level of human capital in district j 
 captures the quality and availability of infrastructure (electricity and 
communications) 
  a vector of factor input price variables in district j 
€ 
WE j  captures the level of wealth in district j 
 measures unobserved characteristics of the district which can affect the firm’s 
profitability. Each firm considers these factors at the time it is making its location 
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decision, but these are not captured in the data. The specifics of the endogeneity 
problem are dealt with in more detail in Section 2.6.  
 
The economic geography variables in this model are represented by market access 
(
€ 
MAj ), localisation economies (
€ 
σ jk), inter-industry economies (
€ 
Λ jk ) and urbanisation 
economies (
€ 
U j ). The variables representing business environment are 
€ 
Ed j  (educational 
attainment) 
€ 
X j  (quality and availability of power and communications’ infrastructure) 
and 
€ 
WE j  (wealth). The remainder of this section provides a detailed description of each 
of the variables used in the model.  
 
Localisation economies (
€ 
σ jk) can be measured by own industry employment in the 
region, own industry establishments in the region, or an index of concentration, which 
reflects disproportionately high concentration of the industry in the region in 
comparison to the nation. I measure localisation economies as the proportion of sector 
€ 
k's  employment in district 
€ 
j  as a share of all of sector 
€ 
k's  total employment in the 
country. The variable takes a different value for each industry in a given district, across 
districts. The higher this value, the higher the expectation of intra-industry 
concentration benefits in the district. 
€ 
σ jk =
E j ,k
Ek
 
 
There are several approaches for defining inter-industry linkages: input-output based, 
labour skill based and technology flow based. Although these approaches represent 
different aspects of industry linkages and the structure of a regional economy, the most 
common approach is to use the national level input-output accounts as templates for 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in regional buyer-supplier linkages (Feser and 
Bergman 2000). The strong presence or lack of nationally identified buyer-supplier 
linkages at the local level can be a good indicator of the probability that a firm is located 
in that region. To evaluate the strength of buyer (supplier) linkages for each industry, a 
summation of regional (here district) industry employment weighted by the industry’s 
input (output) coefficient column (row) vector from the national input-output account is 
used: 
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€ 
Λ jk = wke jk
k=1
n
∑  
 
where, 
€ 
Λ jk is the strength of the buyer (supplier) linkage,  is industry k’s national 
input (output) co-efficient column (row) vector and 
€ 
e jk  is total employment for industry 
k in district j. The measure examines local level inter-industry linkages based on 
national input-output accounts. The national I-O coefficient column vectors describe 
intermediate goods requirements for each industry, whilst the I-O coefficient row 
vectors describe final good sales for each industry.  Assuming that local industries 
follow the national average in terms of their purchasing (selling) patterns of 
intermediate (final) goods, national level linkages can be imposed to the local level 
industry structure for examining whether district j has a right mix of buyer-supplier 
industries for industry k. By multiplying the national I-O coefficient vector for industry 
k and the employment size of each sector in district j, simple local employment numbers 
can be weighted based on what industry k  purchases or sells nationally.  
 
I use the Herfindal measure to examine the degree of economic diversity, as a measure 
of urbanisation (
€ 
U j ) in each district. The Herfindal index of a district 
€ 
j  (
€ 
U j ) is the sum 
of squares of employment shares of all industries in district 
€ 
j : 
 
 
Unlike measures of specialisation, which focus on one industry, the diversity index 
considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for 
€ 
U j  is 
one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Thus a higher 
value signifies lower level of economic diversity.  
 
In principle, improved access to consumer markets (including inter-industry buyers and 
suppliers) will increase the demand for a firm’s products, thereby providing the 
incentive to increase scale and invest in cost-reducing technologies. The proposed 
model will use the formulation proposed initially by Hansen (1959), which states that 
the accessibility at point 1 to a particular type of activity at area 2 (say, employment) is 
directly proportional to the size of the activity at area 2 (say, number of jobs) and 
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inversely proportional to some function of the distance separating point 1 from area 2. 
Accessibility is thus defined as the potential for opportunities for interactions with 
neighbouring districts and is defined as: 
€ 
MAj =
Sm
d j−mbm
∑  
 
Where, is the accessibility indicator estimated for location j, is a size indicator 
at destination m (in this case, district population), is a measure of distance between 
origin j and destination m, and b describes how increasing distance reduces the expected 
level of interaction36. The size of the district 
€ 
j  is not included in the computation of 
market access – only that of neighbouring districts is taken into account37. The 
accessibility indicator is constructed using population (as the size indicator), distance 
(as a measure of separation) and is estimated with the exponent value set to 1. The 
market access measure has been constructed by allowing transport to occur along the 
orthodromic distance38 connecting any two districts within a 500-kilometre radius.  
 
I also use data on education to assess the role played by the human capital across 
different districts on the decisions of firms across different industries to situate 
themselves in a particular district. I include a measure of the effect of education, 
captured by the education variable - 
€ 
Ed j . This is defined as the proportion of the 
population within the district with a high-school education.  
 
I define 
€ 
X j  as a measure of ‘natural advantage’ through the embedded quality and 
availability of infrastructure in the district. I use the availability of power (proxied by 
the proportion of households with access to electricity) within a location as an indicator 
of the provision of infrastructure. In addition I also use the proportion of households 
within a district with a telephone connection as an indicator of communications’ 
infrastructure.  
 
                                                
36 In the original model proposed by Hanson (1959), b is an exponent describing the effect of 
the travel time between the zones.  
37 The final specification includes population to control for the size of district 
€ 
j . 
38 Also known as great-circle distance, it is the shortest distance between any two points on the 
surface of a sphere. 
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€ 
W j  is an indicator of labour costs in a district, and is given by nominal district-level 
wage rates (i.e. non-agricultural hourly wages). The expected effect of this variable is 
hard to pin down theoretically. On the one hand, if wages were a measure of input 
costs39 then one would expect informal activity to be inversely related to wages, since 
high costs within a location would make it less attractive. However, it is also important 
to control for the skill set of the workers since a positive coefficient on wages could be 
proxying for more skilled-labour. In theory, workers with higher ability could demand a 
higher wage rate and in turn enjoy a higher level of consumption. And in line with 
Rauch’s (1992) findings40 one might expect that better-educated workers are able to 
capture the returns from agglomeration in the form of higher wages. If this were the 
case, higher wages would not dissuade firms that benefit from agglomeration economies 
from choosing a location, since the higher costs would be defrayed by higher 
productivity. In general one would expect informal firms to pay low wages consistent 
with some proportion of production being carried out by household enterprises.  
 
Although I am unable to directly control for the ability of the worker, I include 
education as a proxy for the level of human capital within the district. I then use the 
proportion of high-income households (
€ 
WE j ) within a district is an indicator of the 
general level of wealth, or more specifically, consumer expenditure within a district. 
The variable is constructed using household consumption data and refers to those 
households that belong to the highest monthly per-capita consumption expenditure 
group41.  
 
In summary, the economic geography variables are supplemented with controls for 
infrastructure (education, electricity and telephone), market size (wealth) and input cost 
(wages). It is also standard to control for transport infrastructure, but owing to lack of 
data I have been unable to include road or rail transport controls at the district level.  
 
                                                
39 Since the vast majority of informal firms are small enterprises and have little or no access to 
capital or machinery, labour would be their primary input. Thus, wage rates would serve as a 
good proxy for general input costs.  
40 Using the 1980 US Census, Rauch finds that wages are higher in cities with higher average 
education and that the higher returns to education in denser markets could arise because higher 
levels of human capital could result in the transmission of better ideas.   
41 The actual MPCE category differs depending on the year of the survey, the type of district 
(rural or urban) and the population of the district. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
# 
 
Mean Variable 
 
Expected 
Sign 
 Manufacturing (2004-2005) 
Services 
(1999-2000) 
Manufacturing 
(2004-2005) 
Services 
(1999-2000) 
New firms   567 572 3,531 4,111 
Localisation + 557 469 0.003 0.002 
Input + 557 462 4213.2 3821.3 
Output + 557 462 2189.6 8237.7 
Urbanisation - 578 586 0.41 0.33 
Market Access + 574 582 869363 871313 
Education + 578 480 0.074 0.056 
Electricity + 578 486 0.633 0.559 
Telephone + 578 486 0.368 0.083 
Wealth + 578 486 0.051 0.054 
Wages -/+ 574 483 100.94 93.47 
Notes: # refers to the number of districts for which data is available. There are a total of 
604 districts in the country.  
 
 
2.4.3. Data Sources 
The dependent variable, used in the reduced form estimation, is the count of new firms 
within the informal sector in India. I run two separate regressions, for manufacturing 
and services industries. The data is drawn from the Fifty-Seventh Round (July 2001-
June 2002: Unorganised Service Sector) and the Sixty-Second Round (July 2005-June 
2006: Unorganised Manufacturing Enterprises) of the National Sample Survey 
Organisation. The former household survey contains data on services enterprises in the 
informal sector (NIC division 38-97), and the latter on manufacturing enterprises in the 
informal sector (NIC division 15-37). Enterprises are divided into (1) own account 
enterprises, which are normally run by household labour and which do not hire outside 
labour on a regular basis, (2) non-directory establishments, which employ one to five 
workers (including household and hired taken together) and (3) directory 
establishments, which employ six or more workers (including household and hired 
taken together). 
 
I extract data on new firms from the question that asks the enterprise its status over the 
last 3 years (expanding/stagnant/contracting/operated for less than 3 years). I select 
enterprises that respond in the positive to the latter option, in each of the two surveys. 
The surveys also contain data on the district within which the enterprise is located. The 
  93 
total number of new services firms within the 1999 survey equals 2,409,204 and the 
count of new manufacturing firms for the 2004 survey is 2,041,137. In short, I carry out 
two separate cross-sections, one for unorganised manufacturing firms and the other for 
unorganised services firms. Since the surveys sample different firm populations, I am 
not able to exploit changes between the two rounds. However, I am interested in 
looking at what factors drive unorganised manufacturing and/or services firms to a 
district.  
 
The choice of years is dictated by the data. Whilst data on the dependent variable is 
drawn from the NSSO Rounds described above, I extract data from the Employment 
and Unemployment Surveys - Round 55.10 (July 1999 – June 2000) and Round 61.10 
(July 2004 – June 2005). The former is the source of explanatory variables for the cross-
sectional analysis for services, and the latter for manufacturing. This data, which is 
disaggregated by industry and district, allows me to construct my agglomeration 
variables. On average I have data on 24 and 16 two-digit industries for manufacturing 
and services respectively. It is important to keep in mind that since employment data is 
taken from household surveys, it includes employment within the economy as a whole, 
and does not differentiate between the formal and the informal sector. In other words, 
the construction of localisation, input-output and urbanisation economies already 
assumes linkages between the organised and unorganised sectors. Data on education, 
electricity and communications infrastructure, and on wages and wealth within the 
district are also drawn from the household surveys. I use population data from the 2001 
Census to construct the market access variable. 
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Table 2.2: Predictor Variables 
        Availability 
  Variable Indicator Source(s) 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Localisation Intra-industry concentration NSSO  √ √ 
Input/Output 
economies Buyer/Supplier linkages NSSO  √ √ 
Urbanisation Industrial Diversity NSSO  √ √ 
Economic 
Geography 
Market Access Neighbouring markets 
Orthodromic distance 
calculations √ √ 
Education 
Persons with a High-School 
education NSSO √ √ 
Electricity Persons with access to electricity NSSO √ √ 
Telephone 
Households with a telephone 
connection NSSO √ √ 
Wages Non-agricultural hourly wages NSSO √ √ 
Business 
Environment 
 
Wealth High-income households NSSO √ √ 
Notes: NSSO - National Sample Survey Organisation
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2.5 Results and Discussion 
 
I start with an illustration of the characteristics of the data to explain my modelling 
choices. The first observation is that the data is over-dispersed. The mean number of 
new firms per district is around 4,111 for the services sector, and 3,531 for the 
manufacturing sector (see Table 2.A.8). At the same time the respective standard 
deviations are around 1.6 to 2.3 times the mean. A Poisson model implies that the 
expected count, or mean value, is equal to the variance. This is a strong assumption and 
does not hold for my data. A frequent occurrence with count data is an excess of zeroes 
– in this case, however, this is not a significant problem. Only 29 districts (of a total of 
586) have zero new services units, and 52 districts (of a total of 578) have zero new 
manufacturing units. 
 
I also check the suitability of the different types of models with regards to their 
predictive power. ‘Obs’ refers to actual observations in the data, and Fit_p and Fit_nb 
refer to the predictions of the fitted Poisson and Negative Binomial (NB) models 
respectively. Of all the locations in the sample, 4.9% have no new services units, and 
9% have no new manufacturing units. In both cases, the Poisson model (Fit_p) predicts 
that 0% of all districts would have no new units – clearly the model underestimates the 
probability of zero counts. The negative binomial (Fit_nb), which allows for greater 
variation in the variable than that of a true Poisson, predicts that 0.66% and 3.25% of all 
districts will have no new services or manufacturing units respectively.  
 
The response variable is ‘count’, i.e. the number of new firms in a given industry in a 
given district. The Poisson regression models the log of the expected count as a function 
of the predictor variables. More formally, 
€ 
β = log(µx+1) − log(µx ) , where 
€ 
β is the 
regression coefficient, 
€ 
µ  is the expected count and the subscripts represent where the 
regressor, say 
€ 
x , is evaluated at 
€ 
x  and at 
€ 
x +1 (here implying a unit percentage change 
in the regressor42). Since the difference of two logs is equal to the log of their quotient, 
i.e. 
€ 
log(µx+1) − log(µx ) = log(
µx+1
µx
), thus one could also interpret the parameter estimate 
                                                
42 This is because the regressors are in logarithms of the original independent variables. 
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as the log of the ratio of expected counts. In this case, the count refers to the ‘rate’ of 
new firms per district.  
 
Table 2.3 presents the results for informal manufacturing and Table 2.4 for informal 
services. The impact of economic geography variables represented by localisation, 
input, output, urbanisation (industrial diversity) and market access is studied in model 
(1), while business environment variables represented by education, telephone, 
electricity, wages and wealth are introduced in model (2). In model (3) I introduce 
industry fixed-effects to control for differences across two-digit industries, and in model 
(4) I re-run the specification in model (3) within a Poisson model, i.e. assuming the data 
is not overdispersed. . I also control for the size of the district (population). The 
coefficients can be interpreted as follows – if localisation were to increase by one 
percent, the expected number of new informal manufacturing firms would increase by 
28.98 percent (see specification 3 in Table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Informal Manufacturing  
Variable  Negative Binomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Localisation  -0.9739* -0.8976 0.2898*** 0.6951 
Input 1.0012*** 1.0098*** 0.0787 0.0725 
Output -0.6382*** -0.6515*** 0.2575** 0.2122 
Urbanisation -0.0508 0.0268 -0.1895 -0.2321 
Market Access 0.0970 0.0403 0.0103 0.0377 
Education  0.0034 0.0056 -0.0149 
Telephone  0.0060** 0.0061** -0.0009 
Electricity  -0.0069** -0.0039 -0.0040 
Wages  -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0020 
Wealth  0.0191** 0.0179** 0.0361*** 
Population 0.6636*** 0.6524*** 0.7722*** 0.9900*** 
Industry Fixed Effects ×  ×  ×  √  
# 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,762 
AIC 31409 39109 30927 29795 
BIC 32460 39162 30005 30984 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As the model selection criteria I examine and compare the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). Since the models are used to 
  97 
fit the same data, the model with the smallest values of the information criteria is 
considered better. The results of the negative binomial models, for both manufacturing 
and services, have the best goodness-of-fit statistics. 
 
After controlling for the two-digit industrial sector, localisation (
€ 
σ jk) has a strong 
positive and statistically significant effect – since localisation refers to the clustering of 
firms within the same industry within a location, this indicates that new firms are 
attracted to districts where there is strong within-industry clustering of firms. The 
opposite result is observed without the inclusion of industry dummies (i.e. in model 1 
and model 2), indicating that when the coefficient on localisation is averaged across all 
industries, it has a strong negative effect.  Output linkages, i.e. linkages to buyers, also 
have a positive and significant effect on the attractiveness of a district to new informal 
manufacturing activity. On the other hand, the presence of intermediate goods’ suppliers 
has no discernible impact on firms’ location decisions, once industry dummies are 
included. Market access (
€ 
MAj ), i.e. being located close to larger, more populated 
districts again seems to have no effect on how attractive a district is to informal 
manufacturing activity. 
 
With regard to business environment variables, the effect of education and power 
infrastructure seems to be insignificant. The proportion of the population with access to 
a telephone line seems to have a positive effect – a unit increase in the proportion raises 
the expected number of new informal manufacturing firms by 0.61 percent. Wages also 
seem to be unrelated to a location’s attractiveness – as mentioned before I am unable to 
directly account for the skill set of the worker. However, I do include the proportion of 
wealthy households within the district as a control – this would allow me to control for 
the ability of some workers to demand higher wages, and also provide an indication of 
the demand within a district. The proportion of wealthy households within the district 
and the size of the district, both seem to have a significant and positive effect on the 
count of new informal manufacturing firms.   
 
The results (Table 2.4), after controlling for industry, for informal service firm births 
show that the higher the intra-industry concentration, the more the attractiveness of the 
location. In fact if localisation were to increase by one percent, the expected count of 
new informal services firms would increase by 34.21 percent (see model 3). This is 
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especially informative since informal services refer mainly to small shopkeepers and 
households providing services, implying that even for new small-scale units proximity 
to those within the same industry is an important factor. Just as for the case of informal 
manufacturers, the effect of output linkages is positive and significant implying that 
informal services tend to be attracted to those industries that they supply to, but not to 
those that they may buy intermediate products from. Industrial diversity within a district 
seems to have a negative and significant effect - recall that since a higher Herfindahl 
index implies lower industrial diversity, the direction of the sign of the coefficient is 
evidence of a positive association between more industrial diversity and more profits, or 
greater attractiveness of the district. Access to larger markets in neighbouring locations 
also increases the count of new informal services firms in a location.  
 
Table 2.4: Informal Services 
Variable Negative Binomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Localisation  -0.3389*** -0.4704*** 0.3421** -0.3099 
Input 0.0780* 0.0838** -0.3303* -0.1322 
Output 0.1906*** 0.1788*** 0.3770*** 0.2862*** 
Urbanisation -0.3002*** -0.2370* -0.3977*** -0.6186*** 
Market Access 0.1520 0.2524** 0.2275** 0.0129 
Education  -0.0305*** -0.0190* -0.0192 
Telephone  0.0191* 0.0194* 0.0001 
Electricity  0.0086*** 0.0103*** 0.0082*** 
Wages  -0.0012 -0.0016 -0.0048*** 
Wealth  0.0058 0.0024 0.0034 
Population 0.7385*** 0.7935*** 1.0458*** 0.6972*** 
Industry Fixed Effects ×  ×  ×  √  
# 2,655 2,655 2,655 2,655 
AIC 34029 56743 36781 35117 
BIC 33098 53569 40562 36263 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
With regard to the business environment, access to electricity and telephones has a 
positive and significant effect, whilst education seems to have a negative effect. This 
would imply that a lower educational attainment is associated with making the district 
more attractive to new services firms. A closer look at the unorganised sector by 
educational level reveals that almost 90% of those with less than a high-school degree 
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found themselves working in the unorganised sector. In other words, districts with a 
larger proportion of the population with a lower level of education attract more 
unorganised services activity. The size of the district, i.e. population, strongly attracts 
informal services activity. This is intuitive since one would expect clustering from 
personal consumer services (such as hairdressers, or rickshaw drivers) that supply the 
final demands for consumers and thus need to be located close to urban populations.  
 
What is interesting to note, is that although the effect of most variables is consistent 
whether averaged across industries or within, that of the three economic geography 
variables, i.e. localisation, input and output linkages, changes sign dramatically with the 
introduction of industry fixed-effects in Model 3 in some of the specifications. This 
would imply that within-industry variation has a very different effect from that of across 
industries. Controlling for industry group is important since the results should reflect 
that agglomeration economies might be very different for different types of industries. 
Indeed, I explore the industry-specific effects in more detail in Tables 2.A.9 and 2.A.10, 
for manufacturing and services industries separately. The effect of localisation is 
positive and significant for manufacturing industries such as those related to leather 
treatment and production, communication equipment, other transport material 
(essentially tyres, car covers etc), and furniture. Industrial diversity is important for 
informal firms in wearing apparel, rubber and plastic products and most informal 
services activities.  
 
In general, the effects of localisation and output-linkages, and the absence of the effects 
of wages, are broadly stable across different count models employed for both the 
manufacturing and the services sector. Access to telecommunications seems to matter 
positively for manufacturing and services firms. Economic geography variables such as 
industrial diversity and market access also affect the count of new informal services 
firms positively, but have no significant effect on that for informal manufacturing firms. 
The size (i.e. population) of the district also makes a location more attractive to 
informal activity, more so for services than for manufacturing.  
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2.6 Endogeneity Issues, Robustness and Other Exercises 
 
Although all the regressors have been lagged, there could remain endogeneity concerns 
that would bias the coefficients. The underlying assumption within the model is that if a 
particular location offers some inherent features that improve the profitability of certain 
economic activities, firms will be attracted to that location. Such inherent features may 
be related to natural endowments or regulatory specificities, but they could also have to 
do with essentially un-measurable factors such as local business cultures. How to isolate 
the effect that runs from agglomeration to performance thus represents a considerable 
challenge.  With regard to the proposed analysis, the presence of these unobservable 
sources of a location’s natural advantage complicates the estimation procedure, 
particularly in identifying the contribution of production externalities to the location 
decision of firms.  
 
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) point out that the effects of unobservable sources of ‘natural 
advantage’ will not be separately identified from those of production externalities 
between firms that arise simply from firms locating near one another. Simply including 
the number of firms or employment in a particular industry, which is a commonly used 
indicator in empirical studies evaluating localisation economies, will not be able to 
distinguish whether firms are attracted by a common unobservable, whether they derive 
benefits from being located in close proximity to one another, or whether it is some 
combination of the two. As it is impossible to get data on all the factors relevant to a 
firm’s location decision, it would be helpful to control for any unobservable factors. 
 
As I am unable to find an instrument that predicts the decision of the firm only through 
its effect on agglomeration and that is exogenous, I introduce district fixed-effects in my 
estimation. Location fixed effects successfully controls for any time-invariant 
characteristics of the district, such as the presence of natural resources, climate, 
proximity to the coast – in short, all features of the natural geography of the district. 
Since I am mainly interested in the effect of agglomeration on the decision of firms, 
these specifications do not include variables pertaining to the business environment. 
Additionally, as the business environment variables don’t vary by both industry and 
district, these will not be identified with the introduction of both sets of fixed effects.  
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The results for both manufacturing and services sectors are presented in Table 2.5. 
Columns (1) and (4) carry out the regressions without any controls, columns (2) and (5) 
introduce district fixed-effects, and columns (3) and (6) include district fixed-effects, 
and finally, columns (4) and (8) include both district and NIC 2-digit industry fixed 
effects.  
 
It is interesting to observe that as the controls get more stringent the coefficients for the 
agglomeration variables behave differently from one specification to the next. Just as 
earlier in the paper, the introduction of industry fixed-effects underlies the reason 
behind the change. Controlling for district-level unobservables affects the magnitude of 
localisation and input-output only marginally, whilst the direction remains unchanged. 
Similar results are observed for the accessibility indicator. This provides evidence that 
the unobserved characteristics of the location might not have been driving the results 
reported earlier.  
 
In summary, after controlling for the effect of unobservable characteristics of the 
location, and for the industry, intra-industry clustering seems to have a strong positive 
effect on attracting informal firms in both the manufacturing and services sectors. Both, 
informal services and manufacturing are drawn to those they sell to, while informal 
manufacturing seems to be drawn to those they buy from as well. For both sectors, 
wherever the coefficients are identified, market access, industrial diversity and the size 
of the district continue to be important. I also re-run these regressions within an 
ordinary least squares model, with log of non-zero counts of firm births as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 2.A.11.  
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Table 2.5: Controlling for Unobservables (Negative Binomial) 
 Manufacturing Services 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Localisation -0.3739* 0.3320*** -0.4531*** 0.2080** -0.3389*** -0.4116* -0.2609*** 0.3247* 
 [0.544] [0.542] [0.026] [0.089] [0.010] [0.150] [0.090] [0.199] 
Input 1.0012*** 0.0572 0.4533*** 0.4852*** 0.0780* -0.3299*** 0.1018*** -0.4177*** 
 [0.070] [0.118] [0.085] [0.167] [0.040] [0.061] [0.031] [0.052] 
Output -0.6382*** 0.1259 -0.9292*** 0.2716*** 0.1906*** 0.4007*** 0.1933*** 0.4334*** 
 [0.065] [0.098] [0.075] [0.139] [0.033] [0.044] [0.023] [0.040] 
Urbanisation -0.0508 -0.2639*** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3002*** -0.5321*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.099] [0.093] [0.000] [0.000] [0.086] [0.087] [0.000] [0.000] 
Market Access 0.0970 0.0309 0.0000 0.0000 0.1520 0.0875 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.081] [0.084] [0.000] [0.000] [0.106] [0.119] [0.000] [0.000] 
Population 0.6636*** 0.7967*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.7385*** 0.9699*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.097] [0.090] [0.000] [0.000] [0.071] [0.082] [0.000] [0.000] 
District FEs ×  ×  √  √  ×  ×  √  √  
Industry FEs ×  √  ×  √  ×  √  ×  √  
# 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,762 3,796 3,796 3,796 3,796 
AIC 29409 29254 28368 28163 33027 32683 31508 31025 
BIC 29454 29411 28390 28303 33073 32774 31531 31117 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors in square brackets clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.6.1 Robustness check 
As a robustness check, I carry out the same exercise by differentiating between firms of 
different sizes. I divide the sample of enterprises into those that are small (i.e. employ 
less than 5 workers) and large (i.e. they employ more than 5 workers). In the case of 
unorganised manufacturing, almost 90 per cent of the firms in the sample, thus defined, 
are small-scale enterprises. For informal services, small-scale enterprises account for 93 
per cent of the sample. The sample could also be divided into own-account enterprises 
(OAE) and establishments. Own-account enterprises do not employ any hired workers 
on a regular basis, whilst establishment enterprises employ one or more workers on a 
regular basis. Around 68 per cent of all informal manufacturing, and approximately 70 
per cent of all informal services enterprises are own-account enterprises.  
 
When I compare manufacturing firms by their sizes, I make a few interesting 
observations (see Table 2.6). Localisation economies continue to have a strong positive 
effect on small-scale, large-scale enterprises and establishments. However, while small-
scale and large-scale enterprises seem to be attracted to those they sell to, but not who 
they buy from, own-account enterprises seem to be attracted to neither. Large-scale 
manufacturers, on the other hand are drawn to their suppliers. Most importantly, the size 
of the district, i.e. the population explains an important part of what makes a location 
attractive to small-scale, large-scale and OAE enterprises.  
 
Some of these results also hold for small-scale or OAE informal services enterprises 
(see Table 2.7). Localisation has a very strong positive and statistically significant effect 
small-scale and own account enterprises – implying that new births tend to take place in 
locations with more existing firms within the same two-digit industry. Similarly, 
enterprises of all sizes seem to be co-located with those they supply to, while large-scale 
firms are also drawn to those they buy from. The level of industrial diversity has a 
positive impact on all establishments, except for large-scale firms, in which case it has a 
negative but statistically insignificant effect. Access to larger neighbouring markets 
seems to matter only to smaller enterprises. Lower education is invariably associated 
with more numerous small-scale enterprises. Wages have no impact, except a negative 
effect on the largest firms, and the size of the district makes a location more attractive to 
all kinds of informal services firms, no matter what the size. The results for smaller 
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enterprises remain relatively stable compared to those for that for the full sample, and a 
few differences emerge for large-scale enterprises only.  
 
Table 2.6: Manufacturing enterprises by size 
 Negative Binomial 
 Small-scale Large-scale OAE Establishments 
Localisation 0.5844* 0.2102*** 0.4459 0.9406* 
Input -0.1907 -0.3800* -0.9355 0.4475*** 
Output 0.3469*** 0.6748*** 0.0596 0.2262** 
Urbanisation -0.0750 -0.2835 -0.0603 -0.2468* 
Market Access 0.0596 0.6713** 0.0391 0.0186 
Education 0.0084 0.0068 -0.0020 0.0067 
Telephone 0.0072** 0.0053 0.0043 0.0153*** 
Electricity -0.0050* 0.0092** -0.0053 -0.0047 
Wages -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0019 -0.0029 
Wealth 0.0189** 0.0087 0.0256 0.0046 
Population 0.7252*** 0.3339*** 0.7588 0.5448*** 
Industry FEs √  √  √  √  
# 6,150 2,024 3,557 4,617 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.7: Services enterprises by size 
 Negative Binomial 
 Small-scale Large-scale OAE Establishments 
Localisation 0.4749*** 0.8225 0.5452*** -0.4040 
Input -0.2961*** -0.1593 -0.2201*** -0.4544*** 
Output 0.3513*** 0.2674** 0.2901*** 0.4202*** 
Urbanisation -0.3762*** 0.2362 -0.3014** -0.4337*** 
Market Access 0.2294** 0.1704 0.2949*** 0.0996 
Education -0.0181* 0.0479* -0.0191 -0.0104 
Telephone 0.0189* 0.0321** 0.0194* 0.0160* 
Electricity 0.0099*** 0.0050 0.0103*** 0.0089*** 
Wages -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0018** 
Wealth 0.0030 -0.0297* 0.0021 0.0130 
Population 1.0062*** 0.6142*** 1.0074*** 0.8849*** 
Industry FEs √  √  √  √  
# 5,071 1,515 2,778 3,808 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  105 
In summary, the results are broadly similar to those obtained before, except that the 
impact of certain factors seems to be stronger for small-scale firms than for larger 
establishments in the data. In their analysis of Italian firms Lafourcade and Mion (2003) 
also find that small firms are more spatially concentrated than large ones and are more 
sensitive to input-output linkages. Additionally, as the data is unable to differentiate 
between formal and informal services, controlling for the size of the firm provides a 
reasonable approximation of informality, and excludes large services enterprises that are 
not formally registered under the Factories Act, but which in all other ways might be 
run like formal-sector enterprises.  
 
 
2.6.2 Unorganised versus organised 
I also carry out the same exercise for the organised manufacturing and services sector in 
India, to check how the results differ. I use data for manufacturing firms from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and on services firms from the Prowess database. 
Prowess is a corporate database that contains normalised data built on a sound 
understanding of disclosures of over 20,000 companies in India. ASI contains data on 
over 140,000 manufacturing firms in India. I then re-run the regressions for new firms 
for the two cross-sections – 1999-2000 for services and 2004-2005 for manufacturing. I 
also differentiate between firms by size. Since both Prowess and ASI tend to sample 
mostly large firms, my definition of what constitutes a small firm is one with less than 
100 employees. The results are reported in Table 2.8.  
 
Owing to the much smaller sample sizes, the count of new firms by district, industry 
and size tend to be quite low and there is a preponderance of zeroes, which makes 
running count models difficult. This is especially the case when industry dummies are 
being used. As explained by Silva and Tenreyro (2010), count models are less likely to 
converge in cases when the regressor is zero and the dependent variable is positive, 
otherwise being non-negative with at least one positive observation. Dummy variables 
often fit these characteristics, especially when the dummy equals zero for all 
observations with a positive dependent variable, and having positive value when the 
dependent variable equals zero. This is very much the case in this dataset when 
industry-level dummies are introduced into the specification. In a recent paper, Silva 
and Tenreyro (2011) define a new code within Stata to deal with this problem. The 
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alternatives suggested, however, do not deal very effectively with the problem caused 
by the dummy variable. This is because their procedure would involve dropping some 
of the dummies and the zero observations, which would dimply an arbitrary redefinition 
of the reference category. This strategy, as pointed out by the authors themselves, is 
unlikely to be a sensible one. Another alternative might be to use generalised linear 
models that reweight the least squares algorithm to make it more stable43. This option 
does not solve the problems associated with the industry-level dummy, as all the 
dummies are dropped from the procedure, effectively reducing the specification to one 
without any industry fixed-effects. In the absence of other options to reach convergence 
within the count models, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. The OLS 
method ignores observations where the count of patents is zero, but on the flip side it is 
able to account for the unobservables at the level of the industry and the direction and 
magnitude of the coefficients would help provide some level of confidence in the 
estimates.   
 
Since I have data on much fewer firms when using the Prowess or the ASI dataset for 
the organised sector, most of the predictor variables are no longer significant. It is also 
instructive to compare the results with those obtained by differentiating the unorganised 
sector by size. For instance, localisation has a positive and significant effect on the rate 
of new firm births for all formal firms, whether in manufacturing or services, and 
whether classified as small or large. For the informal manufacturing sector (see Table 
2.6), this was also the case, except for very small own-account manufacturing units. The 
effect of localisation was positive and significant only for small-scale firms and own-
account enterprises for informal services (Table 2.7), while the effect for informal large-
scale firms was insignificant. This is in contrast to the positive and significant effect of 
localisation for formal services, whether large or small. This could be evidence that 
large-scale unorganised sector firms are not the same as those in the formal sector, 
which consist mostly of finance, insurance, IT firms etc. Such firms also seem to benefit 
from spillovers when in proximity to one another. 
 
There are some similarities however; for instance, large-scale informal services units 
are attracted to those they sell to, but not those they buy from, and this result is also true 
                                                
43 The authors provide a new command ‘ppml’ in Stata to carry out this estimation. But this 
continues to (correctly) drop the district dummy.  
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for formal services firms. Telecommunications infrastructure attracts both large-scale 
informal services and manufacturing units, and formal units in both sectors, more so for 
services than manufacturing. The effect of population is positive for formal services, but 
negative (albeit statistically insignificant) for manufacturing units. The latter could be 
explained by urban regulations that prevent heavy industries from clustering near large 
population settlements in cities and towns. For informal units, the size of the district 
tended to have a positive effect. And interestingly, education has a positive effect on 
formal services firms, and large-scale informal services firms, but it is negatively 
associated with small-scale informal services firm births.  
 
Table 2.8: Organised Manufacturing and Services (OLS) 
  Services (Prowess) Manufacturing (ASI) 
Variable Small Large Small Large 
Localisation 0.2881*** 0.3374** 0.5219*** 0.3201*** 
Input -0.0012 -0.0986 -0.2248 -0.2883*** 
Output 0.0088 0.1778 0.0495 0.1099** 
Urbanisation 0.0056 0.0411 -0.1833 -0.3760 
Market Access -0.0038 0.1366 -0.0794 0.2804* 
Education -0.0017 0.0232 0.0360* 0.0348** 
Telephone 0.0008* 0.0046 0.0513** 0.0354** 
Electricity 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0003 -0.0012 
Wages -0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0006 
Wealth 0.0026 -0.0102 -0.0397 -0.0360 
Population -0.0018 -0.0631 0.4608** 0.2306* 
Industry Fixed Effects √  √  √  √  
# 3,584 4,849 2,742 2,742 
€ 
R2 0.109 0.190 0.177 0.176 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
One might also expect that the rate of informal activity would be higher in places where 
there are barriers to entry to formal activity. Dutta et al (2011) find evidence of 
increased informal activity in states in India that suffer from higher levels of corruption. 
In other words, it may be possible that informal activity serves as a substitute to the 
formal sector. If this were the case, one might expect to see a negative correlation 
between the informal and formal firm births. In the data, I find that both the count and 
the rate of new firm activity are positively correlated at the geographical level of the 
state and that of the district. Indeed, Mitra (2009) finds that the incidence of informality 
is high in more industrialised Indian states, suggesting that informal activity could be 
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complementary to the formal sector. Arimah (2001) provides evidence of linkages 
between the formal and informal sector in Nigeria in the form of sub-contracting and 
the flow of consumer goods and raw materials. Thus, I investigate the inter-linkages 
between the types of sectors that could be driving these correlations.  
 
 
2.6.3  Measures of co-agglomeration 
While the data treats formal and informal manufacturing and services as separate units, 
in reality these firms are inter-linked in a number of ways. The agglomeration variables 
(localisation, input, output and industrial diversity) have been constructed taking total 
employment, i.e. across the formal and informal sector, into account. However, this 
does not tell us anything about the linkages between and across formal and informal, 
manufacturing and services firms. Following Ellison and Glaeser (1997, 2010) I 
compute pair-wise coagglomeration measures for all 2-digit industries for 
manufacturing and services, across the organised and the unorganised sector (see 
Appendix A for construction of the Index). I have at my disposal data from four 
different sources: organised manufacturing data comes from the Annual Survey of 
Industries, unorganised manufacturing and services data comes from two different 
surveys of the National Sample Survey Organisation, and organised services data comes 
from the Prowess database.  
 
Clearly, the Prowess database contains very few observations as compared to data from 
the NSSO and the ASI. I use the Annual Survey of Industries instead of Prowess for 
manufacturing firms, as the former is a richer source of data, even though the latter also 
contains data on manufacturing units. Since Prowess accounts for such a small 
proportion of firms in the sample, using this database gives an inflated value of 
coagglomeration. In other words, owing to the small size of these sectors when data for 
total employment is pooled the small number of firms in the dataset causes the 
coagglomeration index to be very volatile. Thus, I drop data from Prowess, and 
construct coagglomeration measures using the remaining databases. Subsequently, I am 
unable to construct coagglomeration measures for formal services. 
 
Table 2.A.13 lists the 20 most coagglomerated sectors. Similar to the EG agglomeration 
index, the no-coagglomeration benchmark is when the value of the index is zero (i.e. 
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€ 
E(γ) = 0). In general, if the EG coagglomeration index is greater than 0.05, the 
industries are considered to be highly concentrated.  
 
Certain coaggomerations, such as office and computing maintenance and market 
research activities with education, i.e. primary, secondary, distance learning education 
activities, seem intuitive – one might expect these industries to use similar labour pools.  
However, others, such as the coagglomeration of manufactures of apparel with 
education, or that of recreational and entertainment activities with recycling, is not 
clear.  
 
Earlier results found that linkages to buyers explained a large proportion of new 
informal activity within a district. I will now verify to what extent these linkages are 
correlated with the final coagglomeration indices observed in my data. Whilst the earlier 
analysis made no distinction between organised and unorganised industries, this 
analysis teases out the importance of each type of activity (i.e. formal or informal) for 
each type of industry (i.e. manufacturing and services). To relate the measure of 
coagglomeration to a single measure of linkages between a pair of industries, I follow 
Ellison et al (2010) and construct an input-output index (see Appendix A for 
construction of the Index). I then relate this single measure for each pair of industry to 
the coagglomeration measure also constructed for each pair on industry – except that the 
latter are also constructed separately for formal and informal manufacturing. The table 
below provides the correlation values for each pair of coagglomerated industries with 
the standard input-output index.  
 
Since I do not have data on labour market pooling and knowledge spillovers, in this 
section I try to discern the effect of input-output spillovers only. A major limitation of 
the EG index is that it does not distinguish between spillovers and natural advantages to 
explain the coagglomeration of firms. Thus, I will be unable to single out the effect of 
buyer-supplier linkages from that of natural advantage. A high correlation may be an 
indication that the pair of industries are coagglomerated owing to input-output linkages, 
while a low correlation may be an indication that other factors, such as say, labour 
market pooling or technological spillovers underlie the observed coagglomeration.  
 
  110 
I find that although coagglomeration and input-output linkages are positively associated, 
the level of correlation is quite low. Coagglomeration between formal manufacturing 
and formal and informal manufacturing and services does seem to have some 
correlation with the standard input-output measures, perhaps indicating that these buyer-
supplier linkages may explain the coagglomeration to some extent. Interestingly, the 
standard input-output measure is negatively associated with the coagglomeration of 
formal services with itself – implying that other linkages may be more important. The 
same outcome is true for coagglomeration of informal services.  
 
It could also be argued that input-output linkages and coagglomeration are endogenous 
– in other words, firms may use the outputs of (or sell to) particular sectors simply 
because these sectors are coagglomerated. If it is assumed that input-output linkages are 
determined by given production technologies and that the national input-output vectors 
are representative at the local scale, then I can rule out scenarios in which firms would 
adjust their inputs or outputs according to what was locally available. If this were true, I 
would also expect to find a higher correlation between my measures of input-output 
linkages and coagglomeration. 
 
The results for input and output linkages to explain the attractiveness of a location to 
informal manufacturing activity was significant and positive – in other words, being 
located closer to buyers or suppliers made a location more attractive to new units. The 
coagglomeration exercise conducted above shows that input-output linkages are in fact 
positively correlated with the EG measure of coagglomeration, which is what I would 
expect in light of my earlier results. Similarly, with regards to informal services, 
although output linkages made a location more attractive to new informal services units, 
input linkages had a negative effect. The standard input-output measure in the above 
analysis is an un-directional measure of the input and output variables and thus it could 
be capturing the negative effect of output linkages found in the earlier regression 
analysis.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks answers to the following question: What factors influence the spatial 
distribution of informal economic activity within India? The main aim of the paper is to 
understand what drives the process of spatial variations in informal industrial activity, 
i.e. in identifying the factors that determine location decisions. It is important to 
understand why economic activity tends to concentrate geographically because if one 
can explain geographic concentration, then one can go some way towards explaining 
important aspects of international trade and economic growth. The importance of this 
research is underscored by two inter-related factors – that the clustering of economic 
activity has important implications for economic development and that the contribution 
of the informal sector to economic growth and employment makes it a potent tool in 
influencing regional economic policy.   
 
The empirical analysis finds that economic geography factors have an important effect 
on informal firms’ performance, and thus their decision to locate in a particular area. In 
the case of formal manufacturing in India, Lall and Mengistae (2005) find that there is a 
pattern in the data whereby geographically disadvantaged cities seem to compensate 
partially for their natural disadvantage by having a better business environment than 
more geographically advantaged locations. The findings in this paper are that economic 
geography factors, such as localisation and input-output economies, do in fact positively 
impact the attractiveness of a district to new informal activity, whilst industrial diversity 
and access to markets is more important for services. The analysis finds that the 
presence of telecommunications infrastructure seems to matter, especially to services 
units and larger manufacturing units, whilst the size of the district is also important. 
This is an indication that governments may be somewhat limited in their ability to 
narrow regional disparities in hosting of informal economic activity, which is an 
important source of growth and employment.  
 
This research also makes an important contribution to the empirical literature on 
industrial development and economic geography. There is little or no research on the 
factors driving the location of informal industry, although a handful of papers study the 
effects of agglomeration economies and business environment on the spatial 
concentration of manufacturing in emerging countries. In large developing countries the 
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informal sector accounts for an important proportion of domestic product and 
employment, and any study that does not account for the sector is scarcely 
representative. In addition, whilst the theoretical development of new economic 
geography has received much attention in the literature, there is still much scarcity of 
empirical tests for developing countries. The available evidence on the functioning of 
small and poor enterprises is incomplete in many important ways – using recent data 
complied by national sample surveys this paper provides a first glimpse into the extent 
to which locational attributes drive their incentives.   
 
In addition I also use district and industry fixed effects to rule out omitted variables bias 
by controlling for the difference between first and second nature economic geography. 
In summary, this paper provides evidence of the validity of the forces emphasised by 
new economic geography and location theory approaches. The study does not attempt to 
perfect the theory of economic geography, but it does attempt to confront the existing 
tenets with data on unorganised industry in India. 
 
The policy implications of the research and its findings are of significant importance – 
policy-makers need to have an understanding of the relative importance of existing 
agglomeration economies and business environment if they are interested in influencing 
the decisions of informal activity. With the importance of this sector and its potential 
effect on employment and economic growth, such an understanding could provide a 
powerful tool for spreading growth and employment to geographically less-advantaged 
regions. This analysis finds that governments may find it an uphill task to encourage 
informal economic activity to locate to regions that it has not previously favoured.  
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Appendix 2.A: Indices 
 
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) Index: 
 
The EG Index for industry 
€ 
k  is equal to: 
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where G for industry 
€ 
k  is defined as: 
 
€ 
G = s jk − x j( )
2
 
 
and 
€ 
s refers to the share of total employment of district
€ 
j  for industry 
€ 
k , 
€ 
x  refers to the 
share of district 
€ 
j  in total employment, and 
€ 
H  is the plant employment Herfindahl 
index, corresponding to the sum of the squares of the share of employment of each plant 
over the total employment of the industry. 
 
Theil Index: 
 
The Theil index for specialisation here measures the extent of over or under 
representation of a district with regards to employment across a set of industries. The 
value of the index is44: 
 
€ 
Tr =
x jk
x jk
∑ log
x jk
x j
− log xkx
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) )  
 
where: 
 
€ 
x jk refers to employment in industry 
€ 
k  in district 
€ 
j  
€ 
x j  refers to total employment in district 
€ 
j  
€ 
xk  refers to total employment in industry 
€ 
k  
€ 
x  refers to total employment  
 
Ellison and Glaeser (2010) Coagglomeration Index: 
 
The EG coagglomeration index applies to industry pairs, and for industries 
€ 
i  and 
€ 
j  it is 
defined as: 
 
€ 
γ ij
c =
(smi − xm )(smj − xm )m=1
M
∑
1− xm2m=1
M
∑
 
                                                
44 See Brakman et al (2005) for more on the calculation of the index for concentration.  
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where 
€ 
m  indexes geographic areas (here, districts), 
€ 
smi  is the share of industry 
€ 
i’s 
employment contained in area 
€ 
m , 
€ 
xm  measures the aggregate size of area 
€ 
m  (which is 
modelled as the mean employment share in the district across manufacturing/services 
industries).  
 
Ellison and Glaeser (2010) Input-Output Index: 
 
€ 
Inputi← j  is defined at the share of industry 
€ 
i’s inputs that come from industry 
€ 
j .  
€ 
Outputi→ j  is defined as the share of industry 
€ 
i’s outputs that are sold to industry 
€ 
j . 
To construct a proxy for the linkages between a pair of industries, I follow Ellison et al 
(2010) and define unidirectional versions of the input and output variables by: 
€ 
Inputij =max Inputi← j ,Input j← i{ } and 
€ 
Outputij =max Outputi→ j ,Output j→ i{ }  
 
The combined variable is then defined as: 
 
€ 
InputOutputij =max Inputij ,Outputij{ } 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.A.1: Share of unorganised activity (2002-03) 
Industry Organised  
(% of NDP) 
Unorganised 
(% of NDP) 
Total  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 4.1 95.9 100 
Mining, manufacturing, electricity and 
construction 
60.5 39.5 100 
Services  53.1 46.9 100 
Total  43.3 56.7 100 
Source: National Account Statistics 2005 
 
 
Table 2.A.2: Distribution of Employment (2004-2005) 
    
Number of 
workers 
(millions) 
Distribution 
of workers 
(%) 
Agriculture Organised 6.1 2.4 
  Unorganised 252.8 97.6 
   258.9 100 
Non-Agriculture Organised 56.5 28.4 
  Unorganised 142.1 71.6 
   198.5 100 
Total Organised 62.6 13.7 
  Unorganised 394.9 86.3 
    457.5 100 
Source: NSSO Sample Survey 2004-2005 
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Table 2.A.3: Employment by sector (%) 
1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000 
Industry Org Unorg Org Unorg Org Unorg Org Unorg 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.6 99.4 0.7 99.3 0.6 99.4 0.6 99.4 
Mining and quarrying 55.5 44.5 44.2 55.8 40.7 59.3 43.2 56.8 
Manufacturing 19.7 80.3 17.3 82.7 16.1 83.9 14.9 85.1 
Electricity, gas and water 90.7 9.3 71.3 28.7 69.7 30.3 79.0 21.0 
Construction 17.7 82.3 10.1 89.9 10 90 6.5 93.5 
Trade, hotels and restaurants 2.1 97.9 1.8 98.2 1.6 98.4 1.2 98.8 
Transport, storage and communication 38.8 61.2 34.8 65.2 29.7 70.3 21.5 78.5 
Services 40.3 59.7 36.8 63.2 31.7 68.3 34.8 65.2 
Source: Sakhtivel and Joddar 200645  
 
                                                
45  Organised employment figures are obtained from annual reports (1983 and 1988) and Quarterly Employment Review (1994 and 2000). 
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Table 2.A.4: Contributions to the Theil Index (Unorganised sector) 
District Manu District Serv 
Mumbai 255.43  Kolkata 984.42 
Ludhiana 146.34  Mumbai 958.80 
South Tripura 100.84  Delhi 361.93 
Kolkata 80.03  Purba Champaran 248.53 
Delhi 52.53  Medinipur 226.19 
Ahmadabad 47.11  Ernakulam 175.90 
Jaipur 44.08  Pune 169.70 
South 24 Parganas 43.08  Thane 161.71 
Coimbatore 42.63  Bangalore 139.19 
West Tripura 42.19  Hyderabad 137.65 
Surat 39.93  Lucknow 131.88 
Thane 39.70  Kanpur Nagar 128.59 
North 24 Parganas 39.52  West Tripura 104.66 
Haora 37.08  South 24 Parganas 99.99 
Murshidabad 36.44  Jammu 96.08 
Srinagar 34.17  Thiruvananthapuram 95.27 
Hyderabad 34.00  Madurai 92.67 
Varanasi 32.53  West Godavari 90.62 
Virudhunagar 31.18  North 24 Parganas 90.12 
Vellore 29.69   Barddhaman 86.76 
 
 
 
Table 2.A.5: Contributions to the Theil Index (Organised sector) 
District Manu District Serv 
Bangalore Urban 549.39  Mumbai city 147.16 
Mumbai city 433.85  Delhi 65.41 
Coimbatore 334.99  Kolkata 35.57 
Vellore 246.75  Bangalore Urban 28.74 
Ludhiana 180.36  Chennai 22.01 
Pune 163.48  Hyderabad 21.49 
Thane 143.64  Pune 14.28 
Pudukkottai 129.05  Gandhinagar 7.20 
Delhi 117.97  Kottayam 4.76 
Surat 110.00  Vadodara 4.26 
Ahmadabad 96.51  Dharmapuri 4.10 
Chennai 93.01  Ludhiana 3.75 
Thiruvallur 84.87  Kanpur 3.59 
Guntur 83.19  Bhilwara 3.18 
Kollam 81.97  South 24 Parganas 3.02 
Nizamabad 78.29  Faridabad 2.76 
Gurgaon 76.82  Ranchi 2.44 
Gautam Buddha Nagar 75.07  Ahmadabad 2.26 
Daman 68.29  Coimbatore 2.22 
Rangareddi 68.27   Thanjavur 2.10 
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Table 2.A.6: Ellison-Glaeser Index (Unorganised Manufacturing) 
NIC Description EG Index 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.204 
35 Other transport equipment 0.105 
32 Radio, television and communications equipment 0.069 
33 
Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 0.045 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags saddlery, harness and footwear 0.023 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.021 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.017 
23 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 0.016 
27 Basic metals 0.013 
16 Tobacco Products 0.012 
29 Machinery and equipment 0.010 
24 Chemical and chemical products 0.010 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.009 
21 Paper and Paper products 0.008 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.008 
17 Textiles 0.007 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.006 
36 Furniture 0.004 
20 Wood and cork products (except furniture) 0.003 
28 
Fabricated metal products (except machinery and 
equipments) 0.003 
18 Wearing apparel; Dressing and dyeing of fur 0.002 
15 Food products and Beverages -0.007 
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Table 2.A.7: Ellison-Glaeser Index (Unorganised Services) 
NIC Description EG Index 
73 Research and development 0.287 
61 Water transport 0.206 
72 Computer and related activities 0.099 
63 
Supporting and auxilliary transport activities; activities of travel 
agencies 0.015 
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.013 
70 Real estate activities 0.005 
91 Activities of membership organisations 0.004 
71 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods 0.003 
74 Other business activities 0.003 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.002 
80 Education 0.002 
93 Other service activities 0.002 
85 Health and social work 0.001 
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.001 
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.000 
64 Post and communications 0.000 
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Table 2.A.8: Characteristics of the Data 
  
 
Services 
 
 
Manufacturing 
Variable # Mean Std. Dev. # Mean Std. Dev. 
count 586 4111.27 6749.53 578 3531.38 8207.68 
count>0 557 4325.32 6856.00 526 3880.49 8525.32 
Obs 586 0.0495 0.2171 578 0.0900 0.2864 
Fit_p 480 0.0000 0.0000 570 0.0000 0.0000 
Fit_nb 480 0.0066 0.0025 570 0.0325 0.0227 
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Table 2.A.9: Manufacturing (Industry-Level Results) 
NIC NIC Sector Name Localisation Input Output Urbanisation # 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.3112 0.2826***  0.0693 488 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products -0.7287 0.5256*  -0.4798 123 
17 Manufacture of textiles -0.0018  0.7411*** 0.3764 270 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur -0.2071  0.5759*** -0.3690*** 505 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags and footwear 0.2212**  -0.1546 -1.6314*** 75 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 0.8834  0.1563 -0.5190** 469 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products -0.0618  0.4962 0.0163 65 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.9168  0.4342** -0.5608* 146 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products -0.3427 0.6917***  -0.0423 114 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.9815 0.1277  -0.0682*** 80 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.2504*  0.1588 -0.2350 353 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.2532  -0.1331 -0.0777* 52 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipments 0.1397 0.3423**  -0.7306*** 344 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 0.9254 0.1116  -0.4328 146 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery -0.6519*** 2.0266***  0.0687*** 3 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus N.E.C. 0.0249  0.1957 -0.5699* 98 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus -0.7742*** 0.6258***  -0.0679* 12 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks -0.3538*** 1.1495  0.7871 11 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.1419**  -1.0813* -0.2271*** 29 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing N.E.C. 0.0241** 0.3259 -0.0835 -0.7527*** 378 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.A.10: Services (Industry-Level Results) 
NIC NIC Sector Name Localisation Input Output Urbanisation # 
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.0310 0.3197***  -0.1743 406 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines -0.4672  0.6307*** 0.0072 453 
61 Water transport -0.7715  1.5657* -2.6247 14 
63 Supporting and auxilliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 0.1716 0.0452  -1.3250*** 114 
64 Post and communications 0.5077  0.3738*** -0.5119*** 284 
70 Real estate activities -0.7186  0.1103 -1.8636*** 68 
71 Renting of machinery, equipment without operator and of personal, household goods 0.5128  -0.2383 -0.1267 138 
74 Other business activities 0.2924** 0.1865**  -0.5220*** 322 
85 Health and social work -0.9580  0.3553** -0.5517*** 394 
93 Other service activities -0.7313   0.3594*** -0.6486*** 421 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors (not reported) clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.A.11: Controlling for Unobservables (OLS) 
 Manufacturing Services 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Localisation -0.9610** 0.7426*** -0.4041** 0.6241** -0.1488** -0.9123 -0.7828*** 0.6804 
 [3.563] [3.809] [4.927] [5.212] [11.731] [13.529] [8.691] [4.041] 
Input 0.7269*** 0.1860*** 0.7895*** 1.0023*** 0.0585* -0.2908*** 0.0965*** -0.4193*** 
 [0.051] [0.072] [0.064] [0.082] [0.032] [0.070] [0.033] [0.051] 
Output -0.4012*** -0.0167 -0.4234*** -0.8504*** 0.1976*** 0.4226*** 0.1886*** 0.4574*** 
 [0.048] [0.053] [0.060] [0.054] [0.021] [0.041] [0.023] [0.037] 
Urbanisation 0.0614 -0.1582** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3970*** -0.5253*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.075] [0.077] [0.000] [0.000] [0.104] [0.125] [0.000] [0.000] 
Market Access -0.0441 -0.0945 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0141 -0.0519 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.071] [0.076] [0.000] [0.000] [0.108] [0.117] [0.000] [0.000] 
Population 0.5781*** 0.7765*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.6224*** 0.7585*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.075] [0.070] [0.000] [0.000] [0.095] [0.123] [0.000] [0.000] 
District FEs ×  ×  √  √  ×  ×  √  √  
Industry FEs ×  √  ×  √  ×  √  ×  √  
# 2,078 2,078 2,098 2,098 2,299 2,299 2,319 2,319 
€ 
R2 0.185 0.308 0.446 0.558 0.228 0.310 0.559 0.665 
Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
Standard errors in square brackets clustered at the district level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.A.12: Industry Data Sources 
Type Source Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Organised ASI 40694 8.42 8.42 
Organised Prowess (manufacturing) 684 0.14 8.56 
Organised Prowess (services) 367 0.08 8.64 
Unorganised NSSO (manufacturing) 80591 16.67 25.31 
Unorganised NSSO (Services) 361040 74.69 100 
Total   483376 100   
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Table 2.A.13: Most Coagglomerated Industries 
Industry1 Type* Industry2  Type 
Coagg 
index 
Apparel and fur  Or Education  Unor 0.2321 
Repair/Maintenance of office and computing 
equipment  Unor Education  Unor 0.1715 
Education  Unor Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.1429 
Recreation, motion picture, TV, radio activities  Or Recycling  Or 0.1274 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  Unor 
Repair/Maintenance of office and computing 
equipment  Or 0.1009 
Apparel and fur  Or 
Repair/Maintenance of office and computing 
equipment  Unor 0.0791 
Apparel and fur  Or Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0669 
R&D  Unor Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0611 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation  Or Leather  Or 0.0574 
Office, accounting and computing equipment Unor Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0523 
Coke and refined petroleum  Or Collection, purification distribution of water  Or 0.0511 
Repair/Maintenance of office and computing 
equipment  Unor Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0509 
Radio, TV, Communication Equipment  Or Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0464 
Auxiliary transport, storage and warehousing  Unor Auxilliary transport, storage and warehousing  Or 0.0445 
Furniture, jewellary, musical instruments etc  Or Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0427 
Repair/Maintenance of office and computing 
equipment  Unor Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or 0.0417 
Sea, coastal, inland water transport  Unor Leather  Unor 0.0390 
Furniture, jewellary, musical instruments etc  Or Radio, TV, Communication Equipment  Unor 0.0387 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc Or Office, accounting and computing equipment  Or 0.0380 
Market research, consulting, bookkeeping etc  Or Medical, precision and optical instruments  Or 0.0377 
*Type refers to the organised (Or) or unorganised (Unor) sector 
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Table 2.A.14: Coagglomeration and input-output correlations 
Industry 1 Industry 2 
Correlation 
Index 
Formal Manufacturing Formal Manufacturing 0.0531 
Formal Manufacturing Formal Services 0.0688 
Formal Manufacturing Informal Manufacturing 0.0536 
Formal Manufacturing Informal Services 0.0529 
Formal Services Formal Services -0.0382 
Formal Services Informal Manufacturing 0.0771 
Formal Services Informal Services 0.0175 
Informal Manufacturing Informal Manufacturing 0.0314 
Informal Services Informal Services -0.0271 
Informal Manufacturing Informal Services 0.0502 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 2.A.1: Share of activity as a % of sectoral NDP (2002-03) 
 
Source: National Account Statistics 2005 
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Figure 2.A.2: Distribution of Informal Activity 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), NSSO and Census 
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Figure 2.A.3: Distribution of Informal Activity (with controls) 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), NSSO, Census 2001 
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Figure 2.A.4: Contribution to the Theil Index (Unorganised Sector) 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), NSSO, Census 2001 
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Figure 2.A.5: Contribution to the Theil Index (Organised Sector) 
Manufacturing     Services 
 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organisation (GAUL), ASI, Prowess, NSSO 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the determinants of the location choices made by 
foreign investors at the district level in India to gauge the relative 
importance of economic geography factors, local business conditions, 
institutional conditions, and the presence of previous foreign investors. We 
employ a discrete-choice model and Poisson regressions to control for the 
potential violation of the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives. Our sample includes about 19,500 foreign investment 
projects approved in 447 districts from 1991-2005. We find that foreign 
investors strongly prefer locations where other foreign investors are. This 
effect is significantly positive and robust across different years, sectors and 
different types of FDI. Moreover, path dependence remains significantly 
positive when controlling for institutional conditions at the state and 
district level. Foreign investors tend to follow previous investors from the 
same country of origin, but also investors from other countries of origin. 
They are also attracted to industrially diverse locations and to districts with 
better infrastructure and institutional conditions, though these findings are 
less robust. Surprisingly, districts in the neighbourhood of large metro 
areas do not benefit, in terms of attracting more FDI, from having easier 
access to these markets than remote Indian districts. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that large metro areas divert FDI projects away from 
neighbouring districts, thereby perpetuating or even widening the urban-
rural divide.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: FDI, economic geography, location choice, infrastructure, institutions, path 
dependence  
JEL classification: F23; R12 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India soared from less than US$ 2 
billion in 1991, when the country opened up to world markets, to US$ 123 billion in 
2008 (UNCTAD, 2009). Policymakers in India as well as external observers attach high 
expectations to FDI. According to the (former) Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram, 
“FDI worked wonders in China and can do so in India” (Indian Express, 11 November, 
2005). Bajpai and Sachs (2000: 1) claim that FDI brings “huge advantages with little or 
no downside.” However, the Chinese evidence also suggests that FDI contributed to 
widening income gaps between prospering coastal regions and provinces in the 
hinterland (e.g., Fujita and Hu, 2001; Zhang and Zhang, 2003). 
 
Sachs, Bajpai and Ramiah (2002) argue that the reform-mindedness of Indian states has 
rendered them more attractive to FDI. However, the concentration of FDI in a few 
relatively advanced regions may prevent the effects of FDI from spreading across the 
whole economy. To the extent that greater openness to FDI leads to further 
agglomeration, FDI may fuel regional divergence, rather than promoting convergence. 
According to the Schumpeterian growth model of Aghion et al. (2005), more FDI 
promotes growth in relatively advanced regions, while leaving growth almost 
unaffected in poorer regions. Indeed, FDI is clearly concentrated at the level of Indian 
states (e.g., Purfield, 2006). Maharashtra accounted for more than a quarter of the 
amount of approved FDI in all-India in 2001-2005, followed by Delhi and Karnataka, 
which together contributed another quarter. Preliminary evidence also points to strong 
FDI clustering within large Indian states (Nunnenkamp and Stracke, 2008). 
 
For less advanced regions to share the benefits of FDI, it is thus important to gain 
insights into the location choices of foreign investors. We estimate count and discrete 
choice models using project-specific FDI data to assess the determinants of location 
choices at the level of Indian districts. The focus is on the post-reform period of 1991-
2005. In addition to various factors reflecting the local business environment, we 
account for economic geography factors, including distance-weighted market potential, 
as well as institutional conditions and previous location choices by foreign investors. 
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In the next section, we discuss how the present analysis relates to the previous literature 
and we derive our hypotheses for the case of post-reform India. We describe the data 
and introduce the estimation approach in Section 3.3. The empirical findings are 
presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes with a discussion of major contributions 
and limitations.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis and Related Literature 
 
A fairly strong concentration of FDI in relatively few locations can be observed both 
across and within host countries. A small group of developed countries persistently 
absorbed more than two-thirds of worldwide FDI stocks.46 Among developing 
countries, the 20 top performers account for more than 80 per cent of total FDI stocks. 
At the level of particular host countries, FDI in the United States has been shown 
repeatedly to be located primarily in a few large and relatively advanced states.47 At the 
finer level of US economic areas, almost one third of the FDI transactions used by 
Chung and Alcácer (2002) fall into just four major metropolitan areas (out of 170 
economic areas). Coastal areas in China absorbed about 90 per cent of overall FDI 
inflows during the period 1986-1998 (Zhang and Zhang, 2003). Likewise, the spatial 
distribution of new greenfield FDI in Portugal in 1982-1992 was biased heavily towards 
urban and coastal locations, especially around the largest cities of Lisbon and Porto 
(Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward, 2000). FDI in India, too, is strongly 
concentrated both across and within states (see Section 3). 
 
Models of location choice by foreign investors have addressed various factors that may 
help explain the concentration of FDI across and within host countries. The theoretical 
starting point typically is that foreign firms decide on a particular location based on 
expected profitability. Consequently, location choices depend on how the characteristics 
of one particular spatial unit and its geographic environment affect firms’ profits 
relative to the characteristics of other spatial units. Major factors shaping these choices 
include expected demand for a firm’s products, the supply of required inputs, factor 
costs, the quality of infrastructure and institutional conditions. In addition, previous 
                                                
46 See: http://stats.unctad.org/FDI. 
47 For instance, just two US states – California and New York – account for a quarter of the 
sample of manufacturing firms underlying the analysis of Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee 
(1991). See Coughlin and Segev (2000b) for an analysis at the level of US counties. 
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location choices by peers and competitors figure prominently on the list of FDI 
determinants and have received particular attention in the recent empirical literature. 
 
A priori considerations on more specific hypotheses involve considerable ambiguity 
depending on the level of regional disaggregation and the type of FDI (Alegría, 2006; 
Blonigen et al., 2007). For instance, it may seem obvious that the size and purchasing 
power of local markets induce more foreign investors to enter a location. This 
hypothesis is most plausible in a cross-country context and as long as FDI is purely 
horizontal.48 The motive of market access may also shape the distribution of horizontal 
FDI across fairly large spatial units in major host countries such as US or Indian states. 
Local demand should matter less, however, when location choices relate to smaller 
spatial units such as Indian districts, or when FDI is motivated by vertical 
specialization. Conversely, the surrounding market potential might become more 
important with smaller spatial units being analyzed. 
 
Similar ambiguity prevails with regard to the costs of production. The relevance of 
wage costs, on which previous literature focuses, is “highly sensitive to small alterations 
in the conditioning information set” in cross-country studies according to the Extreme 
Bounds Analysis of Chakrabarti (2001). But even if higher wages discourage (vertical) 
FDI flows at the host country level, location choices by foreign investors within low-
wage countries such as India are less likely to be affected. Regional wage disparity is 
small compared to average wage gaps between the host and source countries.49 As a 
result, the concentration of FDI within low-wage countries is unlikely to be reversed by 
wage increases in its economic centres. 
 
Availability of sufficiently skilled labour, which is the input of major interest in various 
studies, is likely to be a local pull factor accounting for the concentration of FDI within 
host countries such as India. According to the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
                                                
48 This type of FDI essentially duplicates the parent company’s production at home in the host 
countries of FDI. Market access motivations dominate over cost considerations. By contrast, 
vertical FDI provides a means to allocate specific steps of the production process to where the 
relevant cost advantages can be realized. 
49 See Alegría (2006) for a similar line of reasoning. In the case of India, average labour costs 
(per worker and day worked in 2003-04) differed by a factor of less than two between relatively 
rich states such as Maharashtra (Rs. 438) and relatively poor states such as Bihar (Rs. 237) 
(Government of India, 2006). 
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Assessment, survey respondents50 complained about serious skill shortages in various 
Indian states (World Bank, 2004). Majumder (2008) stresses persistent regional 
disparities with respect to education. Majumder also provides extensive evidence on 
substantial variation in the regional quality of infrastructure, particularly with regard to 
financial infrastructure. Regional disparities in the quality of infrastructure appear to 
have widened in the post-reform era. The same seems to apply to institutional 
conditions. Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay and Krishnan (2009) argue that the degree of 
economic federalism in India has increased considerably since the early 1990s. 
 
Local skills and efficient infrastructure can be expected to be important regional pull 
factors of FDI even though FDI-related outsourcing may primarily involve labour that is 
relatively low skilled from the country of origin’s point of view. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997) have clearly demonstrated that the corresponding labour demand of foreign 
investors qualifies as relatively high skilled in lower-income host countries such as in 
India. Even as early as the second half of the 1990s, UNCTAD had argued that foreign 
investors were increasingly pursuing so-called complex integration strategies. 
Accordingly, host countries would have to offer “an adequate combination of the 
principal locational determinants …. important for global corporate competitiveness” 
(UNCTAD, 1998: 112), including sufficiently skilled labour, adequate infrastructure 
facilities and specialized support services. Specifically related to India, UNCTAD 
(2004: 172-3) expects that services outsourced to India are moving towards higher 
value-added levels, thereby giving rise to fiercer competition for skilled local labour.  
 
Regional disparities in India, in combination with increasingly complex integration 
strategies of firms, may strengthen the incentives of foreign investors to cluster in 
economic centres.51 It is thus of particular interest to assess the self-reinforcing effects 
of FDI on current location choices. Existing clusters of FDI may attract subsequent FDI 
by allowing for knowledge spillovers as well as offering a wider range of intermediate 
inputs. According to Bobonis and Shatz (2007), an additional one per cent of FDI stock 
from a particular source country in a particular US state boosts the value of subsequent 
FDI from that source country in that state by 0.11 to 0.15 per cent. Head, Ries and 
                                                
50 Admittedly, these respondents had already chosen to locate themselves in these regions.  
51 Several studies suggest that regional inequality has increased in post-reform India, including 
Sachs, Bajpai and Ramiah (2002) and Kochhar et al. (2006). According to Lall and Chakravorty 
(2005), this also holds at the level of Indian districts. 
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Swenson (1995; 1999) use count data on the location choices of Japanese FDI in 
manufacturing industries of US states. The likelihood of a state being chosen by a 
subsequent investor in a particular industry increases by five to six per cent for states 
where the count of previous Japanese investments in this industry is ten per cent higher. 
By contrast, Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000) find the self-reinforcing 
effects of previous location choices by foreign investors to be rather weak in Portugal. 
Compared to the aforementioned studies on FDI at the level of US states, Guimaraes et 
al. analyze location choices at a much finer regional level, namely the 275 (fairly small) 
Portuguese conselhos, similar to our focus below on Indian districts. 
 
Among developing host countries, China has received most attention with regard to the 
self-reinforcing effects of FDI. Head and Ries (1996) estimate a model of self-
reinforcing FDI using data on the distribution of 931 foreign ventures across 54 Chinese 
cities in 1984-1991. Cheng and Kwan (2000: 379) consider FDI in 29 Chinese 
provinces in 1985-1995, finding “a strong self-reinforcing effect of FDI on itself.”52  
 
Recent contributions to the literature have refined the tools of accounting for economic 
geography and self-reinforcing FDI effects. Until recently, it was common to apply a 
simple form of geographic relationship among spatial units, i.e., setting a dummy 
variable equal to one for adjacent countries or regions.53 By contrast, distance-related 
weighting schemes have been used by Blonigen et al. (2007) as well as Baltagi, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2007) to model more complex spatial effects, notably the surrounding 
market potential and the self-reinforcing effects of existing FDI clusters. A few studies 
have employed these tools so far at the regional level to assess location choices of 
foreign investors within particular host countries, or a group of host countries. For 
example, Alegría (2006) includes the external market potential, weighted by inverse 
distances, as an economic geography factor driving 4,800 instances of intra-EU FDI in 
the period 1998-2005. Ledyaeva (2009) assesses FDI determinants in Russian regions, 
accounting for external market potential and the spatially lagged dependent FDI 
                                                
52 Coughlin and Segev (2000a) also use provincial FDI data for addressing the dependence 
among Chinese provinces by estimating a spatial error (autocorrelation) model. Increased FDI 
in a province has positive effects on FDI in neighbouring provinces. 
53 Studies applying this concept of binary contiguity include: Head, Ries and Swenson (1995), 
Coughlin and Segev (2000a), and Bobonis and Shatz (2007). 
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variable.54 Likewise, Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) include external market 
potential and spatially lagged dependent variables, both weighted according to inverse 
distances in their study on FDI in France. The latter study resembles the present analysis 
in two respects: (i) the number of foreign investors deciding on where to locate is 
relatively large (almost 4,000 observations over ten years), and (ii) location choices 
relate to narrowly defined spatial units (92 French départements), rather than large 
regions such as US states. 
 
3.3 Data and Estimation 
 
3.3.1 FDI Data 
We draw on a detailed account of FDI approvals in India during the period 1991-2005. 
The unpublished data were kindly made available by the Department of Industrial 
Promotion and Policy (DIPP) of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The dataset 
covers about 19,500 FDI projects, providing project-specific information on approved 
amounts, the home country of the foreign investor, as well as the state and district in 
India where the project is located. Non-resident Indians are included as a distinct source 
of FDI. It is also possible to distinguish FDI projects by foreign equity shares, making it 
possible to assess whether FDI determinants differ between minority and majority 
owned subsidiaries in India. Moreover, information on planned activities allows for a 
classification of FDI projects into broad sectors, notably a distinction between FDI in 
manufacturing and services.55 
 
Approved FDI amounts may deviate considerably from realized FDI. However, it does 
not seriously constrain the subsequent analysis that the regional distribution of realised 
FDI in India is not available.56 We focus on the counts of FDI projects, rather than 
                                                
54 As we do in the subsequent analysis, Ledyaeva (2009) performs several cross-section 
estimations for sub-periods of the whole period under consideration (1996-2005). Ledyaeva is 
mainly interested in whether FDI determinants and the type of FDI changed after the 1998 
financial crisis in Russia. 
55 The sector structure of FDI in India has changed considerably since the early 1990s. FDI in 
services accounted for about 60 per cent of all approved FDI projects in recent years. In sharp 
contrast, FDI in manufacturing clearly dominated in the first half of the 1990s. FDI in the 
primary sector remained marginal throughout the period of observation. Chakraborty and 
Nunnenkamp (2008) observed similar shifts for realized FDI stocks. 
56 It may also be noted that aggregate data on realized FDI in India is not perfect either. It is only 
since 2000 that the Reserve Bank of India reports a revised series of realized FDI inflows that 
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approved amounts. While it cannot be ruled out that some approved FDI projects are not 
carried out at all, the count measure is unaffected by the typical gap between approved 
and realised amounts for particular projects. Changes in approval procedures after 
India’s reform program of 1991 should not pose a major problem either. So-called 
automatic route approvals are included in the database until October 2004, according to 
information received from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Hence, our 
estimations are not distorted by the progressive extension of the list of FDI projects 
subject to the automatic approval route. 
 
FDI in India is strongly concentrated at the state level. Maharashtra, Delhi and 
Karnataka accounted for more than half of the amount of approved FDI in all-India in 
2001-2005 (Nunnenkamp and Stracke, 2008). Figure 1 shows that FDI is also spatially 
concentrated within states, i.e. at the district level. The maps reveal the density of FDI 
project applications; the size of the circles is proportional to the number of applications 
within the district. The left-hand side map illustrates that whilst some districts in the 
country potentially attract a lot of FDI activity, others are virtually empty. Of the 
possible 604 districts, FDI seems to be attracted to only 320 districts over the period of 
1991-2005. Of these, 50 per cent of all FDI is drawn to only six districts. The right-hand 
side map replicates the same exercise, but after controlling for district population. FDI 
applications increase in districts in the southern and western parts of the country, and 
activity in districts around Delhi and Mumbai is better highlighted.  
 
3.3.2 Econometric Model 
The two most popular models of location choice are conditional logits (or nested logits) 
and Poisson regressions.57 The use of a discrete choice framework to model location 
behaviour stretches back to the 1970s, when Carlton (1979) adapted and applied 
McFadden’s (1974) Random Utility Maximisation framework to firm location 
decisions.  
 
In line with the discrete choice framework, we start with positing a general profit 
function to explain the location behaviour of foreign investors choosing a location (here 
                                                                                                                                          
includes reinvested earnings and debt transactions between related entities (to be counted as FDI 
according to international standards). 
57 See Appendix table 1 for a summary of studies employing these models. 
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district) in India. Following McFadden (1974) it is assumed that an investor  choosing 
to locate in district  will derive a profit of : 
       (1) 
 
where  is the deterministic part and  represents the random variable. District  
will be preferred by the investor  if 
 
,  
 
The stochastic nature of the profit function implies that the probability that location  is 
selected by the investor  equals: 
 
,  
 
It is assumed that the ith firm will choose district j if  for all  where  
indexes all the possible location choices to the ith firm. Under the assumption of 
independent and identically distributed error terms , with type I extreme-value 
distribution, the probability of choosing district  becomes: 
 
       (2) 
 
The above equation expresses the conditional logit formulation. If we further assume 
that the systematic part of profit is affected by a set of  regressors, we can estimate 
the effects these have on location decisions. Typically, it is assumed that  is a linear 
combination of the explanatory variables: 
€ 
Uij = β1Xij1 + β2Xij2 + ........+ βmXijm  
 
The simplicity of the conditional logit model (CLM) allows first insights into the 
behaviour of foreign investors across different districts within the country. For instance, 
it is possible that a foreign investor may consider large urban agglomerations in 
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different states as possible alternatives. In other words, an investor may consider Kota 
in the state of West Bengal and Pune in Maharashtra as possible alternatives since they 
serve as satellite towns to larger cities (Kolkata and Mumbai, respectively).  
 
In practice, however, the implementation of the conditional logit model in the face of a 
large set of spatial alternatives is very cumbersome.58 The CLM is also characterised by 
the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Consequently the ratio 
of the logit probabilities for any two alternatives  and  does not depend on any 
alternatives other than  and . More formally this implies that the  are independent 
across individuals and choices; all locations would be symmetric substitutes after 
controlling for observables. This assumption could be violated if districts within 
particular states are closer substitutes than others outside of the state boundary. To 
effectively control for the IIA assumption, one would need to introduce a dummy 
variable for each individual choice. This would amount to a specification of the 
following type: 
 
€ 
π ij =Uij +ε ij = δ j + β'zij +ε ij       (3) 
 
where s are the alternative specific constants introduced to absorb factors that are 
specific to each particular choice. In this case all explanatory variables (observable or 
unobservable) that only change across choices are absorbed by the alternative specific 
constants. However, in the presence of a large dataset this implementation would be 
impractical because of the large number of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Count models gained popularity as the number of alternative locations increased, since 
what these lead to computational burdens in conditional logit models but in count 
models these are an advantage owing to the availability of more numerous observations. 
However, count models were at the time not understood to be as theoretically well 
founded as the conditional logit model, which is based on the Random Utility 
Maximisation (RUM) framework. This was until Guimaraes et al (2003, 2004) showed 
that count models can be specified in a way that is theoretically and empirically 
consistent with conditional logit models and thereby the RUM framework. 
                                                
58 Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2003) provide an overview of the problems and how 
different researchers have attempted to deal with them in the past.  
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As an econometric alternative, Guimaraes et al (2003) show that the implementation of 
conditional logit models yields identical log likelihood functions to Poisson regression 
models when the regressors are not individual specific. They demonstrate how to 
control for the potential IIA violation by making use of an equivalence relation between 
the CLM and Poisson regression likelihood functions. In a separate paper, Guimaraes et 
al (2004) provide an empirical demonstration. In this model the alternative constant is a 
fixed-effect in a Poisson regression model, and coefficients of the model can be given 
an economic interpretation compatible with the Random Utility Maximisation 
framework.  
 
Let  be the number of investments in region . Based on the profit function in 
Equation (3), the probability of investor  selecting location  would then become: 
 
€ 
Pij =
exp(δ j + β'zij )
exp(δ j + β'zij )
j=1
J
∑
      (4)  
 
 
The parameters of equation (4) can then be estimated by maximising the following log-
likelihood: 
 
€ 
lnLcl = n j logPij
j=1
J
∑        (5) 
 
Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2003) show that Equation (5) is equivalent to 
that of a Poisson model that takes 
€ 
n j  as the dependent variable and includes a set of 
location-specific explanatory variables. The same results will be obtained if we assume 
that 
€ 
n j  follows a Poisson distribution with expected value equal to 
 
€ 
E(n j ) = λ j = exp(α + β'z j )  
 
That is, the above problem can be modelled as a Poisson regression where 
€ 
z j  varies 
across locations and 
€ 
n j  is the number of investments in .  
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Information on actual individual firm choices is grouped into vectors of counts without 
any loss of information. This occurs since there are groups of firms faced with the same 
choice set and the same choice characteristics. For instance, consider the problem of 
identification of the relevant regional factors that affect firm location. Typically, 
researchers view these individual location decisions as profit (utility) maximising 
actions. Firms from diverse sectors evaluate the regional characteristics of different 
regions (i.e. districts) and choose to locate in the region that maximises potential profits. 
In this case, it is common to assume that all firms face the same choice set, and the 
relevant characteristics of the regional choices are identical for firms belonging to the 
same industry. The available information consists of regional counts of firm births by 
district and variables that reflect the characteristics of the regions. Despite the fact that 
the data consist of individual level choices, the true variation of the data is at the group 
level. Thus, data for the dependent variable may be summarised by vectors of counts.  
We are interested in modelling the data using McFadden’s discrete choice Random 
Utility Maximisation (RUM) framework. This means that inference is based on the 
multinomial distribution because my interest lies in studying the impact that covariates 
have on choice probabilities, treating the number of firms in each group as given, 
wherein all firms share some common group-level characteristics. This introduces the 
possibility that there exist some unobservable group-specific effects that are likely to 
equally influence all firms belong to the same industry. If this happens, then the 
individual choices will be correlated and the vectors of counts will exhibit extra 
multinomial variation (i.e. overdispersion). Much like what happens with count models, 
in this circumstance the conditional logit model will remain consistent but will tend to 
underestimate the variance-covariance matrix.  
 
Guimaraes and Lindrooth (2007) illustrate how the problem can be tackled by using 
Negative-Binomial count models, based on the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution. The 
Dirichlet-multinomial regression is a natural extension of McFadden’s conditional logit 
model, and their paper shows that this relationship is the same as that of the negative 
binomial regression to the Poisson regression. In other words, the NB model provides a 
parametric alternative to deal with the problem of overdispersed data, and the 
parameters of the model would be equivalent to the Dirichlet-multinomial regression, 
which is an extension of the conditional logit regression. In the same way that the 
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likelihood for the conditional logit model is obtained by letting the 
€ 
n j  (i.e. the number 
of new firms in a given district) following a Poisson law and conditioning on the total 
sum for each group, a similar relationship can be derived for the Dirichet-multinomial 
model. In this case, 
€ 
n j  is modelled directly as an overdispersed count variable, wherein 
the number of new firms is distributed according to the negative binomial law implying 
that the total sum of counts for each group also follows a negative binomial distribution. 
 
More recently, Schmidheiny and Brulhart (2009) have shown that the elasticities of the 
conditional logit and Poisson models establish the boundary values at polar ends. In 
other words, they observe that the Poisson model implies more elastic responses by the 
dependent variable (in this case, investment counts) to given changes in own-region 
characteristics than the conditional logit model. Also, unlike in the conditional logit 
model, in the Poisson model, one region’s change in locational attractiveness has no 
impact on the number of investments located among any of the other regions. We will 
exploit the features of all, conditional logits, Poisson and Negative Binomial, models to 
compute the two extremes for the elasticities, i.e. the percentage change in the expected 
number of firms in a region (or a neighbouring region) with respect to a unit change in 
the locational characteristics of the region.59  
 
3.3.3 Specification of Variables 
In the conditional logit model the dependent variable is a binary variable taking the 
value of one if the investor chooses to invest in a district and zero otherwise. In the 
count model the dependent variable is the count of new foreign investment projects 
approved in a district. As noted above, the overall sample includes about 19,500 foreign 
investment projects approved in 447 districts belonging to 35 states and union 
territories. Whilst we have annual FDI observations for the period 1991-2005, data on 
district-level location variables are available for only a few years. Our focus is on the 
fully specified model for 2001. The more limited estimations for two earlier years – 
1996 and 1991 – serve as robustness tests. Furthermore, we perform panel estimations 
                                                
59 The conditional logit model implies a zero-sum allocation process of a fixed number of 
investments over the  locations. In the Poisson model, by contrast, new investments are non-
rivalrous, in the sense that we are in a positive-sum economy and one region’s gain is not 
another region’s loss. 
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by pooling a limited set of variables for the three years 1991, 1996 and 2001. This helps 
mitigate endogeneity concerns (see Section 4.b for details). 
 
The independent variables include characteristics of the district that can affect the 
profits of the investor. We classify these variables into those with an economic 
geography dimension, those that reflect business conditions in the district (notably, the 
availability of complementary factors of production and the quality of infrastructure), 
and those that relate to the behaviour of previous investors within the district as well as 
in other districts of the same state. In extended specifications, we also take account of 
institutional conditions at the state and district level. A brief description of major 
variables follows. 
 
The economic geography variables in our model are represented by the Herfindahl 
index, market access, and population to indicate the size of the local market. We use the 
Herfindahl index to measure the degree of economic diversity in each region.  is the 
sum of squares of employment shares of all industries in region j: 
 
 
Unlike measures of specialisation, which focus on one industry, the diversity index 
considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for is 
one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Thus higher 
values signify lower levels of economic diversity. 
 
Access to larger markets should provide a stronger incentive for investors to pick 
particular locations. For instance, investors in satellite towns, for instance Gurgaon, 
would also have access to larger neighbouring markets, say Delhi. The classic gravity 
model, which is commonly used in the analysis of trade between regions and countries, 
states that the interaction between two places is proportional to the size of the two 
places (as measured by population, employment or some other index of social or 
economic activity), and inversely proportional to some measure of separation such as 
distance.  We use the formulation proposed initially by Hansen (1959) that states that 
the accessibility at point 1 to a particular type of activity at area 2 (say, employment) is 
directly proportional to the size of the activity at area 2 (say, number of jobs) and 
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inversely proportional to some function of the distance separating point 1 from area 2. 
Accessibility is thus defined as the potential for opportunities for interaction. Thus, 
market accessibility is defined as: 
€ 
MAj =
Sm
d j−mbm
∑  
 
where  is the accessibility indicator estimated for location j, is a size indicator at 
destination m, is a measure of distance between origin j and destination m, and b 
describes how increasing distance reduces the expected level of interaction.60 The 
accessibility measure is constructed using population as the size indicator and distance 
as a measure of separation; it is estimated with the exponent value set to 1. The market 
access measure is constructed by allowing transport to occur along the straight line 
connecting any two districts. Instead of calculating the distance between any pair of 
districts across the country, we restrict the links to districts within a 500-kilometre 
radius.  
 
Turning to district characteristics reflecting business conditions, we use non-agricultural 
hourly wage rates as an indicator of labour costs.  We also account for education 
(higher-secondary education or middle-higher schools) as a proxy of the qualification of 
the workforce, which is traditionally considered to be an important complementary 
factor of production. In addition, we employ various proxies for the availability and 
quality of district-level infrastructure, including power (electricity), communications 
(telephone), transport (access to buses or roads), financial (bank branches) and health 
(access to health centres) infrastructure.   
 
Although these variables might affect the business environment directly, we take a step 
beyond standard economic geography variables in extended specifications of our 
empirical models. The recent literature points to institutional conditions and the quality 
of governance as an additional dimension of location choice. For instance, Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan (2006) find that costly regulations hamper the market entry of new 
firms, using firm-level data for various European countries. Bhaumik, Gangopadhyay 
                                                
60 We are grateful to Eckhardt Bode for providing us with the syntax for computing the great 
circle (orthodormic) distance calculations. In the original model proposed by Hanson (1959), b 
is an exponent describing the effect of the travel time between the zones.  
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and Krishnan (2009) focus on institutional factors at the level of Indian states and show 
that variations in entry rates in manufacturing industries were increasingly related with 
these factors in the era of economic federalism after major reforms in 1991. Institutional 
factors and the quality of governance might also have an important effect on making a 
more narrowly defined region such as Indian districts attractive to FDI.61 However, data 
on institutional conditions are typically scarce for narrowly defined regions. 
 
We attempt to overcome this bottleneck in two ways. First, we control for labour market 
institutions at the level of Indian states. Specifically, we include a dummy variable in 
our extended specifications which is set equal to one for FDI decisions involving all 
districts located in states with labour laws rated as pro-business by Besley and Burgess 
(2004).  While labour regulations are mainly legislated and enforced by state 
governments, they are supposed to shape an important aspect of the cost of formal and 
informal contracting at the district level, too. Second, we also include a district-level 
variable on the frequency of riots and social unrest as a proxy for the quality of local 
institutions. This information is drawn from Marshall and Marshall (2008). Even though 
this district-level variable is not directly related to the cost of contract enforcement, it 
captures investor uncertainty and resembles rule-of-law indicators that are widely used 
in the cross-country literature on the determinants of FDI. 
 
Finally, following Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004), we include a variable to 
account for previous investment choices by foreign investors. In particular, we assess 
whether foreign investors are attracted to locations that attracted other foreign investors 
before, and whether this effect is stronger for investors from the same country of origin. 
We include a count variable to take account of all foreign firms within a district and in 
all districts within the state, weighted by their distance. Formally stated, we include: 
 
   and    
 
where and  refer, respectively, to all foreign and all same-country foreign firms 
in location . The values of FA and FS are computed for all years leading up to the year 
for which the cross-section is carried out. 
                                                
61 We thank an anonymous reviewer for having alerted us to this issue. 
  152 
Table 3.1: Explanatory Variables – Description and Sources 
  Variable Indicator Source(s) Availability 
     1991 1996 2001 
HI Economic diversity NSSO    √ 
MA Market access Census/ Orthodromic distance calculations 
√ √ √ Economic geography 
Population Total population Census data √ √ √ 
Wages Non-agricultural hourly wage rates  NSSO   √ 
Electricity* Proportion of villages with access to electricity NSSO/CMIE 
√ √ √ 
Telephone* Proportion of villages with access to telephone connections NSSO/CMIE 
√ √ √ 
Education* Middle-higher schools per 1 lakh population CMIE/NSSO 
√ √ √ 
Buses Proportion of villages with bus services Census data   √ 
Roads Road length per 100 square kilometre CMIE  √ √  
Banks Banking branches per 1 lakh population CMIE  √ √ √ 
Business 
environment/ 
Infrastructure 
Health Primary health centres per 1 lakh population CMIE 
√   
Labour 
Regulations Labour Law Flexibility 
Besley and Burgess 
(2004) 
√ √ √ Institutional 
variables 
 Riots Number of riots per capita Marshall and Marshall (2008) 
√ √ √ 
FA Clustering of previous FDI Ministry of Commerce and Industry NA 
√ √ 
Previous FDI 
 Cumulative Total FDI projects in (t-1) Ministry of Commerce and Industry NA 
√ √ 
Notes:*For 2001: Electricity, Telephone and Education refer to the proportion of population with access to electricity, with a telephone 
connection and with a higher-secondary education (Source: NSSO);  
1 Lakh = 100,000; NSSO: National Sample Survey Organisation; CMIE: Centre for Monitoring of the Indian Economy 
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
3.4.1 Basic Results 
We illustrate the key characteristics of the data and the subsequent modelling choices, 
by using the 2001 cross-section as an example. One of the key characteristics of the data 
is that it is over-dispersed. In Table 3.A.3 the mean number of investments per district is 
around 11, while the standard deviation is over 90, i.e. over eight times the mean. A 
Poisson model implies that the expected count, or mean value, is equal to the variance. 
This is a strong assumption, and does not hold for our data. 
 
A frequent occurrence with count data is an excess of zeroes compared to what would 
be expected under a Poisson model. This is indeed a problem faced by our data – the 
mean number of investments is about 35 when excluding zeros and the standard 
deviation is 161, i.e. around 4.6 times the mean. Also note that 369 out of 533 districts 
did not receive any investments in 2001-2003.62 This implies that we would need to 
take into account, both, over-dispersion and the excess of zeroes in the data, when 
selecting a model to fit the data.  
 
Another way to reiterate the unsuitability of the Poisson model in this case is to show 
that such a model is unable to predict the excess zeroes found in our data. In Table 
3.A.3, “obs” refers to actual observations in the data, and fitp and fitnb refer to the 
predictions of the fitted Poisson and negative binomial models respectively. While 
69.23 per cent of the locations in the sample received no investments, the Poisson 
model predicts that only 58.35 per cent would get no investments. Clearly the Poisson 
model underestimates the probability of zero counts. The negative binomial model, 
which allows for greater variation in the count variable than that of a true Poisson, 
predicts that 63.85 per cent of all districts will receive no investments, much closer to 
the observed value. 
 
Against this backdrop, Table 3.2 reports the results of the 2001 cross-section, step-by-
step and based on alternative models. In this way, we check whether the above noted 
path dependence of FDI decisions is sensitive to the introduction of economic 
                                                
62 Although there are a total of 604 districts in India, we exclude all districts for which we do 
not have data for the regressors. 
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geography (column 2) and infrastructure (column 3) variables. At this stage, the 
estimations are performed without institutional variables to retain as many observations 
as possible. The response variable is ‘count’, i.e. the number of investments received by 
a district. The count regression models the log of the expected count as a function of the 
predictor variables. More formally, , where  is the regression 
coefficient,  is the expected count and the subscripts represent where the regressor, 
say x, is evaluated at x and x+1 (here implying a unit percentage change in the 
regressor).63 Since the difference of two logs is equal to the log of their quotient, i.e. 
, we could also interpret the parameter estimate as the 
log of the ratio of expected counts. In our case, the count refers to the ‘rate’ of 
investments per district. The coefficients are reported in non-exponentiated form and 
can be interpreted as follows: if the population were to increase by a percent, then the 
expected count of investments would increase by 43 percent.  
 
Table 3.2: Model Specifications (2001 cross-section) 
Model NB  NB  NB  Poisson  CL 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Population 0.4337*** 0.2702** 0.4490*** 0.6490** 0.6727*** 
FA 0.5737*** 0.5285*** 0.4423*** 0.3623*** 0.3069*** 
HI  -0.6165*** -0.1943 0.2351 -0.1153* 
MA  -0.6309*** -0.7692*** -0.6115*** -0.6280*** 
Electricity   0.0008 0.0075 0.0018 
Telephone   0.0006 -0.0052 -0.0051** 
Education   0.0590** 0.0592* 0.0651*** 
Buses   0.1281 0.0318 0.0479*** 
Banks   0.0817*** 0.0762** 0.0685*** 
Wages   -0.0045*** -0.0050* -0.0054*** 
# 531 454 402 402 309,914 
AIC 3,340 3,946 3,790 4,229 4,099 
BIC 3,353 3,967 3,814 4,276 4,150 
Notes: NB – Negative Binomial, CL – Conditional Logit.  
Robust standard errors clustered at district level (not shown). Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
We also present the results of the conditional logit estimation in the last column of 
Table 3.2 commonly referred to as ‘odds ratios’. The odds ratio can be interpreted as 
                                                
63 This is because the regressors are in logarithms of the original independent variables. 
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follows: A unit percentage increase in education would be associated with a 6.51 
percent increase in the odds of receiving an investment in a district. The number of 
observations is much higher since the dependent variable is the choice of foreign 
investors to select a district, i.e. for each investment it equals 1 for the district chosen 
and 0 for all other districts not selected. In order to select the preferred model, the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) are also 
provided. Since the models are used to fit the same data, the model with the smallest 
values of the information criteria is considered superior. By these criteria the negative 
binominal models generally perform better than the Poisson models.  
 
For the time being, these results focus on the 2001 cross-section as the data situation is 
clearly superior compared to earlier years. Apart from the health-related variable on 
infrastructure, the full set of explanatory variables is available for 2001 (see Table 3.1 
above). By contrast, two variables of major interest – the Herfindahl index on economic 
diversity and labour costs – are lacking for earlier years.  Moreover, the data is available 
for most Indian districts in 2001, whereas coverage of districts is limited in 1991 and 
1996. We will use data from the two additional years for which explanatory variables 
are available, 1991 and 1996, to carry out panel regressions later in the paper.   
 
The dependent count variable used for the 2001 cross-section actually includes FDI 
projects approved during the three-year period 2001-2003. In this way we make use of a 
larger part of the FDI database introduced in Section 3 above. At the same time, the 
consideration of three years smoothes cyclical FDI fluctuations.64 As a first result, it 
should be noted that we find a strong tendency of foreign investors to go where other 
foreign investors are already present. The preferred binominal models reveal a 
particularly strong clustering of FDI; but even the Poisson and the conditional logit 
(CL) models suggest that a percentage increase in the value of FA (which includes 
investors within the same district and in neighbouring districts) would result in a 30 to 
44 per cent increase in the expected rate of FDI counts. Whenever available the 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level.65 In other words, insofar as 
                                                
64 Similarly, we use FDI approvals in 1996-1998 for the 1996 cross-section and, respectively, 
approvals in 1991-1993 for the 1991 cross-section. 
65 Since convergence could not be achieved with the full set of predictor variables within zero-
truncated models, the coefficients for the dropped variables could not be computed.  
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India’s reform program initiated in the early 1990s resulted in more FDI, the latter 
seems to have concentrated in particular regions.   
 
Turning to the economic geography variables, population consistently has a positive 
effect and, typically, is highly significant at the one per cent level. In the negative 
binominal models, the quantitative effect is about 44 per cent if population increases by 
one percentage point. Recalling the discussion on horizontal FDI in Section 2, 
population is surprisingly robust as a relevant driving force of FDI at the district level. 
This finding contradicts the popular view held in various source countries that the boom 
of FDI in post-reform India is mainly associated with vertical, i.e. cost-cutting FDI; it 
rather appears that FDI is horizontal, i.e. closely associated with the size of the local 
market. 
 
In contrast to population in the district where FDI locates, distance-weighted population 
in other districts - representing our proxy of market access (MA) - does not appear to 
positively impact FDI. The preferred negative binominal models in Table 3.2 suggest a 
negative effect. This is in conflict with the hypothesis that districts in the 
neighbourhood of large metro areas are likely to benefit, in terms of attracting more 
FDI, from having easier access to these markets than remote Indian districts. Rather, it 
appears that large metro areas divert FDI projects away from neighbouring districts, 
thereby perpetuating or even widening the urban-rural divide.66 Conversely, the sharp 
urban-rural divide in India implies limited market potential surrounding the metro areas, 
which further weakens any positive effects MA may have on FDI. 
 
HI seems to have a negative relationship with FDI projects. Recall that this variable is a 
measure of the level of industrial diversity within the district. A higher HI implies 
higher employment concentration by one industry and lower industrial diversity. Thus, 
the negative coefficient for HI is evidence of a positive association between more 
industrial diversity and more FDI. This could be since foreign investors are increasingly 
pursuing complex integration strategies, as noted by UNCTAD (1998). Consequently, 
they rely on a diverse set of intermediate inputs from various industries, giving 
locations a competitive edge where these inputs are easily available. Our finding on HI 
                                                
66 It should be noted in this context that, for instance, almost 90 per cent of approved FDI 
projects in Karnataka went to Bangalore; Kolkata accounted for 70 per cent of projects 
approved in West Bengal (Nunnenkamp and Stracke, 2008). 
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is in line with Kathuria (2002), according to whom the degree of vertical integration of 
FDI projects has declined in post-reform India. Unfortunately, owing to lack of data we 
are unable to test this relationship further for other cross-sections.  
 
It is not only greater industrial diversity that attracts FDI to Indian districts. The same 
applies to districts with a better-qualified workforce, as reflected in the positive and 
statistically significant coefficients. This may indicate that the availability of 
sufficiently qualified labour in Indian districts is important as a complementary factor of 
production. 
 
While better-educated workers attract FDI, higher labour costs could be expected to 
discourage FDI. The negative effect is significant across the different models – a 
percent increase in wages seems to lower the percent of investments by anything 
between 0.45 and 0.54. As will be shown below, the impact of wages on FDI differs 
considerably across sectors. 
 
Finally, Table 3.2 reveals somewhat ambiguous findings concerning the relationship 
between infrastructure and FDI at the district level. On the one hand, electricity seems 
to have no effect irrespective of the choice of model. On the other hand, telephone 
connections – our proxy of communication infrastructure – typically have a negative 
effect. The evidence varies across models with respect to transport infrastructure 
(proxied by bus services). Although it seems that the effect of financial infrastructure is 
positive and significant across different model specifications. As a matter of fact, the 
role of infrastructure as a determinant of FDI in India has remained disputed. While the 
World Bank (2004) claims that deficient infrastructure represents an important 
bottleneck to investment even in relatively advanced states such as Maharashtra and 
Gujarat, Chakravorty (2003) finds that infrastructure had little influence in determining 
the location or quantity of new industrial investment. Nunnenkamp and Stracke (2008) 
show that the impact of infrastructure on state-level FDI depends on the specific 
indicator chosen.   
 
3.4.2 Extensions and Sub-samples 
In the basic specification of our empirical models, we did not account for the quality of 
institutions and governance as an additional dimension of location choice. While cross-
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country studies can draw on a wealth of mostly survey-based data on institutions and 
governance (e.g., the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators), comparable 
data are typically lacking for regional units within particular countries. Neglecting 
institutions and governance as possible determinants of FDI does not necessarily bias 
results in country-specific studies. The development of institutions and the quality of 
governance may reveal little variation within countries, especially in relatively small 
countries with centralized governance structures. In large countries with a federal 
structure such as India, institutions and governance are likely to vary at the state level, 
though probably much less so at lower levels of regional disaggregation. Indian districts 
belonging to the same state may not differ considerably with respect to formal 
institutions. All the same, they may differ with respect to the implementation and 
enforcement of good governance. 
 
Against this backdrop, we extend the basic specification of our empirical models in two 
ways in the following: We include a dummy variable which is set equal to one for FDI 
decisions involving all districts located in states with labour laws rated as pro-business 
by Besley and Burgess (2004), and we include a district-level variable on the frequency 
of riots and social unrest as a proxy for the effective enforcement of rules that may 
reduce investor uncertainty. 
Table 3.3: 2001 cross-section  (Including institutional variables) 
Model  NB NB Poisson CL 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population 0.5939*** 0.4853*** 0.9673*** -0.4444*** 
FA 0.4243*** 0.4170*** 0.5071*** 0.4709*** 
HI -0.1664 -0.1965 0.2770 0.1406 
MA -0.7727*** -0.7463*** -0.6871*** -1.2664*** 
Electricity -0.0021 0.0002 0.0047 -0.0177*** 
Telephone -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0226* -0.0215*** 
Education 0.0601** 0.0506* 0.0428 0.0918*** 
Buses 0.5223** 0.4138* 0.2416 0.3997*** 
Banks 0.1012*** 0.0960*** 0.1140*** 0.2143*** 
Wages -0.0043*** -0.0039*** -0.0052** -0.0091*** 
Labour Regulations 0.1634 0.1942* 0.2838* 0.3966*** 
Riots  0.0303 -0.0731 -0.2375*** 
FS    0.2981*** 
# 368 342 342 158,177 
Notes: NB – Negative Binomial, CL – Conditional Logit.  
Robust standard errors clustered at district level (not shown). Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3, we introduce the standard and the additional 
variables into the NB Model for the 2001 cross-section. It appears that path dependence 
(i.e. the coefficient on FA) weakens only slightly when we account for institutions. The 
coefficients of most of our standard variables are broadly stable and similar to those 
presented in Table 3.2. Interestingly, pro-business labour regulations at the state level 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on making a region more attractive to 
FDI. Additionally, the frequency of riots and unrest as a measure of local governance is 
strongly and negatively related to FDI within a district, under the conditional logit (CL) 
model presented in column (4). 
 
The evidence on the importance of infrastructure strengthens in some respects when 
also accounting for institutions. For instance, transport infrastructure (Buses) as well as 
financial infrastructure (Banks) now has a strongly positive and statistically significant 
effect on FDI in the negative binominal and poisson models. These coefficients are also 
broadly stable with regards to the results for the conditional logit estimation presented 
as odds ratios. On the other hand, the effect of the two institutional variables is sensitive 
to the choice of the model. Pro-business labour regulations have a positive effect within 
the Poisson and the CL models, and social unrest (i.e. riots) has a negative and 
statistically significant effect in the CL models only. All in all, the estimations suggest 
that the basic results would not be grossly biased due to the omission of institutions and 
governance at the local level. 
 
In Column (4), we re-run the CL model by separately accounting for previous 
investment choices by foreign investors of the same country of origin (FS).67 We find 
that foreign investors tend to locate where investors from the same country of origin 
located before; the corresponding odds ratio is 0.29, at the 0.1 per cent level. However, 
the tendency to follow investors from the same country of origin does not appear to be 
stronger than the tendency to follow other foreign investors. This is broadly in line with 
the findings of Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) for FDI in French départements.68 
 
                                                
67 This estimation can only be performed for the CML as the choices of foreign investors need 
to be matched on a one-to-one basis with those belonging to the same country. This matching 
exercise is not possible to carry out when investments are grouped as a count variable. 
68 The inclusion of FS affects the size and significance of some other variables, including labour 
regulations at the state level, when comparing the last columns in Tables 3 and 5. . 
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In the cross-section analysis reported so far, it is impossible to control for all possible 
sources of endogeneity.69 In particular, location choices by previous investors may be 
jointly determined with our dependent variable resulting in an omitted variable bias.70 
This also prevents us from employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach. It is hard 
to conceive of an additional variable with available information at the district level that 
is correlated with location choices of previous investors, but uncorrelated with location 
choices of current investors. Moreover, the data situation does not allow for a panel 
analysis covering a continuous set of years. All the same, we address potential 
endogeneity concerns in the following by running panel regressions for the three years 
1991, 1996 and 2001.  
 
We only include those variables for which we have reliable data across the three years. 
The set of variables includes the institutional indicators introduced in the extended 
specifications above. On the other hand, the Herfindahl index and wages have to be 
excluded as the required data are not available for the two earlier years. We include year 
fixed effects to control for omitted variable bias71. As a result, we can test for the 
robustness of our major findings even though the panel specification is based on a 
limited set of determinants, compared to the cross-section analysis for the year 2001. 
 
We present the empirical results for the negative binomial model in Table 3.4. Not 
surprisingly, the inclusion of year fixed effects in the panel regression affects the 
magnitudes of the coefficients to some extent.  Nevertheless, several findings from the 
previous cross-section analysis prove to be fairly robust. For example, the coefficient on 
population is affected only marginally. The same applies to financial infrastructure 
(Banks). The coefficient on FA still reveals strong path dependence, even though its size 
is considerably smaller than in the cross-section analysis. Among the standard variables, 
the panel regression results on education deviate most pronouncedly from the results for 
the 2001 cross-section. Education, which is proxied by the number of middle-higher 
                                                
69 As noted before, we also estimated separate cross-sections for 1991 and 1996 to fully exploit 
the available data. Although this does not resolve endogeneity concerns, it reduces the 
possibility of bias. 
70 By contrast, there is little reason to be concerned about reverse causality running from our 
regressors to firm-specific location choices. Note also that we lag our regressors by assessing 
their impact on location choices in the concurrent and the two subsequent years, in order to 
mitigate possible endogeneity problems. 
71 Ideally, we would like to introduce location fixed effects to control for any omitted variables 
bias. However, concordance is not reached with the introduction of either state and/or district 
fixed effects.  
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schools per 100,000 inhabitants in the panel regressions, now seems to have a mostly 
statistically insignificant effect on FDI. State-level institutions as reflected in pro-
business labour regulations seem to have no discernible effect. By contrast, governance 
at the district level (Riots) is insignificant for the full specification shown in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4: Panel Estimations: 1991, 1996 and 2001 (NB model)  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population 0.2918*** 0.6671*** 0.6268*** 0.5259*** 
MA 0.4822 0.7199 -0.6608* -0.5023*** 
Education 0.5966** 0.3938* 0.3728* 0.0100 
Banks 0.7425*** 0.8922*** 0.0729*** 0.0732*** 
Labour Regulations  0.0176 0.0425 0.1644 
Riots   0.0109 0.0429 
FA    0.2242*** 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 814 791 759 438 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level (not shown). Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In the final step of our analysis, we perform estimations for sub-samples of FDI 
decisions, based on the full specification with institutional variables for the 2001 cross-
section. First, we differentiate between FDI in the secondary and the tertiary sector and 
re-run the cross-section regressions for the year 2001 to observe if the effect of the 
predictor variables varies across these two sectors. Although we carried out the 
regressions for other models as well, we only report the results of the negative binomial 
specifications.72 This is to facilitate comparison, but more importantly because the 
negative binomial model exhibited the best goodness-of-fit statistics.  
 
In several respects, the results for the manufacturing and services sub-samples in Table 
3.A.4 closely resemble the corresponding negative binominal model results for the 
overall FDI sample in Table 3.3. For both sub-samples, there appears to be a strong 
tendency to locate where other foreign investors have chosen to locate.73 We find, as 
before, that population has a positive effect on FDI projects. While the tendency to 
                                                
72 Results from the other models are available on request.  
73 We estimated FA for the total of projects within the same district and in neighbouring 
districts; i.e., this variable is not further disaggregated by the type of sector. This is because we 
would like to capture the effect of FDI drawn to locations for reasons of intra-industry 
advantages, but also for buyer-supplier linkages across sectors.  
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follow previous investors appears to be slightly stronger in the manufacturing sector, 
population has a somewhat stronger impact of FDI projects in the services sector. This 
is in line with economic intuition, in which services industries usually benefit more than 
manufacturing industries from being close to where people are situated. As before for 
the overall sample, our measure of industrial diversity (HI) is not significantly different 
from one if the negative binominal model is estimated for sector-specific FDI.74 The 
same applies to the two institutional variables when comparing the results in Table 
3.A.4 with those in column (6) of Table 3.3. 
 
Yet we find some interesting differences between FDI in manufacturing and FDI in 
services. Most notably, the costs of local labour discourage FDI only in the services 
sector. Here, the effect of wages is significant at the five per cent level, with a one 
percentage point increase in wages resulting in a decline by more than 30 per cent in the 
expected count of FDI projects. The contrast in wage effects between sectors invites the 
conclusion that vertical FDI, which is mainly motivated by cost considerations, is 
largely restricted to India’s services sector, whereas FDI in its manufacturing sector 
continues to be horizontal, i.e., local market seeking.75 This could also be because 
certain services sectors rely on access to cheap and abundant labour (for instance, call 
centres) and they would then be theorised to be more sensitive to wage increases. 
However, since we are unable to disaggregate the data down to the two-digit industry 
level, we cannot be certain which specific industries within these sectors maybe driving 
the results. Moreover, the sector-specific perspective adds to the ambiguity concerning 
infrastructure. The effect of electricity proves to be strongly significant for FDI in 
manufacturing only, while the effect of banking facilities at the district level on FDI is 
particularly strong in the services sector at the one per cent level of significance. 
 
The next step distinguishes between majority and minority foreign owned joint ventures 
(JVs). We use foreign equity shares as presented in the DIPP database to group all FDI 
projects into these two categories.76 This distinction may be relevant as higher foreign 
equity shares tend to be associated with a relatively strong bargaining position of 
                                                
74 The IRR for our variable on education appears to be of similar size for FDI in manufacturing 
and services. In contrast to the corresponding estimation for the overall sample, however, this 
variable turns statistically insignificant at the ten per cent level for sector-specific FDI. 
75 Agarwal (2001) suspects FDI in India continues to be domestic market seeking. 
76 Information on the foreign equity share is missing for various FDI projects, which results in a 
considerably reduced number of observations. 
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foreign investors (e.g., Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) which, in turn, may imply that 
location choices are more strongly determined by the preferences of foreign investors 
than those of the host government. Indeed, there are some significant differences 
between majority and minority owned JVs with respect to the determinants of location 
choices. Majority owned JVs seem to rely more strongly on better-educated workers 
than minority JVs, possibly because the former involve transfers of relatively advanced 
technologies. More surprisingly, economic diversity (reflected in higher values of HI) 
appears to discourage majority owned JVs. Possibly, these JVs are associated with a 
higher degree of vertical integration and draw mainly on specialised inputs from within 
the same industry. On the other hand, infrastructure plays a more important role for 
minority owned JVs. This is most plausible for financial infrastructure given that 
majority owned JVs may turn primarily to international capital markets for financing.  
 
Similar to majority owned JVs, larger FDI projects appear to be more reliant on better-
educated workers. This is revealed by the third sample split when considering the 
median of the value of foreign equity as the dividing line between small and large FDI 
projects. By contrast, the effect of local financing is somewhat stronger for smaller FDI 
projects. At the same time, smaller FDI projects tend to be discouraged by higher wage 
costs. In other respects, however, our results are barely affected by distinguishing 
between small and large projects. Notably, local institutions and governance remain 
insignificant independent of the size of projects. 
 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature relating to the geography of foreign 
direct investment in a number of ways. Although there is some previous research on the 
behaviour of foreign investors in emerging countries like China, to our knowledge this 
is the first paper that analyses location decisions for over 19,500 FDI projects in India. 
We differentiate between economic geography factors, such as the presence of existing 
FDI, access to neighbouring markets and industrial diversity, and factors relating to the 
local business conditions including the quality of infrastructure at the level of districts. 
The difference between these two sets of factors is of obvious policy relevance: Whilst 
  164 
public policy may be in a position to influence the level and quality of infrastructure 
within a lagging region, its ability to affect economic clustering is limited.  
 
Indeed, we find that path dependence tends to constrain the influence of regional 
policymakers. Foreign investors strongly prefer locations that already host other foreign 
investors. This effect is significantly positive and robust across different years, sectors 
and different types of FDI. Moreover, path dependence remains significantly positive 
when controlling for institutional conditions at the state and district level. Foreign 
investors tend to follow previous investors from the same country of origin, but also 
investors from other countries of origin. We also find that the degree of economic 
diversity within a location attracts FDI, but this result is less robust and we are unable to 
test it for different years. More surprisingly, districts in the neighbourhood of large 
metro areas do not benefit, in terms of attracting more FDI, from having easier access to 
these markets than remote Indian districts. On the contrary, our results suggest that large 
metro areas divert FDI projects away from neighbouring districts, thereby perpetuating 
or even widening the urban-rural divide. 
 
However, geography is not destiny. In several respects local business conditions matter 
for the location choices of foreign investors at the level of districts. For instance, the 
presence of an educated population has recently become a significant factor drawing 
FDI projects to a location. This reveals that FDI in post-reform India is attracted not 
only by lower labour costs but also by the availability of sufficiently skilled labour as an 
important complementary factor of production. Providing adequate schooling and 
training thus appears to be an important policy tool for regional policymakers. 
 
Investing in infrastructure represents another option to attract FDI.  Access to power, 
transport and financial infrastructure – factors that the World Bank often classifies as 
‘investment climate’ – clearly matters for the location decisions of foreign investors. 
However, the evidence is more ambiguous when it comes to the question of which 
aspect of infrastructure is particularly relevant for FDI in particular sectors.  For 
instance, the presence of bank services within a location seems to be an important factor 
driving location choices for FDI in services, but less so for FDI in manufacturing. The 
opposite pattern prevails for power supply. This ambiguity may render it difficult for 
policymakers to decide on investment priorities in the area of infrastructure. 
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Institutional factors also seem to matter, both at the state and at the district level. Pro-
business labour regulations tend to make a state more attractive to FDI, and just as one 
would expect, less social unrest within a district attracts more FDI. However, the latter 
result is not robust to our panel estimations, whilst the effect of labour law flexibility is 
sensitive to the choice of models. The policy options at the local level may be 
constrained to the extent that institutional conditions such as labour laws in India are a 
state subject. However it is difficult to know how implementation and enforcement 
might differ across districts within states. Furthermore, it remains open to question how 
foreign investors react to other critical governance issues such as the enforcement of 
property rights and the credibility and accountability of local authorities. 
 
Future research may also help overcome a few other shortcomings once additional data 
are made available by Indian authorities. While we conduct panel regressions at the 
district level and use year fixed effects to mitigate endogeneity concerns, such concerns 
could be better addressed with data for more continuous years. Additional insights 
might also be gained if all FDI projects were differentiated between industrial sectors at 
a disaggregated level. Industry-specific estimations could reveal whether the location 
choices of foreign investors and the relative importance of economic geography and 
local business conditions differ across industries. For instance, computer or financial 
services would probably require different levels and types of labour skills than retail or 
transport services.  
 
Finally, even though the FDI data offer various details on the characteristics of joint 
ventures in India, it would be desirable to match this dataset with data on the foreign 
parent company. Its size, age, productivity and technological sophistication may shape 
location decisions, in addition to district characteristics. This is especially true when 
such firm characteristics influence the relative bargaining position of foreign investors 
vis-à-vis regional authorities competing for FDI.  
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Tables 
Table 3.A.1: Summary of Empirical Literature 
Study Country Sample Methodology 
  
      clogit poisson 
Carlton (1983) 
USA 
528 new firms; 1967-
1971 
√  
Papke (1991) USA 8.3 million 
establishments; 1975-
1982 
 √ 
Head, Ries and Swenson 
(1995) 
USA 751 new firms; 1980-
1987 
√  
Becker and Henderson 
(2000) 
USA 641 new births; 1963-
1992  
√ 
Guimaraes, Figueiredo and 
Woodward (2000) 
Portugal 758 greenfield 
investments; 1982-1992 
√  
List (2001) California, 
USA 
67 greenfield 
investments; 1983-1992  
√ 
Head and Mayer (2004) EU 452 firms; 1984-1995 √  
Crozet, Mayer and 
Mucchielli (2004) 
France 3,902 firms; 1985-1995 √  
Guimaraes, Figueiredo and 
Woodward (2004) 
USA 65,158 firms; 1989-
1997  
√ 
Holl (2004) Spain 122,000 new plants; 
1980-1994  
√ 
Duranton, Gobillon and 
Overman (2006) 
UK 21,813 new firms; 
1984-1989  
√ 
Brulhart, Jametti and 
Schmidheiny (2007) 
Switzerland 13,768 new firms 
(1999-2002), and 
12,465 new firms 
(2001-2002) 
 √ 
Devereux, Griffith and 
Simpson (2007) 
UK 79,337 greenfield 
investments; 1986-1992 
√  
Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2008) 
New York 
county  
502 new advertising 
firms; 1992-1997  
√ 
Davis and Henderson (2008) USA 11,990 new HQ firms; 
1977-1997  
√ 
Coeurdacier, De Santis and 
Aviat (2009) 
EU 73 per cent of all 
M&As; 1985-2004  
√ 
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Table 3.A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
# Mean 
Variable  
Expected 
sign  1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 
Investment 
decisions* 
(new/cumulative) 
 1,234 1,669 1,905 - 4,634 12,927 
HI -   533   0.34 
MA + 434 423 530 224,984 240,099 231,256 
Population + 406 408 533 1,982,719 2,075,529 1,926,232 
Wages -   454   89.54 
Electricity + 334 350 533 0.84 0.88 0.56 
Telephone + 126 117 533 0.46 1.12 0.09 
Education + 231 305 533 0.17 0.22 0.06 
Buses +   533   0.50 
Roads + 207 184  61.25 69.30  
Banks + 393 418 415 7.60 7.32 6.95 
Health + 167   2.59   
Labour 
Regulations 
+ 15 15 15 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Riots - 385 383 480 0.00012 0.00010 0.00008 
FA +  244 530  25.06 32.84 
*Reference years: 1991, 1992, and 1993 (for 1991); 1996, 1997, and 1998 (for 1996); 
2001, 2002, and 2003 (for 2001). 
Note: # refers to the number of districts for which there are observations. 
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Table 3.A.3: Characteristics of the Data (2001 cross-section) 
Variable # Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
count 533 10.96 90.91 0 1,289 
count>0 164 35.64 161.52 1 1,289 
obs 533 0.6923 0.4619 0 1 
fitp 4231 0.5835 0.3498 0 0.9996 
fitnb 423 0.6385 0.3225 2.62E-06 0.9998 
fitzip 423 0.6484 0.3241 0.0014 0.9999 
1 The number of observations is less than the number of cases in the dataset owing to missing values for 
some variables in the model. 
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Table 3.A.4: Incidence Rate Ratios (2001 cross-section), negative binominal model for sub-samples  
Variable Secondary Tertiary Equity>50% Equity<50% 
Less than 
median 
More than 
median 
Population 0.4521*** 0.6482*** 0.1123 0.1311 0.1453* 0.1025 
FA 0.0962*** 0.0497*** 0.7672*** 0.6915*** 0.7224*** 0.7833*** 
HI 0.0237 -0.1035 -0.0249** -0.0407 -0.0060 0.2303 
MA 0.2296 -0.2517 -0.0091 -0.2470** -0.2982** -0.0499 
Electricity 0.5665*** 0.3277 -0.0735 -0.0234 -0.0234 -0.2234 
Telephone -0.1066 -0.1008 -0.0063 0.0202 -0.0256 -0.1315 
Education 0.1621 0.3187** 0.5155*** 0.2538* 0.1602 0.4772*** 
Buses 0.4429* 0.4847* 0.4397** 0.4634* 0.3737 0.8373*** 
Banks 0.3204** 0.5356** 0.0467 0.2578* 0.3579** 0.2481** 
Wages 0.1422 -0.3765** -0.1209 -0.1625** -0.1986** -0.1377 
Labour Regulations -0.0838 -0.1571 0.4321 0.2015 0.1049 0.1579 
Riots 0.1099 0.1229** -0.0363 0.0133 0.0748 -0.0166 
       
# 331 300 72 83 77 81 
AIC 778 580 367 434 408 402 
BIC 831 632 399 468 441 436 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level (not shown). Non-Exponentiated coefficients 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figures  
Figure 3.A.1: Spatial Distribution of FDI Projects 
 
Source: Department of Industrial Promotion and Policy, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
Innovation is crucial to regional economic competitiveness and to productivity 
growth. A salient feature of the Indian economy is the geographic clustering 
of both, economic activity and innovation. In this paper, I study to what extent 
the spatial distribution of economic activity drives innovation. I analyse patent 
applications between 1999 and 2007 across districts in India and my 
econometric findings suggest that R&D expenditures, industrial diversity and 
the distribution of human capital endowments can have an important effect on 
generating innovation. The estimates are robust to omitted variables bias, to 
different model specifications and to the type of applicant.  
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4.1  Introduction 
 
Economists and urban geographers have long noted the co-location of clusters of 
economic activity and of innovative activity. Theory dictates that people and 
organisations choose to live close to one another mainly because it is expensive to 
transport goods, people and ideas across space. Historically, transportation costs have 
been falling and the advent of new information and communication technologies led 
many to predict the ‘death of distance’. On the contrary, economic activity continues to 
be concentrated and agglomerations continue to exist, and grow in size. If it is no longer 
as costly to transport goods, people and ideas from one place to the next, why do people 
choose to agglomerate? 
 
It was Marshall (1919) who was the first to formally identify the benefits of 
agglomeration. Clustering of economic activity allows for the sharing of inputs, skilled 
labour and knowledge – producers can access both buyers and suppliers more easily and 
at lower costs, and can exploit the presence of a thick labour market with multiple 
specialisations. Agglomeration also facilitates face-to-face contact by shortening 
interaction distances, which results in knowledge spilling over, leading to innovative 
activity.  
 
Romer (1986, 1990) developed a theory to explain economic growth by making 
endogenous the effect of the accumulation and spillover of technological knowledge. 
This seminal contribution provided an explanation of economic growth that went 
beyond a simple focus on the role of investment in physical capital and increases in the 
labour supply. Changes in technology constitute an important source of new knowledge. 
 
And lastly, Feldman and Florida (1994) suggest that innovation is ‘increasingly 
dependent on a geographically defined infrastructure that is capable of mobilising 
technical resources, knowledge, and other inputs essential to the innovation process’. 
Examples of such innovation-supporting advantages include the presence of networks 
of industry, concentration of Research and Development (R&D) activity, be it in the 
private or in the public sector, and the presence of a large pool of service activities with 
multiple specialisations.  
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In this paper, I employ a regional knowledge production framework to empirically 
identify the effect of agglomeration economies, knowledge spillovers and infrastructure 
on innovative output. I find that whilst R&D expenditures impact innovation, in fact 
clustering of innovative activity and factor inputs within a location also matter 
significantly. Section 4.2 outlines the literature and discusses the main focus of the most 
relevant papers. Section 4.3 provides a descriptive overview of patent activity in India. 
Section 4.4 describes the empirical model and the sources and description of the data.  
This is followed by a summary of the study results and a discussion of the key findings 
in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 addresses possible endogeneity concerns and carries out 
robustness checks, and the paper concludes with a discussion of key contributions and 
limitations.  
 
 
4.2  Related Literature 
 
The idea that clustering creates externalities that could lead to an increase in innovation 
and which in turn could drive economic growth, is not a new one – for instance, see 
Krugman 1991, Kelly and Hageman 1999, Paci and Usai 1999 and Hanson 2001. The 
literature has dealt jointly with the concepts of agglomeration and innovation under the 
general research umbrella of economic geography. Different studies have defined their 
clusters of observations differently – as industrial districts, technological clusters, 
learning regions, and innovation milieus (for an overview of these studies see Ibrahim 
2009). 
 
Griliches (1979) proposed a knowledge function approach at the level of the firm – a 
Cobb-Douglas function that measured a firm’s innovative output tin terms of physical 
R&D inputs and some indicators of the knowledge stock. Jaffe (1986) was the first to 
use such a knowledge production function framework at the regional level77, within 
which he measured the effect of knowledge spillovers on innovative output. The 
knowledge production approach has since been widely used in the empirical literature – 
see Table 4.A.1 for an overview of some of these studies.  
 
                                                
77 Pakes and Griliches (1980) used the knowledge production framework for patenting data, but 
at the level of the firm.  
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The empirical literature has many findings regarding the effect of regional differences 
on innovative output. For instance, some studies find evidence of a positive impact of 
localised knowledge spillovers resulting mainly from the presence of academic research 
(Anselin et al 1997, Fischer and Varga 2003, Fristch and Slavtchev 2007, Kantor and 
Whalley 2009, Ponds 2010). Others concern themselves with the effects of neighbours, 
i.e. the economic geography impact of R&D investments in surrounding regions 
(Bottazzi and Peri 2003, Bode 2004). Some authors, those who are able to access 
superior data, use patent citations to estimate the extent of knowledge spillovers (Jaffe 
et al 1993, Co 2005). A number of studies also draw out the difference between 
diversity and specialisation within a location and the associated impact on innovation 
(Feldman and Audretsch 1999, Carlino et al 2007). 
 
Most studies have made use of data from the United States (Audretsch and Feldman 
1996, Anselin et al 2000, Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008, Crescenzi et al 200778) 
or from the European region (Autant-Bernard 2001, Fischer and Varga 2003, Castro and 
Quevedo 2005, Fritsch and Slavtchev 2007). In short, there are very few studies that 
deal with developing countries, and none that analyse India. This paper attempts to fill 
this gap in the literature. One might expect that the dynamics of innovation and the 
relationship between R&D and patenting may differ in the context of developing 
countries. For instance, small and medium-sized firms in India can scarcely afford in-
house R&D for technological innovations, and the spilling over of the industry-level 
stock of knowledge may matter more. However, one may expect that customer-driven 
innovations would depend on market demand for product diversification, and associated 
patenting activity may not differ from that in developed economies. Cumulative 
innovative processes could be internal to the firm or to the industry, but they could also 
depend crucially on institutional factors, which may be region or country-specific. The 
dynamics of innovative activity would depend on a country’s labour markets, its legal 
systems and the quality of its infrastructure, factors which may differ between 
developing and developed countries, and even within countries. Ayyagari et al (2007) 
show that innovation varies greatly across countries, and that factors such as access to 
finance, governance, competition and educational attainment all remain important to 
explain differences across firms and regions within countries. Thus, one might expect 
                                                
78 Free availability of US patent data from the NBER website has helped to spur multiple 
empirical studies based on the data.  
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innovative activity to be more significantly affected by characteristics of the location 
and the workforce for firms and industries in developing countries.  
 
 
4.3 Patents in India 
 
Patenting activity is considered a yardstick for innovative activity within a country, and 
in keeping with the literature, this paper uses patents as a proxy for the outcome of the 
inventive process. Data on patents (applications) is taken from the Indian Patent Office 
(IPO). The IPO registers patent applications at its four branches located in Kolkata 
(West Bengal), Chennai (Tamil Nadu), Mumbai (Maharashtra) and Delhi (Delhi). 
Although it is easier to aggregate data on the basis of which office an application was 
made to, the analysis within this paper requires data on the address of the applicant, or 
the location of the organisation or firm, at the level of the district. Data disaggregated at 
the level of the state is made available in the annual reports of the IPO. However, 
information on the exact location of the applicant is only contained within the weekly 
journals published by the IPO79. Each patent file contains information on the following 
variables of interest: (1) date of application (2) the name of the inventor(s) (3) the 
address of the inventor(s) and, (4) the International Patent Classification (IPC) code.  
 
Most patent jurisdictions publish a patent application 18 months after its original filing 
date, after which the application is considered to be in the public domain. Before this 
publication, the content and the very act of filing are considered proprietary information 
that is closely guarded by most filers. Although applications from residents within the 
country have increased steadily over the last 10 years or so, applications made by 
foreigners have accounted for the bulk of increase in total applications (see Figure 
4.A.1). Between 1995 and 2008, a total of 189,577 patents were filed with the IPO, of 
which applications from foreigners accounted for 78.11%. According to the IPO’s 
2007-2008 Annual Report, the total patents in force, as of 31 March 2008, were 29,688, 
of which 7,966 comprised of patents granted to applicants residing in India. For a 
descriptive overview of pre-1995 patenting trends in India, see Rajeswari (1996). In this 
                                                
79 These weekly journals can be accessed from: http://www.ipcindia.nic.in/  
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paper, I consider only those applications that are made by those residing within the 
country.  
 
The first reference line (year=1999) in the figure refers to the onset of the India-
Pakistan war, and the second reference line (year=2005) refers to the year in which the 
Indian Patents Act (1970) was in full compliance with the Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property System (TRIPS) agreement of the WTO. Amendments to the Indian Patent Act 
were made in 1999, 2002, 2005 and finally in 2006 in anticipation of the country’s 
obligations under the TRIPS agreement. Inventors, whether domestic or foreign, who 
were looking to file patent applications over this time period would have experienced a 
changing environment – for instance, pharmaceutical firms were not permitted to file 
product patents up until 2005. However, since this analysis does not deal with cross-
country comparisons and is mainly concerned with the concentration of patenting 
activity within the country, changes in the national environment should not have 
differential geographical impacts. However, there is evidence to suggest that the impact 
may differ across industrial sectors. For instance, as expected, patent applications from 
pharmaceutical firms tripled from 765 in 2004-05 to 2,373 in 2008-09 (total 
applications doubled over the same period)80. As a check, I include industry fixed 
effects in the empirical model. 
 
Patents are classified according to the International Patent Classification system, which 
is technology based rather than product based.  Figure 4.A.2 provides an example of the 
different categories for patent applications for the latest year for which data is available. 
The product classification system limits the economic usefulness of the data, since it 
does not automatically allow an analysis of innovation by industry or sector. However, I 
match the IPC classifications with 2-digit industry level classifications, and am able to 
explore the impact of industry agglomeration on innovative output. The one-to-one 
matching is provided in Table 4.A.5. I carry out the matching by comparing the 2-digit 
National Industrial Classification (NIC) provided by the Indian government with the 
detailed IPC classification provided by the World Intellectual Property Organisation81. 
 
                                                
80 See: http://www.nipo.in/nipoinnews.html  
81 See: http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en  
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In addition, I also differentiate between different types of applicants - from public and 
private funded research organisations, universities, and from private firms, industry and 
individuals. I use these applicant classes as a further robustness check later in the paper. 
One of the shortcomings of the IPO data is that it does not differentiate patent 
applications made by individual laboratories of the Council for Scientific Research 
(CSIR) and lists the organisation’s headquarters in Delhi as the default location for all 
such applications. I am thus forced to drop these observations, and then re-instate them 
using data from the CSIR which disaggregates applications made on the basis of the 
location of the laboratory 82.  
 
Because patents contain geographic information about their inventors, I make use of this 
data to study the factors affecting the generation of knowledge in these locations. Patent 
activity in India shows signs of high levels of spatial concentration (see Figure 4.A.3). 
The maps provide an actual representation of the density of patent applications for the 
country – the size of the circle is proportional to the number of applications within the 
district. The map indicates that whilst some districts in the country host a lot of patent 
activity, others are virtually empty. Of the possible 604 districts, patent activity is 
present in only 190 districts. And of those, around 22 districts account for 90% of all 
patenting activity. It could be argued that the high degree of clustering of activity is 
explained mainly by the size of the district – after all districts like Mumbai, Delhi, 
Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore etc account for the lion’s share of patents. However, 
the map on the right depicts patenting activity after controlling for the size of the district 
– in other words, the size of circle is proportional to the patents per capita within a 
district. Two results emerge: relative clustering increases, and clustering now spreads to 
neighbouring regions. Patenting per capita is higher in districts in the southern and 
eastern parts of the country. There is also evidence to show that the rate of patenting 
activity is high in satellite towns and cities such as Noida, Pune, Ghaziabad, Gurgaon, 
Vadodara, Coimbatore etc. In general, keeping in mind the simplest no-clustering 
(uniform distribution) benchmark, there is evidence of concentration of patent activity 
in the country. 
 
 
                                                
82 The full list of CSIR laboratories can be found on the website of the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research: http://www.dsir.gov.in/a_report/english/2005-06E/Annexures-8.pdf.  
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4.4 Empirical Model 
 
I test the importance of geography and human capital for knowledge spillovers by 
implementing an extended version of the Griliches-Jaffe regional knowledge production 
function at the district level in India.  
 
At the level of the firm, such a production function assumes that there exists a stable 
relationship between R&D investments by a firm and the production of economically 
useful knowledge. However, firm-level studies are unable to take into account the 
spillovers received by a firm from its geographical region and investments, which are 
made in one sector but can often spillover into other sectors, such that the total exceeds 
the sum of the individual components. The empirical link between knowledge inputs 
and innovative output becomes stronger with higher aggregation of the unit of 
observation, from the firm to the industry to the region.  
 
What constitutes the right level of aggregation? A number of authors have pointed out 
that the effect of knowledge spillovers remains relatively localised and begins to 
diminish with increasing distance (see Jaffe et al 1993, Varga 1998, Acs et al 2002 for 
the United States, and Autant-Bernard 2001, Fischer and Varga 2003 for Europe). 
Whilst it is possible that the marginal cost of transmitting information across geographic 
space has been rendered invariant by the telecommunications revolution, the marginal 
cost of transmitting knowledge, and especially tacit knowledge, rises with distance 
(Audretsch 1998). This argues for as small a geographical unit of analysis as possible. 
Previous studies have used ‘states’ (Jaffe, 1989; Smith, 1999) or Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (Anselin et al., 1997, 2000), or ‘districts’ (Keeble and Wilkinson 1999; 
Piergiovanni and Santarelli 2001) as their boundaries. Some studies approached 
comparison and analysis at the national level (UK Department of Trade and Industry 
2001), where ‘cluster’ refers to every technological concentration within the country 
(Ibrahim 2009).  
 
If I were to choose the state as the unit of observation, I would be able to expand my 
sources of data to patent applications made to the US and the European Patent Offices 
from applicants based in India. Krugman (1991) has emphasised that ‘states aren’t 
really the right geographical units’, and although he was referring to states within the 
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United States, it does not make much sense to compare states like Uttar Pradesh 
(population: 190 million, area: 243 thousand km2) with states such as Chandigarh 
(population: 900 thousand, area: 114 km2) and city states such as Delhi (population: 12 
million, area: 1,484 km2). Thus, a better, albeit still far from perfect, unit of observation 
in this case would be the district. This assumes that knowledge flows are bounded 
within a relatively narrow geographical range. 
 
In the typical regional production function approach, the innovative output of a region 
depends upon the level of R&D (measured either by employment or expenditures) 
within the region and in neighbouring regions. Agglomeration within a location is also 
theorised to be a catalyst to innovation, and I include economic geography variables to 
capture agglomeration at different levels. A vector of local economic characteristics that 
could contribute to the generation of new knowledge is also often included. These 
include the level of human capital, the presence of scientists and engineers, industrial 
diversity, the quality of technological infrastructure within the location etc. Following 
other empirical studies (Anselin et al 1997, Feldman and Audrestch 1999, Del Barrio-
Castro and Garcia-Quevedo 2005, and Ponds 2010), this paper will use a count data 
model within the knowledge production framework. 
 
Based on these specifications, the following model is estimated: 
 
(I) 
€ 
Pjkt = β0 + β1RDjkt + β2Access jt + β3σ jkt + β4HI jt + β5Edu jt + β6X jk +δk + γ t +ε jkt  
 
Where 
€ 
j  indexes the districts, 
€ 
k  indexes the IPC-industry classification and 
€ 
t  refers to 
the years of observation. 
€ 
RDjkt  refers to private research and development expenditures 
within the district, 
€ 
Access jt  refers to R&D expenditures in neighbouring districts, 
€ 
σ jkt  
is a measure of agglomeration by industrial sector and district, 
€ 
HI jt  is a measure of 
industrial diversity in the district, 
€ 
Edu jt  is a measure of human capital, 
€ 
X jt  refers to 
other district-level characteristics, 
€ 
δk  and 
€ 
γ t refer to industry and year fixed effects 
respectively, and 
€ 
ε  is a stochastic error term.  
 
The dependent variable is the count of new patent applications within a district, which 
varies by industry and year. As mentioned before, these patent counts are taken from 
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weekly journals of the Indian Patent Office. Only domestic applicants are included in 
the analysis, specifically when the address of the applicant is within the territory of 
India. The location of the patent refers to the location of the patent applicant, and not to 
the location of the firm – this is to avoid biases resulting from centralised patent 
applications from companies with multiple branches in different locations.  Patents are 
assigned to the address of the first inventor named on the patent. The total patent 
applications gleaned from weekly journals total 15,782 applications made in 190 
districts belonging to 35 states and union territories from 1999-2008. The choice of 
years of study is dictated by data limitations. Whilst annual patent application data 
exists for the period 1999-2008, I have data on district-level location variables for only 
a few years. Economic geography and infrastructure data is mostly taken from 
household-level surveys conducted by the NSSO. I use data from the Employment and 
Unemployment surveys: Round 55.10 (July 1999 – June 2000) and Round 61.10 (July 
2004 – June 2005). This effectively restricts the sample to two years: 1999 and 2004. 
The sources of data used to construct the predictor variables are summarised in Table 
4.1. 
 
Industrial R&D refers to firm-level expenditures on research activities. The data is 
reported in Indian Rupee Crores83. This data is taken from the Prowess database and is 
then aggregated across different districts in India. Prowess is a corporate database that 
contains normalised data built on a sound understanding of disclosures of over 18,000 
companies in India. The database provides financial statements, ratio analysis, fund 
flows, product profiles, returns and risks on the stock market etc. Unfortunately the data 
does not include information on R&D contracted to universities and to research 
institutions.  
 
The accessibility indicator is defined as the potential for opportunities for R&D 
expenditures in neighbouring regions to spill over to the location: 
€ 
Access j =
RDm
d j−mbm
∑  
 
                                                
83 1 Crore = 10 Million 
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Where, 
€ 
Access j  is the accessibility indicator estimated for district 
€ 
j , 
€ 
RDm  is the R&D 
expenditures in neighbouring districts m84, 
€ 
d jm  is a measure of distance between the 
district j and its neighbour m, and b describes how increasing distance reduces the 
expected level of interaction85. The exponent value is an indicator of how distance is a 
restrictive factor, and in the simple model, accessibility is estimated with the exponent 
value set to 1. The accessibility measure is constructed by allowing transport to occur 
along the orthodormic distance connecting any two districts. Instead of calculating the 
distance between any pair of districts across the country, I restrict the links to districts 
within a 500-kilometre radius.  
 
Localisation economies (
€ 
σ jk) can be measured by own industry employment in the 
region, own industry establishments in the region, or an index of concentration, which 
reflects disproportionately high concentration of the industry in the region in 
comparison to the nation. I measure localisation economies as the proportion of sector 
k’s employment in district j as a share of all of sector k’s total employment in the 
country. The higher this value, the higher the expectation of intra-industry concentration 
benefits in the district.  
€ 
σ jk =
Ek, j
Ek
 
 
Since the data provided by the IPO lists the IPC classification, which is mainly a 
technology-based categorisation, it was necessary to relate this to the Indian National 
Industrial Classification (NIC) system to enable the computation of industrial 
agglomeration. A broad overview of the matching is presented in Table 4.A.5.  
 
A higher level of industrial diversity may also translate into the presence of a wider 
selection of producer services essential to innovation, such as information technology, 
legal, marketing services etc. I use the Herfindal measure to examine the degree of 
economic diversity, as a measure of urbanisation in each district. The Herfindal index 
for district j (
€ 
HI j ) is the sum of squares of employment shares of all industries in 
district j: 
                                                
84 I am grateful to Eckhardt Bode for providing me with the syntax for computing the great-
circle (orthodormic) distance calculations.  
85 In the original model proposed by Hansen (1959), b is an exponent describing the effect of the 
travel time between the zones.  
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€ 
HI j =
E jk
E j
" 
# 
$ $ 
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Unlike measures of specialisation, which focus on one industry, the diversity index 
considers the industry mix of the entire regional economy. The largest value for 
€ 
HI j  is 
one when the entire regional economy is dominated by a single industry. Thus a higher 
value signifies lower level of economic diversity. 
 
It is especially important to control for local inputs into the R&D process. Skilled 
workers endowed with a high level of human capital are a mechanism by which 
economic knowledge is created and transmitted. I include the share of the population 
with a higher education (defined as a high school degree or more) as a proxy for the 
general quality of human capital. However, more specifically, I also include the 
proportion of the population that possess a degree in a scientific subject – defined as 
agricultural sciences, engineering, medicine etc. Skilled workers endowed with a high 
level of human capital are a mechanism through which knowledge externalities 
materialise, and I would expect these to have a positive effect on the generation of 
patents.  
 
Non-agricultural hourly wage rates are used as an indicator of labour input costs. The 
expected effect of this variable is hard to pin down theoretically. On the one hand, one 
would expect innovative activity to be inversely related to labour costs, since high costs 
within a location could drive down productivity. On the other hand, since I am unable, 
at this stage of the analysis, to differentiate wages on the basis of the skill set of 
workers, it is possible that there would be a positive effect since high wages are in effect 
accounting for the presence for highly skilled labour in the workforce.  
 
Other district-level characteristics include variables which proxy for quality of 
infrastructure, in particular access to electricity and telephones. Descriptive statistics of 
the variables used is provided in Table 4.A.2. Please note that all covariates in the 
empirical model are lagged by one period in order to mitigate potential endogeneity 
concerns.  
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Table 4.1: Predictor Variables 
        Availability 
  Variable Indicator Source(s) 
1999-
2000 
2004-
2005 
R&D R&D Private R&D expenditures Prowess √ √ 
Access Neighbouring R&D 
Orthodromic distance 
calculations 
√ √ 
HI Economic Diversity NSSO  √ √ 
Economic 
Geography 
 Localisation Economies NSSO √ √ 
Education 
Proportion of population with a High-
School education NSSO 
√ √ 
Technical 
Education 
Proportion of population with a 
technical diploma/degree NSSO  
√ √ Infrastructure 
 
Wages Non-agricultural hourly wages NSSO √ √ 
 Notes: IPO: Indian Patent Office; NSSO: National Sample Survey Organisation 
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4.5  Results and Discussion 
 
I illustrate the key characteristics of the data and the subsequent modelling choices, by 
using the data from 1999 as an example. One of the key characteristics of the data is 
that it is over-dispersed. In 1999, the mean number of patent applications per district is 
around 6.8, the standard deviation is over 75, i.e. over 10 times the mean (see Table 
4.A.3). A Poisson model implies that the expected count, or mean value, is equal to the 
variance. This is a strong assumption, and does not hold for my data. 
 
A frequent occurrence with count data is an excess of zeroes compared to what would 
be expected under a Poisson model. This is indeed a problem faced by this data – the 
mean number of non-zero patent counts is around 31 and the standard deviation is 161, 
i.e. around 5.2 times the mean. Also note that of 58886 districts, a total of 462 districts 
have zero patent applications. This implies that one would need to take into account, 
both, over-dispersion and the excess of zeroes in the data, when selecting a model to fit 
the data87.  
 
Another way to reiterate the unsuitability of the Poisson model in this case is to show 
that such a model is unable to predict the excess zeroes found in the data. In Table 
4.A.3, obs refers to actual observations in the data, and Fit_P, Fit_NB and Fit_ZIP refer 
to the predictions of the fitted Poisson, negative binomial and zero-inflated Poisson 
models respectively. It is clear that 78.57% of the locations in the sample have no patent 
applications, but the Poisson model predicts that only 47.97% would make zero patent 
applications. Clearly the Poisson model underestimates the probability of zero counts. 
The negative binomial model, which allows for greater variation in the count variable 
than that of a true Poisson, predicts that 75.9% of all districts will make no patent 
applications, much closer to the observed value.  
 
One way to account for the excess zeroes would be to assume that the data comes from 
two separate populations, one where the number of investments is always zero, and 
another where the count has a Poisson distribution. The distribution of the outcome is 
                                                
86 Although there are a total of 604 districts in India, I exclude all districts for which I do not 
have data for the regressors.   
87 I am unable to use a log-linear specification since it would result in a loss of all zero 
observations that constitute an important part of the data.  
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then modelled in terms of two parameters – the probability of always zero and the mean 
number of patent applications for those locations not in the always zero group. The 
zero-inflated Poisson model (fit_ZIP) predicts that 76.36% of all locations will not 
apply for patents, marginally better than the predictions of the negative binomial model.  
 
An alternative approach to deal with an excess of zeroes would be to use a two-stage 
process, with a logit model to distinguish between the zero and positive counts, and then 
a zero-truncated Poisson or negative binomial model for the positive counts. In the case 
of this paper this would imply using a logit model to differentiate between districts that 
make no patent applications and those that do, and then a truncated model for the 
number of districts that apply to at least one patent. These models are referred to as 
“hurdle models” – a binary probability model governs the binary outcome of whether a 
count variate has a zero or positive realisation; if the realisation is positive, the ‘hurdle’ 
is crossed and the conditional distribution of the positives is governed by a truncated-at-
zero count model data model (McDowell 2003)88.  
 
The response variable is ‘count’, i.e. the number of patent applications per district. The 
Poisson regression models the log of the expected count as a function of the predictor 
variables. More formally, 
€ 
β = log(µx+1) − log(µx ) , where 
€ 
β is the regression coefficient, 
€ 
µ  is the expected count and the subscripts represent where the regressor, say 
€ 
x , is 
evaluated at 
€ 
x  and 
€ 
x +1 (here implying a unit percentage change in the regressor89). 
Since the difference of two logs is equal to the log of their quotient, i.e. 
€ 
log(µx+1) − log(µx ) = log(
µx+1
µx
) , thus one could also interpret the parameter estimate as 
the log of the ratio of expected counts. In this case, the count refers to the ‘rate’ of 
patent applications per district. Table 4.2 provides the results using different types of 
count models. 
 
The coefficients can be interpreted as follows – if R&D expenditures were to increase 
by one unit (i.e. by INR 1 Crore), the expected number of patent applications would 
increase by 0.24 percent. On the other hand, if the Herfindahl Index were to increase by 
a unit (implying a reduction in industrial diversity), the expected count of patent 
                                                
88 I was unable to achieve convergence when using the zero-inflated and the zero-truncated 
negative binomial models, and these results are excluded from the paper. 
89 This is because the regressors are in logarithms of the original independent variables. 
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applications would decrease by 528 percent. A unit increase in the percent of the 
population with a technical degree and with a high-school degree is associated with an 
expected increase in patents of 25 and 10 percent respectively - see the coefficients for 
the Poisson model in Table 4.2).  
 
As the model selection criteria I also examine and compare the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). Since the models are used to 
fit the same data, the model with the smallest values of the information criteria is 
considered better. These regressions also control for industry and year, and so I rule out 
the possibility that these results are driven by changes specific to any one type of 
industry, or to any one of the two years in the pooled dataset.  
 
The first result to note is that the effect of R&D expenditures remains positive and 
significant, irrespective of the model used – see Table 4.2. The main economic 
geography variables are localisation and industrial diversity, while market access is a 
measure of the effect of neighbouring regions. Notably, the effect of the agglomeration 
measure – localisation – is positive and significant across most models. This implies 
that an increase in clustering of firms within a given industry is associated with a 
positive rise in innovative output in that industry. Recall that the Herfindahl Index (HI) 
is a measure of the level of industrial diversity within the district. A higher HI implies 
higher employment concentration by one industry and lower industrial diversity, and 
vice versa. Thus, the negative coefficient for HI is evidence of a positive association 
between more industrial diversity and more innovation.  
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Table 4.2: Model Comparisons  
Variable Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
Inflated 
Poisson 
Zero-
Inflated 
Negative 
Binomial 
Zero-
Truncated 
Poisson 
Zero-
Truncated 
Negative 
Binomial 
R&D 0.0024*** 0.0022** 0.0022*** 0.0033** 0.0022*** 0.0042* 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Access 0.3321* -0.1077 0.2921* 0.0726 0.2976* 0.1191 
 [0.191] [0.197] [0.176] [0.167] [0.177] [0.174] 
HI -5.2841** -3.6493*** -1.7552 -1.2203 -1.7516 -1.4180 
 [2.085] [1.002] [1.925] [1.938] [1.935] [2.004] 
Localisation 3.2190*** 3.6905*** 2.2987*** 3.4353 2.2927*** 2.8107 
 [0.884] [5.107] [0.816] [2.673] [0.814] [5.126] 
Education (technical) 0.2540*** 0.2257** 0.1861*** 0.0710 0.1861*** 0.0619 
 [0.045] [0.093] [0.042] [0.109] [0.042] [0.165] 
Education (high-school) 0.1058*** 0.2377*** 0.0550** 0.1426*** 0.0552** 0.1274*** 
 [0.027] [0.047] [0.026] [0.042] [0.026] [0.045] 
Wages -0.0030 -0.0047** -0.0008 -0.0028** -0.0008 -0.0038** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] 
Industry FEs √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year FEs √ √ √ √ √ √ 
# 16,375 16,375 16,375 16,375 2,745 2,745 
AIC 147296 27536 99722 25999 88974 15343 
BIC 147420 27667 99961 26246 89069 15444 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The effect of ‘Access’ is positive and significant, albeit only at the 10% level, in the 
case of the Poisson models. This positive effect could be seen as evidence of spilling 
over of expenditures in one region positively affecting innovation in others. As a 
measure of human capital within a location, I also include the percentage of the district 
population with a high-school degree or higher, and with a technical degree (i.e. a 
degree in agricultural sciences, engineering, medicine etc). Whilst the coefficient of the 
proportion with a high school education (or higher) is positive and significant across all 
models, that of technical education is positive and significant for most models with the 
exception of the zero-inflated and zero-truncated negative binomial. It is interesting that 
the magnitude of the effect of the percentage of the population with a technical degree, 
wherever statistically significant, outstrips the effect of that of a high-school degree.  
 
Wages are included as an indicator of labour costs within a district, and as discussed 
earlier the expected coefficient is difficult to predict since the data does not allow me to 
control for the skill set of the workers. On average, however, the results seem to 
indicate that higher wages are associated with a lower count of patent applications.   
 
Since research in this field has previously not been carried out for India, I limit myself 
to comparisons with studies for other countries. Autant-Bernard (2001), Bottazi and 
Peri (2003), Fischer and Varga (2003), Bode (2004) and Rodriguez-Pose and Creszensi 
(2008) find evidence of inter-regional spillovers, but find that these decay quickly over 
larger distances. It is possible that in this paper I am unable to measure spillovers at a 
scale lower than that of the district, and thus note only negative effects of R&D in 
neighbouring locations. However, Del Barrio-Castro and Garcia-Quevedo (2005) also 
fail to find any significant effect of R&D expenditures in neighbouring regions for 
Spain. Ponds et al (2010) find evidence of inter-regional spillovers, and of positive 
effects of human capital in the Netherlands. However, since their paper concentrates on 
university linkages, it is difficult to make one-to-one comparisons. Knudsen et al (2008) 
measure the effect of the presence of scientists and engineers for metropolitan areas in 
the US and are unable to find a statistically significant effect on patent activity. On the 
other hand, Carlino et al (2007) find a positive and significant effect of college-educated 
population on patents per capita in the US. For Italy, Paci and Usai (1999), find that 
localisation and industrial diversity have positive and significant effect on innovation. 
On the other hand, for the US, Feldman and Audretsch (1999) find that localisation has 
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a negative effect on innovation, while industrial diversity has a positive effect. 
However, Aces et al (2002) find that the localisation (labelled location quotient in their 
paper) has no effect on patent activity. A number of these and other papers also measure 
the effects of university research on a location’s patent activity and find evidence of 
positive effects – however, owing to lack of data I am unable to analyse the effects of 
university research in this paper.  
 
At this stage the paper does not claim causality – potentially a number of variables have 
been omitted and the comparisons are being made across districts and not within 
districts. Nevertheless, the associations provide some interesting results. The next 
section addresses some of these concerns and provides some robustness checks.    
 
 
4.6  Omitted Variables Bias and Robustness Checks 
 
Although all the regressors have been lagged, there could remain endogeneity concerns 
that would bias the coefficients. One potential source of bias could be the possibility of 
variables omitted from the model that could lead to biased estimates of 
€ 
β3 . For instance, 
there could be factors intrinsic to the natural geography of the region that could be 
driving these results. In other words, some underlying features of the natural geography, 
could be jointly influencing agglomeration and innovation within a location. The 
introduction of district fixed effects would effectively control for the effect of 
unobservable variables at the level of the district.  
 
Ideally, the introduction of district fixed-effects should be introduced at each point of 
the count models presented above, along with the industry and the year fixed effects. 
However, the introduction of district dummies does not allow the count models to 
converge in the specifications provided in Table 4.2. As explained by Silva and 
Tenreyro (2010), count models are less likely to converge in cases when the regressor is 
zero and the dependent variable is positive, otherwise being non-negative with at least 
one positive observation. Dummy variables often fit these characteristics, especially 
when the dummy equals zero for all observations with a positive dependent variable, 
and having positive value when the dependent variable equals zero. This is very much 
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the case in this dataset when district-level dummies are introduced into the 
specification.  
 
In a recent paper, Silva and Tenreyro (2011) define a new code within Stata to deal with 
this problem. The alternatives suggested, however, do not deal very effectively with the 
problem caused by the dummy variable. This is because their procedure would involve 
dropping some of the dummies, which would dimply an arbitrary redefinition of the 
reference category. This strategy, as pointed out by the authors themselves, is unlikely 
to be a sensible one. Another alternative might be to use generalised linear models that 
reweight the least squares algorithm to make it more stable90. This option does not solve 
the problems associated with the district-level dummy, as all the dummies are dropped 
from the procedure, effectively reducing the specification to one without any district 
fixed-effects.  
 
In the absence of other options to reach convergence within the count models with the 
introduction of district fixed effects, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. The 
OLS method ignores observations where the count of patents is zero, but on the flip side 
it is able to account for the unobservables at the level of the district and the direction 
and magnitude of the coefficients would help provide some level of confidence in the 
estimates. The results are presented in Table 4.3.  
 
The first three columns introduce the set of explanatory variables, column (4) includes 
industry fixed effects, column (5) includes industry and year fixed effects and column 
(6) includes industry, year and district fixed effects. The dependent variable is the log of 
the count of patent applications. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: a unit 
increase (i.e. 1 Crore) in R&D expenditures leads to a 0.09 percent increase in the count 
of patent applications, a unit increase in the Herfindahl Index (i.e. a fall in industrial 
diversity) leads to an 85 percent reduction in patent applications and a unit increase in 
the percentage of the population with a technical degree leads to a 1.9 percent increase 
in the count of patent applications (see column 6). The effect of R&D expenditures is 
relatively stable and statistically significant across different specifications, although the 
magnitude of the effect is not very large and drops somewhat with the introduction of 
                                                
90 The authors provide a new command ‘ppml’ in Stata to carry out this estimation. But this 
continues to (correctly) drop the district dummy.  
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district fixed-effects. A fall in industrial diversity also has a relatively large and 
consistently negative effect on patent applications, and the percentage of the population 
with a technical degree only positive effects patent applications significantly when 
district dummies are introduced. Note that the number of observations falls considerably 
compared to the count models, since the dependent variable only includes non-zero 
values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  198 
Table 4.3: Step-by-Step OLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
R&D 0.0037*** 0.0031*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0009** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Access  0.1419 0.1105 0.0936 0.1013 -0.0544 
  [0.140] [0.135] [0.148] [0.150] [0.045] 
HI  -2.3228*** -1.4809*** -1.5192*** -1.0679** -0.8555 
  [0.504] [0.530] [0.555] [0.526] [1.343] 
Localisation  3.5514* 3.2139* 4.0055** 3.7481** 0.8255 
  [2.106] [1.942] [1.894] [1.651] [0.524] 
Education (technical)   -0.0718 -0.0729 0.0280 -0.0195 
   [0.045] [0.049] [0.058] [0.032] 
Education (high-school)   0.0475** 0.0529** 0.0599*** 0.0098 
   [0.020] [0.022] [0.020] [0.017] 
Wages   0.0002 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0007 
   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Industry FEs ×  ×  ×  √  √  √  
Year FEs ×  ×  ×  ×  √  √  
District FEs ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  √  
# 2,766 2,745 2,745 2,745 2,745 2,745 
€ 
R2 0.339 0.398 0.416 0.460 0.493 0.778 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As a robustness check, I also differentiate between different types of applicants - from 
government-funded research organisations, private-funded research organisations, 
industry and individuals. For each cross-section, I disaggregate the data according to the 
type of applicant and re-run the OLS regressions to observe if the effects of the 
predictor variables vary across each group - see Table 4.A.4. The specifications include 
industry, year and district fixed effects.  
 
Recall that R&D represents only private R&D, and it is worth noting that it positively 
affects patents applications from firms and individuals, but has no statistically 
significant effect on private government-funded research91. Much more notably, the 
effect of the variable ‘Access’, i.e. R&D funding in neighbouring locations positively 
affects the innovative output of government-funded research agencies and firms. In 
other words, being situated close to a regions with higher R&D funding could lead to 
positive effects on the propensity to innovate for some types of patent applicants. The 
negative effect of the presence of more technical human capital on government-funded 
innovative output could be explained by the propensity of these agencies to locate in 
remote areas with low levels of technical human capital in the general population. As 
expected, however, technical human capital affects individual-level patenting positively, 
while the effect of high-school education has a positive effect on firms’ innovative 
output.  
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The main findings of the paper are that (1) private R&D expenditures have a positive 
effect on fuelling innovation, (2) that the spatial spillovers of these expenditures seem to 
be positive for firms and individuals, (3) industrial diversity has a positive effect on the 
count of new patent applications within a location, and that (4) the level of human 
capital, both technical and more general, seems to matter as well.  
 
                                                
91 Government-funded research includes both, research carried out within government 
departments and within government-funded research institutions.  
  200 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the geography of innovation in a 
number of ways. There is little research that has looked at emerging countries, and this 
is the first study of what drives innovative activity in India. Secondly, responding to the 
shortcomings of regions or states as the unit of observation, the spatial scale of the study 
goes down to the level of districts, which in a number of cases correspond to city-level 
boundaries in India. Indeed, data on patents has not been collected or used previously at 
the spatial scale of districts. And lastly, the study finds robust evidence to link the 
agglomeration of economic activity to innovative activity, after controlling for possible 
omitted variables bias.  
 
The study has a few limitations. The analysis of patent applications made to the US and 
the European Patent Offices are not included. The analysis is also based on patent data, 
which certify new inventions, and thus innovation citations are excluded. As a number 
of authors have warned (Griliches 1990, Mansfield 1984, Scherer 1983 – quoted in 
Feldman and Florida 1994) that the number of patents is not directly equivalent to a 
measure of innovative output as many patented inventions never become commercially 
viable products while many successful products are never patented. Nonetheless patents 
continue to be used as a useful measure of the generation of ideas. In addition the 
empirical analysis is based on cross-sectional data, albeit at two points in time. 
Although the time lags between the dependent and independent variables lower the risk 
of endogeneity, future studies using panel data are necessary to come to more decisive 
conclusions. 
 
The findings of this study could have important implications for policy. Firstly, the 
effect of private, firm-level R&D has a positive effect on not just industry-level 
innovation, but also spills over into patenting activity carried out by private individuals. 
While the effect of government R&D has not been studied in this paper, it would be 
interesting to see to what extent the public sector could further spur innovation. 
Secondly, education matters. This may be self-evident, but it is worth reiterating. A 
better-educated labour force increases the ability of a region to innovate, and investing 
in education would be an efficient means to spur on lagging regions. Lastly, the results 
indicate that agglomeration economies continue to have a significant effect on 
innovative activity – this result holds within the panel estimates and is robust to the type 
of innovator being examined. While government policy can have a direct effect on 
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improving education and research infrastructure, its capacity to generate agglomeration 
economies remains unclear.  
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Tables 
Table 4.A.1: Summary of Empirical Literature 
Study Country Sample Unit of Observation 
Jaffe (1986) 
USA 
432 firms; 1973, 1979 
Firm  
Jaffe et al (1993) USA 950 and 1,450 patents; 1975, 
1980 State 
Feldman and Florida (1994) USA 4,200 innovations; 1982 State 
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) USA 8,074 innovations, 1982 State 
Anselin et al (1997) USA 4,200 innovations; 1982 MSA 
Feldman and Audretsch (1999) USA 3,696 innovations; 1982 MSA 
Paci and Usai (1999) Italy 1978-1995 Local Labour System 
Anselin et al (2000) USA 1982 MSA 
Piergiovanni and Santarelli (2001) France 20,700 patents; 1991-1992 State 
Autant-Bernard (2001) France 1994-1996 Department 
Acs et al (2002) USA 4,476 patents; 1982 MSA 
Bottazzi and Peri (2003) Europe 3,010 patents; 1977-1995 NUTS 1/NUTS 2 
Fischer and Varga (2003) Austria 1993 District 
Bode (2004) Germany 27,361 patents; 1998 NUTS 3 
Co (2005) New England, USA 1975-1999 MSA 
Del Barrio-Castro and Garcia-
Quevedo (2005) 
Spain 1996-2000 
NUTS 2 
Barkley et al (2006) Southern counties, 
USA 
125,589 patents; 1990-1999 
MSA 
Carlino et al (2007) USA 581,000 patents; 1990-1999 MSA 
Girma et al (2007) China 239,085 firms; 1999-2005 Firm 
Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007) Germany 31,434 patents; 1995-2000 NUTS 3 
Knudsen et al (2008) USA 1999 MSA 
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Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008) Europe 1995-2003 NUTS 1/NUTS 2 
Ibrahim et al (2009) USA 5,353 patents; 2000-2003 Telecom clusters 
Kantor and Whalley (2009) USA 1981-1996 County 
Kerr (2009) USA 1975-1984 City 
Menon (2009) 
USA 1,161,650 patents; 1975-
1999 MSA 
Ponds et al (2010) 
The Netherlands 3,332 patents; 1999-2001 
NUTS 3 
Notes: MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area; NUTS: European Nomenclature for Territorial Units for Statistics 
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Table 4.A.2: Some Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
# 
 
Mean 
  
Expected 
sign 1999-2000 2004-2005 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Patents   587 579 6.77 10.80 
R&D  + 589 579 3.7064 10.0654 
Access + 583 575 870246 868285 
Localisation + 485 575 0.0043 0.0036 
Herfindahl Index - 589 579 0.3377 0.4185 
Education (High-School)  + 489 579 0.0566 0.0742 
Technical Education  + 487 577 0.0024 0.0112 
Wages -/+ 486 575 93.9052 101.0757 
Notes: # refers to the number of districts for which data is available. There are a total of 604 districts in the country.  
 
 
Table 4.A.3: Characteristics of the Data (1999) 
Variable # Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
count 587 6.77 75.22 0 1353 
count>0 126 31.61 160.55 1 1353 
obs 588 0.7857 0.41 0 1 
Fit_P 48592 0.4797 0.29 0 0.94 
Fit_NB 485 0.7590 0.15 0.06 0.97 
Fit_ZIP 485 0.7636 0.20 0.00 0.98 
 
 
 
                                                
92 The number of observations are lesser than the number of cases in the dataset owing to missing values for some variables in the model.  
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Table 4.A.4: Robustness Checks  
Variable 
Government-
funded 
Private-
funded Firms Individuals 
R&D 0.0019 0.0002 0.0006** 0.0005* 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Access 1.4871*** 0.2132 0.5283*** 0.2461 
 [0.409] [0.198] [0.183] [0.198] 
HI -4.5803* 1.3518 0.3008 -0.7141 
 [2.408] [2.753] [2.437] [1.625] 
Localisation 0.2765 0.8199 0.6344 1.3367 
 [1.779] [1.614] [2.524] [0.989] 
Education (technical) -0.1540 0.0615 0.0284 0.0938* 
 [0.090] [0.039] [0.042] [0.052] 
Education (high-school) 0.0241 0.0166 0.0731** 0.0661 
 [0.037] [0.026] [0.030] [0.069] 
Wages -0.0107* 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0091 
 [0.006] [0.003] [0.001] [0.006] 
Industry Fixed Effects √  √  √  √  
Year Fixed Effects √  √  √  √  
District Fixed Effects √  √  √  √  
# 547 430 1,018 423 
€ 
R2 0.840 0.587 0.805 0.727 
Robust standard errors clustered at district level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.A.5: IPC and NIC Matching 
IPC IPC definition NIC NIC Definition 
1 Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 
5 
Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; 
service activities incidental to fishing 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
18 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing N.E.C. 
A 
Human 
Necessities 85 Health and social work 
20 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
22 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
34 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
37 Recycling 
50 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 
61 Water transport 
62 Air transport 
B 
Performing 
operations and 
transporting 
63 Supporting and auxilliary transport activities; 
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activities of travel agencies   
64 Post and communications 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of 
luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
23 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
C 
Chemistry and 
Metallurgy 27 Manufacture of basic metals 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
D 
Textiles and 
Paper 21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
11 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; 
service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction 
excluding surveying 
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
13 Mining of metal ores 
14 Other mining and quarrying 
41 Collection, purification and distribution of water 
45 Construction 
E 
Fixed 
Constructions 90 
Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 
activities 
28 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipments 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C. 
F 
Mechanical 
Engineering 31 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
N.E.C. 
G Physics 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
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machinery 
32 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
33 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
65 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and 
pension funding 
72 Computer and related activities 
H Electricity 40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
Notes: IPC: International Patent Classification 
           NIC: National Industrial Classification 
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Figures 
 
Figure 4.A.1: Patent Applications to the IPO (1995-2008) 
 
Source: IPO Annual Reports 
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Figure 4.A.2: Patent applications by sector (2004) 
 
 
 
Source: IPO Annual Report (2004-2005) 
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Figure 4.A.3: Spatial distribution of patents 
 
Total       Controlling for district size 
 
 
Source: FAO and IPO
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